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SUMMARY 
 
Governments throughout the world are confronted with new challenges, in 
particular having to reconcile economic growth, sustainability and social 
inclusion. Tackling these issues requires new forms of collaboration between 
public and private actors. As such, how can public–private partnerships be 
effective?  
 
This research addresses the emergence of the state’s active role as a risk-taker 
and co-investor in technological innovation. The analysis undertaken considers 
policy issues that arise from public–private partnerships, by focusing on how 
public actors may directly appropriate financial rewards. From a perspective that 
views innovation policy as creating markets, experimentation is crucial for 
shaping equitable partnerships and strengthening the entrepreneurial role of the 
state. Furthermore, purposeful state action can influence the institutional 
frameworks within which these partnerships unfold, and favour the realisation of 
socially desirable policy goals. The interplay between the two – experimentation 
with partnerships and changes in the institutional environment – is investigated 
in three papers that are presented as chapters within the thesis.  
 
In Chapter 1 a framework for studying public–private partnerships for investments 
in innovation is developed. By highlighting the legal dimension of the role of the 
state in institutional change, the framework includes essential tools that public 
actors could use for negotiating more equitable reward distribution with business. 
In chapters 2 and 3 concrete attempts to build investment partnerships in Brazil 
are examined, focusing on the recent revival of active and explicit industrial 
policies in the country. Chapter 2 is a comparative analysis of two R&D 
programmes, oriented towards biofuels and health, which leads to an appraisal 
of their preliminary outcomes, viewed through the risk–reward nexus lens. 
Chapter 3 comprises an in-depth case study in the qualities (attributes and 
functions) of the contracts that enable public actors to appropriate financial 
rewards of high-risk investments.  
 
Viewed as a whole, these three chapters contribute to the understanding of the 
legitimation processes that underlie the role of the state as an investor, by offering 
a nuanced appreciation of the limits, tensions, possibilities and tools for building 
effective public–private partnerships. The theoretical and practical insights from 
this thesis should benefit the design, implementation and assessment of 
innovation policies geared to tackling contemporary challenges in Brazil and 
elsewhere. 
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Preface 
This work had rather ambitious origins. I wanted to organise and integrate the 
scattered and seemingly chaotic knowledge acquired in the fields in which I have 
previously graduated, conducted research or acted professionally.  
I studied law but felt uneasy with what seemed to me a disconnection between 
the legal formalism on the one hand, and the concrete problems for which the law 
sought a solution on the other. I approached this issue by trying to diversify my 
interests and to explore the interface between the law and other disciplines within 
the social sciences. In particular, I turned to applied research into the economic 
and policy implications of intellectual property rights and competition law, and the 
relationship between the two. At the same time, I started working on capacity 
building and training courses for civil servants who held a wide range of positions 
in the State Government of São Paulo (Brazil) – an experience that provided me 
with a more grounded perspective on policy processes. It was only a few years 
later, when I joined the Innovation and New Technologies Unit at the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean and could 
combine research, engagement and technical assistance activities, that I realised 
that STI policy could be an interesting field within which to integrate knowledge 
and practice from different backgrounds.  
The desire to establish myself in this field motivated me to seek further education. 
Despite many doubts about where to go, a mix of pragmatism, personal interests 
and good luck led me initially to complete an interdisciplinary master’s degree in 
Law, Science and Technology at Stanford Law School (United States). This 
course, with its emphasis on intellectual property issues, gave me a glimpse into 
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a rich body of work, but I was limited in what I could achieve in one year; I 
therefore looked for an opportunity to pursue a PhD in STI policy studies. By then, 
consultations with academics, and my contact with Professor Mariana 
Mazzucato, with whose research approach I had an affinity, convinced me that 
the Science Policy Research Unit at the University of Sussex (England) was just 
the right environment within which to pursue studies that would be aimed at 
problem-solving.  
At first, I envisaged I would explore issues around the appropriation of the 
financial results of publicly funded research and development by focusing on 
models through which public sponsoring institutions manage intellectual property. 
This would have allowed me to draw upon my earlier training and practical 
experience. However, one of my supervisors, Professor Mazzucato, challenged 
me to think about the appropriation of the rewards of public investment in 
innovation from a much broader perspective. Among other aspects, this exercise 
highlighted the existence of a wide range of financing and legal instruments that 
could enable public organisations to both recoup a share of financial resources 
and shape an institutional environment more favourable to innovation. I decided 
to take on the challenge, and I now thank Professor Mazzucato for guiding me 
down such a thought-provoking path.  
That said, I also have to acknowledge the numerous difficulties encountered 
along the way. My change in direction forced me to explore a topic about which 
there was scant theoretical and empirical work to which I could resort for 
guidance. Some of the first problems I encountered lay at the theoretical level. 
How would I develop a consistent approach to dealing with an eminently practical, 
complex and wide-ranging issue? Also, how would I integrate the contributions of 
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different kinds of literature, disciplines and traditions? From the outset, I sensed 
that the positive role that the state could play in legal and institutional design had 
not been paid enough attention; rather, it was implied under generic terms such 
as ‘embeddedness’ and ‘regulation’, or boiled down to ‘institutional bypass’. 
Although these expressions do describe relevant aspects of reality, they seemed 
to fall short of explaining the circumstances in which legal and institutional forms 
were purposefully engineered with a view to achieving chosen policy objectives. 
At the same time, I was uncertain how I would reconcile the idea of developing 
an approach that was interdisciplinary while simultaneously trying to clarify what 
is ‘legal’, thus implying the approach would be within the realm of the law as a 
discipline. Such boundaries are not evident; they are only construed. Even so, I 
recognised that each of the disciplines of law and economics offered instruments 
that would be useful in my goal of understanding and analysing property rights 
and contractual relationships. I explore these dilemmas in the three papers 
comprising the main body of this thesis, and in drawing upon them as a whole I 
have sought to develop an argument that has balance, depth and breadth.  
Despite these challenges, my examination of a wide range of literature, and 
approaches towards changing how we think about concrete problems that are 
confronted by innovation policy practitioners, has led me to develop tools that 
have proved useful for empirical analysis and offered insights into the quality of 
public–private partnerships.  
As a reflection on my initial aspirations, having now done this piece of work, the 
only certainty left is that although I have learned a great deal, I have taken but 
one step down a long road.  
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Introduction 
This thesis is the outcome of research undertaken on the emergence of an active 
role of the state as a risk-taker and co-investor in technological innovation. The 
focus of my analysis has been on policy initiatives aimed at building public–
private partnerships that maintain a nexus between the risks taken and potential 
rewards appropriated by each actor. The risk–reward nexus is a common notion 
in finance: the higher the risks of an investment, the higher the reward potential. 
It is therefore expected that in an investment partnership, the parties will share 
both the risks of losses and the financial gains of any successful initiative. 
By ‘rewards’ appropriated by public investors I mean rewards that arise through 
direct instruments like royalties, equity stakes, pricing caps, or other 
conditionalities and, hence, beyond those that come from economic growth and 
increased tax revenue. While some public funding organisations have 
experimented with direct instruments – remarkably, development banks in Brazil, 
China and Germany, but also the Israeli government-launched initiative (Yozma) 
and the Finnish innovation fund (SITRA), among others – it is clear that some 
attempts have been more successful than others. In this thesis I delve into the 
stories behind how some of the successes in building equitable public–private 
partnerships came about.  
In a context dominated by the notion that businesses lead innovation and the 
state only fixes ‘market failures’, the idea of a risk–reward nexus as part of public 
investment is hardly questioned. From this standpoint, the relevant analytical 
problem is often posed as one of striking an optimal balance between private 
incentives, i.e. private profitability, and social returns, i.e. the benefits that accrue 
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to society (Nelson 1959; Arrow 1962). Although investments in innovation have 
no guaranteed return, the social benefits in the equation can be embodied in 
cheaper and better goods available to consumers, new knowledge, positive 
externalities, job creation and ultimately economic growth. Besides, such 
increased economic activity may enable the state to re-appropriate financial gains 
through tax collection from which, in turn, society will again benefit if such funds 
are used to supply public goods and services, infrastructure and other factors 
useful to society.  
The emphasis on the quantity of public (and private) investments needed to fulfil 
the potential for an optimal rate of social return, although being important, 
overshadows the fact that the risk–reward nexus here is only indirect. This has 
prompted Mazzucato (2013) to pose the question “can an innovation system 
based on government support be sustainable without a system of rewards?” (p. 
166) and to propose tools that could be used to explore it. In my research I have 
aimed to extend her work by applying these tools to an in-depth analysis of three 
case studies. 
Another fact that has warranted investigation is that, in addition to having pace, 
innovation can have more or less inclusive trajectories as regards the 
appropriation of any incomes and benefits generated. The quality of finance and 
the partnerships that mobilise the finance are key factors that influence these 
paths.  
Given that governments throughout the world are now confronted with major 
challenges such as income inequality and climate change, some may argue that 
the state should play a proactive role in solving them, in particular using mission-
18 
 
oriented policies (Mazzucato 2018). ‘Mission-oriented’ is the term used to 
describe innovation policies with a broad-based and problem-solving approach, 
which were implicit in the behaviour of government agencies that had backed 
important disruptive innovations in the past (Ergas 1986; Foray et al. 2012). While 
many examples originate from military agencies, such as the internet, cell 
phones, and satellites, health is another area in which a mission-oriented 
approach has developed (Sampat 2012). For the purpose of this thesis, it is worth 
noting that mission-oriented policies can be regarded as an example of a more 
general policy approach characterised by the pursuit of creating new markets in 
different directions from those that already exist (Kattel et al. 2018). This type of 
policy is based on a view of the innovation process as a systemic, rather than 
linear, phenomenon, and thus involves mobilising actors and resources towards 
not just basic science but also scaling up and commercialisation throughout the 
early stages of development. To the extent that public funding moves 
downstream to the point that the uncertainties gradually give way to risks,1 there 
have been calls for public actors to pursue a ‘portfolio’ approach.  
In the same way in which large firms diversify their expenditures in research and 
development (R&D) because they recognise that most of them will fail, public 
investors would target pre-set problems, seek desirable outcomes and spread 
risks through different types of R&D collaboration that would be designed to 
maximise the chances of good outcomes. If such a portfolio were also designed 
to allow public actors to appropriate any financial gains in case of success, and 
these gains were used to replenish public funds and for further investment that 
                                               
1 In this thesis, I rely on Knight’s distinction between uncertainty and risk: risk is a probabilistic 
distribution of success or failure, which differs from genuinely uncertain outcomes, where the 
odds cannot be estimated (Knight 1921). 
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had a clear public purpose, then hopes for innovation-led and inclusive growth 
could be realised (Block 2008; Mazzucato 2013; Rodrik 2015). Such an approach 
implies a direct nexus between risks and rewards (Lazonick & Mazzucato 2013).  
Inevitably the dangers of such a course of action do invite caution: public actors 
may lack implementation know-how; financial appropriation by public actors may 
attract corruption or disproportionally raise transaction costs and, ultimately, 
discourage private investment (Windus & Schiffel 1976; Korn & Heinig 2004). In 
a context in which policymakers are facing increasing pressure to demonstrate 
performance, all those issues deserve attention and require adequate measures. 
But the fact is that efforts to build public–private partnerships that are focused on 
creating new markets and solving concrete economic, environmental and social 
problems are already being made; some of these initiatives have been quite 
successful in enabling public actors to share in any earnings through the direct 
instruments already mentioned.  
Because these partnerships materialise in contracts which in turn are an integral 
part of a broader institutional environment that is largely (but not only) legal, 
broadening our understanding of how these successes developed in the legal–
institutional arena is vital for guiding policy practice. This has motivated my 
research into the risk–reward nexus. In the three papers that are presented as 
chapters within this thesis I explore the following overarching question: How can 
public–private partnerships be effectively implemented and scaled up to address 
contemporary societal challenges?  
In the first chapter, co-authored with Professor Mazzucato, we have asked how 
both the risks of innovation and the rewards can be shared between public and 
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private actors. The discussion and critique of different theoretical approaches 
have led us to develop a framework that highlights the legal underpinning of the 
role of the state as an investor. We have also proposed essential tools that public 
actors can use for structuring financial relationships so as to favour a more direct 
risk–reward nexus. In the second and third chapters I have examined concrete 
attempts to implement public–private partnerships, in the context of an emerging 
economy, where the institutional frameworks for innovation are under 
construction. In one I have undertaken a comparative analysis of two R&D 
programmes oriented towards biofuels and health. I have also conducted an 
appraisal of the preliminary outcomes of these programmes through the lens of 
the risk–reward nexus. In the other chapter I have explored the qualities 
(attributes and functions) of the contracts that have enabled public actors to 
appropriate a direct share of financial rewards in a partnership that was geared 
towards promoting advanced solar panels. 
In what follows, I summarise the issues addressed in the three chapters and draw 
attention to their main contributions to my thesis. 
Socialising the risks and rewards of public investments: 
Economic, policy and legal issues 
 
Concern over contemporary societal challenges has brought renewed interest 
into the debate about the role of the state in the economy. From a majority view 
that primarily sees policymaking as limited to correcting market failures arises the 
need to think about new forms of collaboration between actors in the public and 
private sectors.  
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From a ‘market-failure’ perspective, innovation happens within firms, and the 
private sector hosts the leading entrepreneurs, given that sector’s superiority in 
organising the production and owning the necessary capital assets. Private 
entrepreneurs capture value as profits understood as the “rewards for risk-taking” 
(Samuelson 1997). In contrast, the state plays a secondary role. It only steps in 
when the idealised market conditions fail, such as in the presence of public goods 
(e.g. basic research), externalities (e.g. pollution) or asymmetric information 
(small and medium enterprises – SMEs).  
Within this framework, there is little reason for the public sector to worry about 
the rewards of public investment. So long as public actors stick to a ‘fixing’ role, 
and the costs of a government’s own failures do not outweigh those of the market 
(Buchanan 2003), social returns will appear naturally. The assumption is that 
government funding is rewarded, albeit indirectly, through the natural 
mechanisms of economic growth, which produces consumer surplus (new, 
cheaper and better goods), public goods (e.g. new knowledge), spillovers 
(diffusion), new jobs and, ultimately, increased tax revenues. The tax system is 
understood as the main route by which the state may recoup any amounts 
invested and deploy its distributive function.  
Whenever the state chooses to go beyond the above instruments of appropriation 
of social returns – either by changing the baseline within which they operate or 
by trying to retrieve revenues through alternatives sources to the tax system – it 
faces high criticism. To understand this, one must grasp the rules underpinning 
market interactions and the underlying written or implicit contracts on which 
actors must agree. Contracts “create obligations, allocate risks, and assign 
ownership rights which relate to the terms and conditions to use an asset, change 
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its form or substance, and to appropriate the returns arising from it” (Hall 1994, 
p. 207). From the market-failure perspective, however, the rules under which 
actors operate are quickly taken for granted (Jensen & Meckling 1976; 
Williamson 1988a) or seen as constraining their behaviour (North 1990), whereas 
contracts appear as functional to mitigating the costs of the markets. 
The premise that social returns are naturally achieved through economic growth 
can be questioned not by seeing the problems as aberrations, but rather as direct 
implications of the limited theoretical framework regarding the role of the state in 
the economy. Indeed, in her book The Entrepreneurial State, Mazzucato (2013) 
has aimed at debunking the myths behind the dichotomy between the public and 
private sectors, by uncovering a far more active, dynamic and close engagement 
of public actors in financing business innovation. The contrast between this 
hidden reality and the abstract conceptualisation of the role of the state as a 
‘fixer’, ‘de-risker’ or ‘facilitator’ (which stems from neoclassical economics) has 
triggered efforts to develop an alternative framework for policy.  
Drawing on studies on mission-oriented R&D, evolutionary theory, the 
developmental state and the entrepreneurial state, Mazzucato (2016) has 
contemplated that in circumstances in which the state plays an active role, 
innovation policies co-create and shape markets, besides fixing them. 
Accordingly, the kinds of markets that emerge can, and should, be the result of 
conscious actions by policymakers.  
In an earlier study, Lazonick and Mazzucato (2013) explained how the neglect of 
the collective nature of the innovation process, in which the state takes a vital 
part, has led to a dysfunctional risk–reward nexus. While the risks of investments 
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are socialised, the rewards are privatised, which contributes to income inequality. 
On the one hand, in the light of increased deregulation and financialisation, 
private actors have accumulated powers to successfully lobby for measures that 
have enabled them to appropriate, in different ways, more value than their 
contributions could have generated on their own. On the other hand, by widening 
the market frontiers, the institutional reforms of the 1980s and 1990s have also 
weakened states’ ability to resist.  
The focus on the source of the risk–reward breakdown, although essential as a 
basis for the formulation of policy responses, does not allow us to deepen our 
understanding of how efforts in the opposite direction – i.e. to socialise both the 
risks and rewards of innovation – may develop and eventually lead to success. 
Despite that, the (tacit) recognition that power relations shaping financial 
appropriation also express themselves in the legal domain leads to an interesting 
path that deserves exploration. That path is followed in this thesis. 
In the first paper (Chapter 1), the question is posed: How can both the risks of 
innovation and the rewards be shared between public and private actors? The 
issue has been addressed from a theoretical point of view. The review of the 
different theoretical approaches, their discussion and critique, have led to the 
formulation of a framework that highlights the legal dimension as a crucial aspect 
of the analysis of the possibilities for developing effective and equitable public–
private partnerships. Building on the market co-creation and shaping framework 
for policy (Mazzucato 2016), the state emerges as active in this process. At the 
same time, attention to the legal dimension has allowed us to study how, even in 
the context of real constraints, the state may be able to fulfil its role of promoting 
innovation where private actors lack the motivation or tools to do so.  
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From the angle of legal institutionalism (Deakin et al. 2017) – from which we 
derive a view of the law as both a concept and an instrument – building a risk–
reward nexus in public–private partnerships appears as a rather experimental 
process. It may very well be that the actors involved do not know what to do from 
the outset, nor how. And yet by exploration, trial and error, public actors can learn 
and accumulate the powers needed to negotiate better deals with supported 
businesses. Without a doubt, the possibility of experimentation also depends on 
the framework conditions under which the partnerships take place. Nevertheless, 
these also can be subject to changes and steered towards socially desirable 
policy goals. Thus, in this regard, our position on how the state shapes the context 
and outcomes of innovation policy has converged with evolutionary theory 
(Nelson & Winter 1982) and Rodrik’s view on policymaking as a discovery 
process (Rodrik 2014).  
By broadening the view on the role of the state as a contract-maker and enabler 
of institutional change, the chapter contributes to expanding those studies on 
innovation policies that rely on public–private investment partnerships. It also 
promotes the understanding of how public actors might seek to appropriate a 
share of any rewards of supported innovations, beyond those that come from 
economic growth and increased tax revenue, for the sake of adding effectiveness 
and legitimacy to their investments. Furthermore, in the chapter we have 
highlighted the variety within two sets of legal instruments – profit-sharing and 
conditionalities – that could assist policymakers in the design, implementation 
and assessment of a portfolio approach to public investments oriented towards 
tackling societal challenges. 
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The market co-creating and shaping role of the state: Insights from 
the Brazilian experience 
  
In recent years, there has been growing academic interest in examining actual 
experiences of implementation of mission-oriented policy initiatives. The special 
issue of Research Policy edited by Foray et al. (2012), explicitly concerned with 
the need to develop new policy instruments, brought contributions from areas as 
diverse as health (Sampat 2012), renewable energy (Anadón 2012), agriculture 
(Wright 2012) and defence (Mowery 2012). In general, the few studies that 
proceed to comparative analysis refer to variations in the goals pursued, 
governance mechanisms and institutional structures as responsible for 
differences in the implementation of public–private partnerships (Foray et al. 
2012). However, they do not question the quality of the risk–reward nexus, 
especially regarding the appropriation of potential financial rewards by public 
actors. As a result, despite an increase in case studies, that concept has yet to 
be operationalised. 
In the second paper of the thesis (Chapter 2) I have sought to address this gap 
via two routes: (i) an analysis of the implementation of public–private investment 
partnerships in real R&D programmes, and (ii) an assessment of their preliminary 
outcomes in the light of the concept of the risk–reward nexus.  
With the focus being on one country, it is implicit that the case study is based on 
the idea that although globalisation has homogenising and pervasive features in 
several respects, fundamental national differences persist in the forms of 
organising and governing state–market relations. Indeed, as the literature on 
varieties of capitalism suggests (Hall & Soskice 2001), wealthy countries in the 
West can be roughly characterised as liberal markets (such as the USA and the 
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UK) or coordinated economies (for instance Germany). Nevertheless, elsewhere 
in emerging and developing economies, it is often the state that takes on the role 
of driving economic activity (among others, Brazil, China, India and Indonesia), 
which some have regarded as a state-led type of capitalism (Bremmer 2009). It 
is plausible to assume that variations in such structural features carry 
consequences for the challenges and opportunities for experiments in the field of 
innovation policies. Empirical studies of the incipient steps towards undertaking 
mission-oriented initiatives in emerging and developing countries – where, as 
mentioned above, the state explicitly embraces such an active role – although 
scant, are of particular interest, as these offer opportunities to look more clearly 
at the economic, political and institutional dynamics. 
In this regard, Brazil is a thought-provoking illustration. The import substitution 
model that led to the industrialisation of the country in the 1970s also imposed 
significant constraints on domestic capacities to promote technical change. 
Consequently, a pattern of foreign-owned enterprises and innovations of low level 
of knowledge intensity – and, thus, involving investments of low or no risk – came 
to prevail. With the structural reforms and opening of the market in the 1990s, it 
was expected that companies would change their behaviour and become more 
entrepreneurial (World Bank 1991). However, that did not happen. Private 
investments in R&D declined, and the pre-existing pattern was reinforced. The 
2000s mark the rise of active policy measures adopted by the federal 
government, under the idea that the state needs to become an investor and risk-
taker so that companies can follow a similar path. This, in turn, required significant 
efforts in institutional building and legal design. There were attempts to create 
risk-sharing financing instruments, and parameters for their implementation, as 
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well as establishing instruments that enabled public actors to share in any 
rewards achieved because successes were known to be occasional. In short, 
Brazil illustrates the gradual change from neither the private nor the public sector 
accepting the risks of innovation, to the rise of partnerships between the two (that 
do accept the risks), upon the initiative of the state.  
The chance to undertake an in-depth study of this process opened up possibilities 
for me to gain theoretical and practical insights into how mission-oriented 
innovation policies could develop and spread. The lessons from the Brazilian 
experience may be useful, in the first place, for those countries where the state 
explicitly aims to embrace such a strategic stand.  
A comprehensive comparative case study was therefore the main analytical tool 
adopted, and two R&D programmes were examined: (i) the BNDES–FINEP Joint 
Programme for Supporting Industrial Technological Innovation in the Sugar-
based Economy and Sugar-Chemicals Sectors (PAISS); and (ii) the Ministry of 
Health’s Production Development Partnerships Programme (PDPP). Interviews 
with science, technology and innovation (STI) policymakers revealed that these 
programmes were considered path-breaking in introducing features of mission-
driven policies in the country, as well as positive experiences in building public–
private partnerships (Mazzucato & Penna 2016a). In addition, these programmes 
cover areas of high societal benefit potential, including biofuels and health. For 
these reasons, the programmes were particularly apt for exploring the risk–
reward nexus, and the interplay between experimentation with partnerships on 
the one hand, and changes in the legal and institutional frameworks on the other. 
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The theoretical approach presented in the first chapter enabled me to develop 
principles which I could then apply to an empirical investigation of the risk–reward 
nexus. It gave rise to five categories of analysis, which in turn I have translated 
into the following guiding questions: (i) What are the programmes’ motivations 
and aims? (ii) Who takes the lead, the private or public sector? (ii) What legal and 
institutional changes enable implementation? (iii) How do federal funding 
agencies seek to increase and manage the risks taken? (iv) How is an equitable 
sharing of rewards pursued?  
The primary data source for study was a set of interviews (51) with a wide range 
of subjects from the public and private sectors; all interviewees had been involved 
in projects or situations relevant to the study, and some held leadership positions. 
The interviews enabled me to understand certain nuances in the policy process 
and to capture perceptions about the creation of policy instruments that allow for 
a direct risk–reward nexus. They revealed, for example, that at this point, 
Brazilian policymakers were more concerned with enabling the state to take risks 
than with ensuring it could appropriate a financial reward in the event of success.  
Furthermore, the results provided empirical support to our initial framework. In 
particular, the data indicated that public funding actors have: (i) seized mapped 
opportunities in areas of high social benefit; (ii) taken the leadership; (iii) engaged 
in risk-sharing and institutional building; (iv) pursued risk diversification and 
competition to mitigate the risks; and (v) sought an equitable sharing of rewards, 
through profit-sharing instruments (both programmes resorted to equity stakes in 
supported companies and new financing instruments) and conditionalities (only 
in the programme oriented towards the health sector). In contrast, the 
assessment exercise regarding the risk–reward nexus, based on the preliminary 
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results of the programmes, showed that while public risk-taking had played a 
catalytic function, there were limitations in the investment partnerships and in the 
instruments adopted for sharing the rewards.  
My analysis of these experiences in Brazil has enabled me to develop insights 
into an understudied, but essential, aspect of the implementation of innovation 
policies in which the state takes on an active role: the risk–reward nexus. 
Furthermore, as well as corroborating prior theoretical studies, my analysis has 
also indicated where further research is needed in order to appreciate better 
those local versus global dynamics that also affect risk–reward distributions. 
Public risks rewarded: Lessons from contract design in public 
investments in innovation 
 
Public–private investment partnerships materialise in contracts that allocate risks 
and assign rights to the appropriation of any arising rewards. These contracts 
also provide structure to, and guide, social and economic behaviour, and yet they 
are rarely the subject of empirical analysis in innovation policy studies. 
Nonetheless, it is reasonable to assume that actors in the public sector who invest 
in innovation accumulate experiences in contract-making that will contain useful 
lessons for others involved in promoting innovation, but if not studied, these 
experiences will be lost. In the third and final paper of this thesis (Chapter 3) I 
have attempted to take a step towards filling this void. 
With this aim in mind, my starting point was a review of the literature on contracts 
and insights developed in the first chapter, in which I have focused on the 
importance of the legal dimension in understanding the dynamics of 
experimentation with partnerships and institutional change.  
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In the contract literature (predominantly rooted in neoclassical economic theory), 
analysis of the structural characteristics of contracts, such as their decision-
making mechanisms, compensation and monitoring schemes, is often based on 
the degree to which these control agency problems (Fama 1990; Kaplan & 
Strömberg 2004; Cumming 2008). From this perspective, attributes such as 
predictability, efficiency and security are desirable if contracts are to play their 
primary function as cost-mitigating devices that ultimately serve the purpose of 
correcting market failures.  
In this chapter, I conjecture that within an alternative framework that rests on a 
different theoretical background and incorporates the notion that innovation policy 
co-creates and shapes markets, contracts would have additional characteristics. 
This gave rise to the following research question: What attributes and emerging 
functions of contracts enable a move from a situation where the parties do not 
share any rewards, to another that facilitates the construction of a balanced risk–
reward nexus? 
As this is a first attempt to operationalise the concept of the risk–reward nexus 
proposed by Lazonick and Mazzucato (2013) in the analysis of contracts, an in-
depth case study has been chosen as the main research method.  
According to Baldwin and Davis (2003, p. 881), “empirical research in law 
involves the study, through direct methods rather than secondary sources, of the 
institutions, rules, procedures, and personnel of the law, with a view to 
understanding how they operate and what effects they have.” However, legal 
scholarship shows a preference for conducting close textual analysis of legal 
material (Genn et al. 2006; Korkea-aho & Leino-Sandberg 2019). Interviews are 
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rather uncommon in legal research, in contrast to the social sciences, where they 
are widely employed as an effective data collection technique to elicit information 
on political and social phenomena (Webley 2010).  
Because this thesis builds upon the literature on institutionalism in which the law 
is viewed within a broad social, political and economic context (Hodgson 2015; 
Deakin et al. 2017), in this third chapter my methodological approach has been 
to combine document analysis with interviews. The latter allowed me to take into 
account the experiences and perceptions of the actors involved in the contracting 
process. 
For the reasons explained above, Brazil seemed to present an interesting 
geographical focus. Furthermore, the breadth and depth of the interviews 
conducted during fieldwork pointed to the partnership between the state-owned 
Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), and the Brazilian subsidiary of the private, 
non-profit Swiss Centre for Electronics and Microtechnology (CSEM Brazil), as 
the only instance known at the federal level to involve the conversion of a non-
reimbursable instrument into another that enabled the sharing of financial 
rewards. Therefore it offered a unique opportunity to move beyond document 
analysis and gain the insights into the actors involved. Putting this another way, 
it allowed me to study how the law is ‘in action’ rather than simply how it is in ‘the 
books’ (Halperin 2011). Other than that, two additional facts indicated that the 
study could promote a better understanding of public–private investment 
partnerships, which could be useful for guiding future mission-oriented innovation 
policies. First, the case in question involved investments in renewable energy, 
namely, second-generation solar panels, and hence was related to environmental 
challenges. Second, the parties themselves recognised the investment 
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partnership as being a positive experience. This opened up the possibility of 
learning about issues around legitimation. Against this background, the case was 
selected for in-depth examination. 
Through my exploration of the relationship between public–private partnerships 
and the context in which they take place, I have offered an interpretation of the 
attributes and functions of contracts from the perspective of public actors who 
decide to take the risks of innovation and share in the potential rewards. The 
attributes and functions found distinguish some of the contracts that had been 
devised to allow a direct nexus to be established between the risks and rewards 
of public investments: the attributes are flexibility and ambiguity; the functions are 
levering, legitimation and preservation. Taken together, these features make it 
possible to identify the experimental nature of contract design and negotiation. 
However, in the analysis presented in the chapter I also demonstrate that there 
are significant constraints against a one-off experiment being rolled out into an 
institutionalised practice. I conclude the study by reflecting on this duality and by 
drawing out the implications for building effective and legitimate public–private 
partnerships in which both the risks and rewards are shared. 
Overall, the chapter is a useful addition to the literature on the risk–reward nexus 
because its findings make explicit the relationships between contracts and their 
context. I have shown some of the challenges and opportunities for enabling an 
active role of the state to develop; furthermore, I have described the features of 
contracts underpinning public–private investment partnerships – attributes and 
functions – found in connection with a rationale for policy concerned with creating 
and shaping markets. Such features suggest a complementarity with those found 
under a market-failure framework for policy. The chapter also provides empirical 
33 
 
evidence on the instruments that have been developed to allow the state to 
appropriate a direct share of financial rewards. 
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Chapter 1 Socialising the risks and rewards of public 
investments: Economic, policy and legal issues 
 
Andrea Laplane and Mariana Mazzucato2 
 
 
Abstract3 
In this chapter we develop a framework for analysing the role of public agencies 
in making high-risk investments along the innovation chain and ask how both the 
risks of innovation and the rewards can be shared between public and private 
actors. We build on a new approach to innovation policy, which we call market 
co-creating and shaping, in which the state is not only fixing markets but also 
actively co-creating them. We also look at the legal institutions that influence (and 
are influenced by) the relationship between public and private actors. Policy 
measures to institutionalise rewards in a way that promotes more equitable 
public–private partnerships can be understood as attempts to mediate 
asymmetric power relations, tensions and conflicting views among multiple 
stakeholders, as well as building a shared notion of the value and legitimacy of 
the role of the state. We conclude by outlining analytical and policy implications 
and identifying avenues for future research. 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The last fifty years have witnessed the emergence of several disruptive 
technological innovations – from information and communication technologies 
(ICT) to biotech and, more recently, renewable energy – that have involved 
profound institutional changes and brought unprecedented levels of value 
creation. In this process, the idea that innovation is led by private entrepreneurs 
                                               
2 Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose (University College London). 
3 A slightly modified version of this chapter has been published in the IIPP Working Paper Series 
(cited in chapters 2 and 3 as Laplane and Mazzucato (2019)) and submitted to Research Policy 
in 9 June 2019 (currently under review). 
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who benefit from publicly funded infrastructure and research due to the presence 
of ‘market failures’ has prevailed as a guide for innovation policy.4 
This view has justified the notion that business deserves to capture a large portion 
of the value of innovation as profits. From a societal standpoint, as long as 
adequate framework conditions were in place, the advantages of optimal levels 
of public spending in R&D (i.e. confined to fixing markets) were apparent. This 
approach would naturally bring about ‘social returns’ such as better quality and 
cheaper goods and services (‘consumer surplus’), job creation and public goods 
(such as new knowledge), ultimately resulting in economic growth and positive 
fiscal impact.  
As direct public funding increasingly moves from basic research towards the later 
stages of R&D and commercialisation – where the risks of technological and 
commercial failure are high but so are the expected financial rewards in the event 
of success – it begins to defy the economic rationale underlying private 
appropriability. Following the 2008 financial bailouts in particular, a key question 
raised was whether governments would continue socialising the risks of 
investments, while rewards were privatised (Mazzucato 2013). With the ICT-
based technological revolution turning growing income inequality into a significant 
contemporary challenge (Piketty 2017), the debate on the distribution of rewards 
of public investments has become all the more urgent.  
                                               
4 We use ‘innovation policy’ broadly to mean policies that have a significant effect on innovation 
(Edler & Fagerberg 2017). Innovation is defined in Schumpeterian terms as new combinations of 
existing knowledge, capabilities and resources brought into the market, thus distinguishing them 
from mere inventions (Schumpeter 1934). Using this definition, innovation policy in some respects 
overlaps with what may be called ‘technology policy’ or ‘industrial policy’. However, we consider 
that industrial policy is broader in scope (see, for instance, Andreoni and Chang (2019)). 
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Meanwhile, fierce competition for budgetary funds and rising pressure on public 
bodies to be more effective and accountable have led to some rather timid 
attempts at policy responses. In the United States, the original text of the Bayh-
Dole Act from the 1980s established an obligation for companies whose products 
benefited from the results of publicly funded research to pay back a share of their 
profits to the Treasury (Herder 2008). While this particular effort did not translate 
into law, other institutional innovations and new financing instruments enabling 
public–private partnerships to share both risks and rewards started to appear 
there and elsewhere.  
Attempts to obtain a more equitable agreement between actors in public and 
private sectors who contribute to the innovation process have coexisted with 
other initiatives seeking to steer and target more tangible economic and social 
benefits. Though still incipient, public agencies’ efforts to increase the strings 
attached to the use of public funds, including conditions on accessible prices, 
R&D collaboration and open science (Mowery 2009), reinvestment in R&D, and 
local production, reflect an increasing desire for a more concrete social return on 
investment than that assumed under a market-failure framework. 
Nevertheless, only a few authors have examined governments’ initiatives to 
capture a share of both the financial gains and the more compelling benefits to 
society beyond those that come from growth and hence increased tax revenue 
(Enke 1967; Windus & Schiffel 1976; Korn & Heinig 2004; Herder 2008; Sampat 
& Lichtenberg 2011). Most importantly, sporadic attempts to find a coherent 
economic rationale for government recoupment of financial rewards – as in 
Windus and Schiffel (1976) – have lacked a framework that acknowledges and 
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links these problems explicitly. Therefore, up to now policymakers have found 
only poor or indeed no guidance.  
Lazonick and Mazzucato (2013) made an important step towards filling this gap. 
They offered a comprehensive framework which they named the ‘risk−reward 
nexus’ for use in investigating the relationship between innovation and inequality. 
Their main argument was that the collective, cumulative and inherently uncertain 
nature of innovation processes enables the dissociation between the risks taken 
and rewards realised by different types of economic actors – workers, citizens 
(represented by the state) and shareholders. The authors focused on strategies 
that allow financial actors to position themselves along the innovation chain and 
extract more value than their contributions could have generated on their own, at 
the expense of the other actors.  
This chapter complements that study by looking at the relationship between the 
role of the state as an investor and the extent to which public funding agencies 
attempt to reap a share of financial rewards realised in partnerships with 
business. This analysis builds on a new framework – market co-creating and 
shaping – in which the state is a leading actor and entrepreneur working in close 
collaboration with the private sector and is therefore endogenous to economic 
processes (Mazzucato 2013; 2016). We adopt a perspective that highlights the 
constitutive role of the state, in the institutional shaping of market relations, 
society and the state itself, which some academics have referred to as ‘legal 
institutionalism’ (Hodgson 2015; Deakin et al. 2017). This approach makes it 
possible to go beyond the notion of legal rules and contracts as background 
incentives for profit-maximising agents, and to assess their quality in terms of the 
potential for shifting the nature, goals or meanings of economic activity and 
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organisation to deliver increased wellbeing (Stryker 2003). Bringing these 
economic and legal angles together creates a richer understanding of the 
complexities, complementarities and tensions underlying the dynamics of public–
private partnerships concerning risk-and-reward distributions.  
In this chapter, our aims are two-fold. One is to develop analytical tools that help 
to frame and systematise challenging aspects of contemporary innovation policy 
related to the risk–reward nexus. By conceptualising the institutionalisation of 
reward structures as a social, legal and political process – rather than an optimal 
end-point – the new framework should help researchers and decision-makers 
identify some of the relevant dilemmas. The second aim is to advance knowledge 
that can guide better policy practices and tools towards socialising the risks and 
rewards of public investments, to promote inclusive, innovation-led growth. 
Hence, this framework operates at the level of a mid-range theory akin to policy 
guidance, as opposed to abstract or general theory (George & Bennett 2005).  
In Section 2.2 we review the market-failure approach to innovation policy and its 
main shortcomings. In Section 2.3 we introduce three bodies of literature that lay 
the foundations for a new approach, these being (i) the developmental state, (ii) 
legal institutionalism and (iii) the entrepreneurial state. We consider the role of 
legal institutions underpinning economic structures, showing that legal and 
economic action and institutional design are interdependent. New functions of 
legal rules and contractual relationships become apparent in the co-creation and 
shaping of markets and the underlying power relations. In Section 2.4 we ask 
how the state can capture a share of the rewards, on behalf of citizens, that better 
reflects its lead role as a risk-taker. In Section 2.5 we conclude by outlining 
analytical and policy implications, and areas for future research.  
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1.2 The market-failure approach to innovation policy and its main 
shortcomings 
 
Within the neoclassical economic framework, innovation policy is viewed as fit for 
correcting market failures, stemming from the notion that ‘free’ market 
interactions play a prominent role in the economy. The production function is the 
conceptual model of value creation within firms, wherein the use of labour and 
capital inputs produces new products and services. As the primary organiser of 
production and owner of the capital assets involved, the private sector is the 
leading entrepreneur. Government’s role is to guarantee the necessary 
conditions for markets to operate and to intervene in the economy to correct 
‘market failures’. 
Regarding innovation, market failures involve under- or over-investment by 
business. A classic example refers to the ‘public good’ nature of basic research, 
which offers insufficient incentives for firms to invest given the high spillover 
effects, making it difficult to appropriate returns (Nelson 1959; Arrow 1962). There 
is also asymmetric or incomplete information in the financial markets, which 
increases the cost for firms – especially SMEs – to finance R&D (Hall & Lerner 
2010). Eventually, investments in certain areas exceed desirable levels, for 
instance, when negative externalities take place – such as those created by 
patent races, pollution or traffic congestion (Stiglitz 2000). The government’s 
direct financing has a limited role in fixing those problems and should focus on 
scientific research and SMEs. As public funding moves downstream, it receives 
more criticism, because, in theory, late spillover effects are not as significant as 
those that occur early on, and companies are in a better position to capture 
returns.  
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The expectation of achieving high rewards through public funding is vital for 
legitimising innovation policy. However, the accepted instruments for the state to 
appropriate rewards tend to be limited. The assumption is that government’s role 
in fixing markets naturally generates a return through welfare increases and 
economic growth. As a result, the benefits to society – the ‘social returns’ – are 
new and better goods at reduced prices for consumers, ‘public good’ provision, 
knowledge spillovers and new jobs. Also, these benefits reflect a positive fiscal 
position. Supposing that supported companies and individuals pay their due 
taxes, then increased economic activity contributes to increased tax collection 
(one of the primary mechanisms through which the state recoups a financial 
gain). While imperfections may block or reduce the optimal social rate of return, 
these are, again, just imperfections for government to fix. In short, because this 
approach is based upon the perception that public funding is a passive tool for 
boosting private entrepreneurship, governments tend to pay insufficient attention 
to how to appropriate the rewards of public investment.  
Implicit here is also a limited view on the role of the state regarding the rules 
underpinning market interactions and the underlying written or informal contracts 
on which actors must agree. These rules and contracts are crucial, however, as 
they ultimately define reward distributions between public and private actors. 
Assuming that economic exchanges only happen among private owners, the 
state appears as an external entity responsible for the rule of law. It helps the 
market system operate at its best by ensuring robust and stable institutions 
through well-defined property rights and rigorous contract enforcement (Posner 
2014).  
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Accepting that only one set of rules maximises economic welfare – by definition 
these are ‘the best’ – (Coase 1960), economic analyses of contractual 
relationships have mostly taken the underlying rules as given. Consequently, 
according to the literature on new institutional economics, the role of government, 
operating through courts, is at best limited to seeking efficient or aligned incentive 
structures that enable shareholder maximisation and transaction cost mitigation 
(Jensen & Meckling 1976). At worst, the state is almost irrelevant and ineffective 
in filling gaps, correcting contractual errors or settling any arising disputes 
(Williamson 1988a). Even when the rules of the game are admittedly 
endogenous, the political, economic and social contexts reduce manoeuvring 
room (North 1990). Therefore, any policy guidance that is derived from this 
approach will deal with removing legal barriers and strengthening the incentives 
for profit-maximising entrepreneurs.  
The market-failure framework for innovation policy has attracted significant 
criticism. The ‘systems of innovation’ literature qualifies that while substantial 
innovations happen within firms, they depend on a complex network of actors, 
institutions and interactions that influence the rate and pattern of knowledge 
creation and diffusion across the economy (Lundvall 1992; Freeman 1995). Neo-
Schumpeterian and evolutionary theory has highlighted what is omitted from 
neoclassical economics. Neoclassical economics examines existing landscapes 
(markets, sectors or technologies) and existing trajectories (whether firms are 
investing too little or too much in a given area), thus overlooking the dynamic and 
cumulative process through which new landscapes and trajectories come about 
(Dosi 1982). It also neglects the range of actors and particularly the role of state-
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owned financial institutions that contribute to changing them, and this is an area 
which has been receiving increased attention (Mazzucato & Penna 2016b).  
A significant shortcoming of the market-failure approach, in the context of the 
present chapter, is the passive role attributed to public finance (Perez 2003; 
Mazzucato 2013). This has meant that the approach does not include the 
possibility of having an array of mechanisms, beyond taxation, that public 
agencies may deploy in order to recoup a direct share of financial rewards of 
investments downstream. Examples include royalties on intellectual property 
rights (IPR) or sales and equity stakes on supported firms. A related problem is 
the neglect of the state’s influence on the rules and contracts that underpin 
public–private partnerships, through legislators, regulators, courts (Pistor 2009; 
Hodgson 2015; Deakin et al. 2017) and funding agencies themselves (Mowery 
2009; Mazzucato 2013; Hockett & Omarova 2014). These shortcomings suggest 
the need for a new conceptual framework for innovation policy that extends the 
justification for public funding. Such a framework must take into account the risks 
taken by state actors, the legal grounds and procedures for them, and the legal 
instruments adopted for capturing rewards.  
1.3 Towards a new framework: market co-creating and shaping 
 
Three bodies of literature lay the foundations for a new approach for policy. These 
are on (i) the developmental state, (ii) legal institutionalism and (iii) the 
entrepreneurial state (Figure 1.1): the first draws on Karl Polanyi’s insights on the 
nature of markets as socially embedded, stressing the active and endogenous 
role of the state in economic transformations (Polanyi 1944); the second 
disentangles the collective processes through which legal arrangements frame, 
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influence and sustain the organisation of the economy and the state; the third 
sheds light on the risk-taking role of public actors as a driver of the rate and 
direction of innovation. 
Figure 1.1 The building blocks of the market co-creating and shaping 
framework 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
Bridging these complementary and sometimes overlapping bodies of literature 
allows for a richer understanding of the complexities, complementarities, tensions 
and power relations underlying the dynamics of public−private interactions in 
innovation. On this basis, the market itself becomes an outcome to which the 
state, operating through multiple actors, makes a vital contribution (Mazzucato 
2016).  
 
 
Developmental 
State
Entrepreneurial 
State
Legal 
Institutionalism
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1.3.1 The developmental state 
 
In his description of the emergence of capitalism, Polanyi emphasises that 
policies are not ‘interventions’, and that markets are embedded in social and 
political institutions, and largely influenced by them (Polanyi 1944; Evans 1995). 
Studies on the developmental state have conceptualised and documented such 
an intrinsic and active state leading profound transformations, such as those 
involved in the development of emerging East Asian economies (see Johnson 
(1982), Amsden (1989), Wade (1990), Woo-Cumings (1999) and Chang (1999)).  
The concept of the developmental state was pioneered by Johnson in his book 
on the ‘Japanese miracle’ (Johnson 1982) in which he characterised the role the 
state played in fostering the high growth of the Japanese economy in the 
twentieth century. His central argument was that the successful economic 
performance of Japan owed a great deal to conscious and persistant government 
policies focused on economic development. This ‘visible hand’ acted as a capital 
provider and coordinator of industrialisation and technical change processes.  
Johnson’s book was followed by other studies in which analysis of the 
developmental state was extended to different Asian contexts: for example, 
Amsden (1989) investigated the case of South Korea; Wade (1990) examined 
the case of Taiwan; and Weiss and Hobson (1995) conducted a comparative 
analysis of Japan, Korea and Taiwan. This body of work has served to emphasise 
that the success of policy implementation in the countries studied can be largely 
attributed to the institutionalised structures that allowed for continuous dialogue 
and exchange of information between their governments and their business 
sectors.  
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On this subject, Evans (1995) put forward the concept of ‘embedded autonomy’, 
explaining that in order to accomplish its developmental mission a government 
needs to maintain both roots in society (i.e. remain accountable) and some 
degree of autonomy (i.e. be able to impose its own will against vested interests). 
This idea, coupled with a theoretical understanding that state capabilities to 
govern industrial transformation vary (Weiss 1998),  remains valid in the most 
recent studies on the developmental state.   
This literature has expanded into the concept of a developmental network state, 
exposing the often hidden activity of public agencies that also governs change in 
advanced economies (Ó Riain 2004; Block 2008; Block & Keller 2011). While 
past industrialisation experiences were about imitation and adaptation of existing 
technologies, the contemporary model puts innovation – R&D and 
commercialisation – at the centre of competitive strategies. High-tech booms in 
countries like Israel, Taiwan, Ireland and the United States exemplify policies 
encouraging activities that were not being done at all, working as devices to 
revitalise the economy.  
Another distinctive feature refers to the decentralised, ‘networked’ and flexible 
structures on which government relies (Ó Riain 2004), rather than the top-down, 
centralised organisation exemplified by the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI) in Japan. Various types of public agencies operate by engaging 
in direct and close partnerships with businesses (Block & Keller 2011). Public 
officials who have a problem-solving focus perform a range of activities that do 
not fit under the market-failure framework: targeting resources in promising 
areas; opening windows that enable support for other innovations; brokerage; 
and facilitation (such as providing infrastructure and standards). Such proactive 
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stances can enable the creation of new networks of collaboration, or stimulate 
those that already exist. Hence, they are key to the accumulation and diffusion of 
knowledge that drives technological change (Block 2008, pp. 172–179). 
1.3.2 Legal institutionalism 
 
Drawing on various traditions,5 emerging studies serve to restore the view on 
legal institutions – including the state – as playing a central, constitutive role in 
capitalist societies and as a source of power (Hodgson 2015). The term ‘legal 
institutionalism’ has been used to refer to this approach, which is still dispersed 
in the literature and does not yet incorporate a fully structured theory (Deakin et 
al. 2017), but it does offer useful insights on the interrelations between legal and 
economic processes, policy and social change, otherwise obscured under the 
notion of ‘embeddedness.’  
From this perspective, legal arrangements that structure markets and other 
institutions are outcomes rather than natural circumstances. The interactions of 
legislators, courts and policymakers with a broader group of actors, including 
firms and civil society, are indispensable for sustaining legal rights and 
obligations. This is partly because the effectiveness of those arrangements also 
lies in shared norms and values informing perceptions regarding their 
reasonableness, fairness and compliance with established rules (Commons 
1959). Enabling participation is important for legitimation in democratic 
environments. Legal institutionalism emphasises that this interplay between 
state-dependent and spontaneous legal developments (contingent on private 
                                               
5 The sources of inspiration range from legally grounded institutional analyses e.g. Commons 
(1959) and Samuels (1989) – see Deakin et al. (2017) – to contemporary institutional political 
economy studies e.g. Chang (2002) and Chang and Evans (2005) – see Coutinho (2017).  
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interactions, culture and custom) underpins essential institutions within 
capitalism, such as property, money, contracts, corporations and markets 
(Hodgson 2015). If law plays an integral part in capitalist societies, the potential 
for shifting the nature, goals or meanings of economic activity, and achieving 
enhanced equality, also have an expression in the legal sphere (Stryker 2003).  
This view implies a crucial conceptual distinction. Law is part of institutionalised 
power structures, but it is also an instrument for the exercise of power and an 
expression of power itself (Deakin et al. 2017); it is not just the mirror image of 
pre-existing power relations. The state’s power is manifested through the actions 
of public officials in the executive, legislative and judicial branches, which, under 
well-grounded rules of their time, make decisions that define policies and assign 
legal rights (Commons 1959).  
Similarly, the process of setting up systems of substantive rules, contracts, 
procedures, routines and practices institutionalises policy goals. However, 
formalisation is imperfect because there are always gaps between written rules, 
their interpretation and practice. The outcomes of state policy and legal choices 
are not neutral; they fit different purposes, benefit particular interests, and frame 
which economic (among other) performances are to be pursued (Samuels 
1989).6 Consequently, legal processes themselves become the arena of conflict 
and power relations, unravelling through negotiation, bargaining and 
compromising (Pistor 2009).  
                                               
6 In this regard, legal institutionalism is consistent with the political economists’ remarks that the 
promotion of economic development requires institutions to fulfil specific functions, which are 
better served by certain institutional forms (Andreoni & Chang 2019).  
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A central contribution of legal institutionalism is to conceive of the opportunities 
for advancing policy agendas as associated with participation in law-making, 
regulation and contracts. This is a view in which it is claimed that law can (and 
must) be subject to intentional operationalisation geared towards framing 
adequate and legitimate institutional arrangements in public policies (Coutinho 
2017). It follows that the scope for shifting power relations in the economy largely 
depends on (public) actors discovering how to effectively use the law to advance 
their goals (Deakin et al. 2017). Therefore, successful policies are also contingent 
upon experimentation in the legal domain.  
1.3.3 The entrepreneurial state  
 
Research on the entrepreneurial state challenges the received wisdom that 
business is the only risk-taker (Mazzucato 2013). It builds on scholarship on 
industry dynamics, which offers a more refined view of entrepreneurial 
phenomena, distinguishing progressive and regressive characteristics affecting 
the entry of new firms to industry and performance (Vivarelli 2013). Firms act as 
profit-seekers driven by expectations about future opportunities that become 
clearer as the innovation process unfolds (O’Sullivan 2006). Recognising that 
public investments are a trigger for economic and technological opportunities, 
Mazzucato (2013; 2016) has drawn attention to the roles that different types of 
public actors and public finance may play in the risk landscape (Figure 1.2).  
 
 
49 
 
Figure 1.2 Sources of public and private finance along the innovation chain 
(United States) 
                      growth and diffusion 
            market creation 
         development 
 
 
 
Source: Authors adaptation of underlying figure by Auerswald and Brascomb (2003). 
NSF, National Science Foundation; NIH, National Institutes of Health; DARPA, Defence 
Advanced Research Projects Agency; SBIR, Small Business Innovation Research 
Programme; NASA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration; InQtel (venture 
capital firm funded by the CIA Central Intelligence Agency). 
  
The concept of ‘entrepreneurial state’ refers to the public sector’s “willingness to 
invest in, and sometimes imagine from the beginning, new high-risk areas before 
the private sector does” (Mazzucato 2016, p. 149). It supports an interpretation 
of the history of most of the important contemporary technological breakthroughs, 
by showing that strategic public investments often arrive early, absorbing major 
uncertainties and long-term risks. They ultimately enable new industries to be 
taken over by business only once profits are apparent. Examples include the ICT 
revolution (Block & Keller 2011), the biotech industry (Lazonick & Tulum 2011; 
Vallas et al. 2011), and emerging renewable energy technologies (Mazzucato & 
Semieniuk 2017).  
As far back as the 1930s, Schumpeter (1934) considered that new markets 
created through innovation depended on inventiveness (creating ‘new 
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combinations’), entrepreneurship (envisioning business opportunities and 
bringing inventions to market) and capital (providing finance so entrepreneurs 
could control the production factors needed). Noting that these roles may not 
necessarily be conflated in the same individual or entity, Schumpeter made it 
clear that financiers are those who put their capital at risk, not entrepreneurs as 
such.7 Therefore, in Schumpeterian terms, especially in the initial capital-
intensive stages of technology development, the state is a leading financier in 
contemporary market economies, acting both as a capitalist (who is a risk-taker) 
and an entrepreneur (who is opportunity-driven). In light of this, Mazzucato (2016) 
has argued that the role of the state is better understood as co-creating and 
shaping markets, and not only fixing them. 
Further insights derived from mission-oriented R&D literature indicate that public 
risk-taking has a pervasive space dimension. Public funding spans the entire 
innovation chain, reaching both the supply-side – from fundamental to applied 
research and early-stage financing of companies downstream – and the demand-
side (Mowery 2009; Foray et al. 2012). Public resources operated in this way may 
play a catalytic role if, beyond direct funding, policymakers embrace a systemic 
approach that includes complementary measures such as regulation and taxes 
(Ergas 1986).  
Analysis of the entrepreneurial state leads to the argument that neglect of the 
nature of public investments has created a pattern of socialising risks while 
privatising rewards, preventing innovation policy from realising its full potential 
(Lazonick & Mazzucato 2013). In turn, acknowledging state risk-taking implies 
                                               
7 As Schumpeter (1934) stressed, even when entrepreneurs invest their own resources in R&D, 
they absorb the risks of failure in the capacity of financiers, not entrepreneurs.  
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accepting that most attempts to create new businesses are likely to fail. 
Occasional successes come through trial and error. As a result, academics have 
pointed to the advantages of conceiving a portfolio of long-term public 
investments so the state can also benefit from the potential financial rewards 
(Stiglitz & Wallsten 1999; Block 2008; Mazzucato 2013; Rodrik 2015), recover 
from losses and continue to fund further rounds.  
1.3.4 The legal–institutional dimension of market co-creating and 
shaping  
 
Attention to the institutional and legal foundations of markets can reveal an 
essential dimension of policymaking, implementation and assessment. Legal 
institutionalism sheds light on state agencies’ ability to create, change, use and 
sustain legal rules, procedures and contracts that contribute to socially desirable 
and democratically legitimised innovation policy objectives. Admitting that 
institutionalisation is the product not only of state design, but also of shared norms 
and values at a point in time, this approach makes it possible to consider those 
legitimation processes that underlie a risk-taking state. Thus, the conditions for 
enabling adequate institutional alternatives and consensus-building become 
more important than determining the constraints on market creation and shaping.  
Consistent with the above, a dynamic and context-dependent analysis of the 
different forms and functions of legal and institutional arrangements takes priority 
over a static comparison with the best set of rules for optimal markets. Such 
analysis provides for a more nuanced appreciation of the limits, tensions and 
possibilities of public and private collaboration throughout the innovation and 
policy processes. Integrating these ideas into this new framework opens the way 
for new analytical tools that can be used to deal with real-world policy challenges, 
52 
 
such as the potential mismatches between the risks taken and rewards realised 
by actors participating in public–private partnerships.  
1.4 Socialising the risks and rewards of public investment: 
elements for a portfolio approach 
 
The allocation of risks and rewards in public–private partnerships offers a unique 
lens through which to observe the division of innovative labour, perceptions about 
the ‘failure’ and ‘success’ of public investments, and expected returns. It makes 
it possible to look into actual mechanisms whereby the state, on behalf of citizens, 
seeks to reap a share of the financial rewards and use other instruments to 
appropriate returns that go beyond the prescriptions of market-failure theory. 
Nevertheless, certain limitations need to be recognised, given that public and 
private contributions are closely intertwined (Nelson 2005). 
Because innovation is inherently uncertain, and investments have no guaranteed 
return, enhancing public control over any arising rewards is a necessary condition 
for legitimising the state’s role in creating and shaping markets. Within a 
framework that sees public agencies as capable of absorbing high technological 
and market risks, there is a valid expectation that the fruits of successful public 
finance will serve the taxpayer and therefore provide a rationale for also 
socialising the financial rewards achieved (Lazonick & Mazzucato 2013).  
Market-failure theory assumes that the state already recoups rewards via job 
creation, knowledge spillovers, increased living standards and tax revenues. 
However, it ignores concrete limitations in those mechanisms. Patents granted 
broadly and upstream end up blocking or slowing down knowledge spillovers, 
either of which can harm follow-up innovations (Mazzoleni & Nelson 1998). 
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Similarly, when companies avoid or evade tax payment, the state is unlikely to 
reap enough fiscal surplus to enable its redistributive function. Furthermore, the 
mainstream approach has no explanation for a variety of instruments that public 
agencies eventually consider in seeking to link risks and financial rewards. A 
market co-creating and shaping approach incorporates the view that these 
government initiatives are an intrinsic dimension of the investment process and 
strategy.  
As this framework focuses on innovation policy that is oriented towards critical 
societal needs, the socialisation of rewards can be understood as an attempt to 
balance financial returns and broader economic and social benefits. Thus, the 
framework enables a distinction to be made between two sets of complementary, 
yet sometimes conflicting, practical measures: profit-sharing and conditionalities.  
1.4.1 Profit-sharing policy instruments 
 
In neoclassical economics, business profits often mean the “rewards for 
innovation and risk-taking” (Samuelson 1997). Conversely, if the state plays a 
lead entrepreneurial (investor-of-first-resort) role, it would be reasonable for 
public agencies to share in the profits. Claiming a share of the financial gains of 
public investments, beyond taxation, makes it possible to compensate for the 
inevitable losses (given the high uncertainties involved) and continue to invest in 
future innovation. Therefore, it could help to create a revolving fund, as in the 
case of private venture capital portfolios.  
One advantage of profit-sharing mechanisms over taxation concerns the potential 
for attaining a more stable source of public funding and having a higher impact 
on the direction of innovation. A revolving fund allows public agencies to enhance 
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their discretion over, and independence from, highly competitive budget funds. 
Another advantage is that governments can design and manage the recoupment 
of revenues more flexibly than they could through taxes. Besides being essential 
for the alignment of private and public actors’ interests, flexibility prevents harm 
being done to supported firms (Enke 1967). Moreover, having the state retain a 
share of business profits arising from successful innovations is an essential 
instrument for building consensus around the public sector’s role and 
performance (Windus & Schiffel 1976). As a public portfolio leaves a traceable 
record of supported projects and firms, and gains and losses, it also offers an 
objective measure of success against which public managers can be held to 
account (Mazzucato 2016).  
Failure of public funding, for any reason, is often considered indicative of an 
inability to ‘pick winners’ or ‘distortion’ of (otherwise optimal) markets (Owen 
2012). Yet many of the successes go unnoticed and even result in public rewards 
being privatised. The US Department of Energy (DoE) attracted criticism for 
providing a guaranteed loan of $528 million to the solar-power start-up company 
Solyndra, which went bankrupt once the price of silicon chips fell dramatically, 
leaving taxpayers to pick up the bill (Wood 2012). However, few critics 
acknowledged that a similar guaranteed loan ($465 million) supported Tesla for 
the development of the Model S electric car, which led to success; even fewer 
have ever questioned why the government accepted early payment of the 
underlying loan (earning $12 million back) instead of negotiating stock options 
that could have been worth almost $1.4 billion, according to some estimates 
(Woolley 2013). Had the DoE chosen the stock options, the royalties retained 
could have not only covered the Solyndra losses many times over but also been 
55 
 
used to continue to fund promising ventures (Mazzucato 2013), signalling the 
importance of the government’s high-risk funding for achieving renewable energy 
technologies. 
The above example also exposes the set of strategic decisions that policymakers 
face regarding the selection of profit-sharing mechanisms suitable for each 
context. Table 1.1 illustrates how the design of financing instruments for 
supporting innovation downstream (first and second columns) entails choices 
regarding how and to what extent public investors may be able to capture 
financial rewards (third and fourth columns). 
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Table 1.1 Existing policy instruments for financing innovation that allow for profit-sharing (selected examples) 
Financing instruments Types Key features Returns to funding 
agency 
Some country examples 
     
Debt financing Repayable grants/ 
Advances 
Repayment required, 
partial or total; could be 
granted on the basis of 
private co-funding  
Royalties of IP licensing or 
levy on sales 
Repayment grants for start-
ups from 2014 to 2016 (New 
Zealand) 
Debt/equity financing Mezzanine funding Combination of several 
financing instruments 
that incorporate 
elements of debt and 
equity in a single 
investment vehicle  
Interest rates  
plus spread 
Credit line mezzanine 
financing (Portugal)  
Equity financing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Venture capital funds 
and fund of funds8 
Funds provided by 
institutional investors 
(e.g. banks, pension 
funds) to be invested in 
firms at early-to- 
expansion stages;  
referred to as patient 
capital, due to lengthy 
time span for exiting (10 
to 12 years) 
Equity stakes Innpulsa (Colombia), 
National Innovation Fund – 
Venture Capital Fund (Czech 
Rep.), Corporate Venture 
Programme (France), 
Yozma Fund (Israel), 
Scottish Co-Investment Fund 
(UK) 
Public procurement for R&D and innovation Demand for technologies 
or services that do not 
exist yet; or purchase of 
R&D services (pre-
commercial procurement 
of R&D) 
IPR of research results; 
agency can opt to shift 
ownership to contractors 
and establish licensing 
conditions 
Entrepreneur Growth 
Strategy (Estonia), Strategy 
for Public Procurement 
(Sweden), Small Business 
Innovation Research (SBIR) 
Program (US) and SBIR-
type of programmes (UK) 
Source: Authors’ adaptation of OECD (2014; 2016) 
                                               
8 Fund of funds – also known as ‘multi-manager’ funds – are those comprising investments in a range of other funds controlled by different asset 
managers. Financial Times Lexicon, retrieved from: http://markets.ft.com/research/Lexicon/Term?term=multi_manager-fund. Last accessed on 9 
November 2019.  
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Profit-sharing mechanisms may include: repayable grants with profit-sharing via 
royalties on sales or equity stakes; public venture capital funds enabling royalties 
on equity; debt financing convertible into equity; and other sorts of fund-mixing 
elements of equity and debt (OECD 2014). Hence, besides the timing for the 
public sector to reap any rewards, a critical distinction concerns the revenue basis 
upon which public and private actors agree to share, ranging from a low-value 
basis (IPR) to high-value (capital gains), as the Solyndra versus Tesla case 
illustrates. 
Although state-owned banks adopt many of these instruments, the market-failure 
approach often takes them as distortions. From a market co-creating and shaping 
perspective, public financial institutions are authentic mechanisms for socialising 
the risks and rewards of investments (Mazzucato 2013). By definition, banks are 
structured to operate with an expectation of return and to manage their 
investments through a portfolio approach. They retain equity when running 
venture capital support while eventually benefiting from windfall gains, as 
corroborated by evidence on state-owned banks in Brazil, China and Germany 
(Mazzucato & Penna 2016b). Alternatively, even less risky investments ensure a 
reward; for example, when involving loans or corporate bonds. Furthermore, for 
state-owned banks typically operating a wide range of financing instruments, it is 
plausible to assume that they are also in a privileged position to innovate in the 
design of those instruments so as to compensate for the risks absorbed, with 
proportional financial rewards. Using a market co-creating and shaping 
framework ensures that questions are asked about what lessons can be drawn 
from development banks to help the broader range of public agencies that fund 
innovation to develop a coherent portfolio approach.  
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A related concern is the types of structures of the state apparatus and 
governance schemes that are appropriate for delivering desirable outcomes. 
While there are analytical gains in assessing the risk–reward nexus in public–
private partnerships, further thinking is required on the possible safeguards to 
mitigate policy risks. One key issue in this regard is how to ensure a recouping 
state does not shy away from reinvesting with a clear public purpose. 
1.4.2 Policy instruments involving conditionalities 
 
Recognising the importance of balancing risks and financial rewards does not 
mean neglecting the core objective of innovation policy, which is to generate 
tangible economic and social benefits. A market co-creating and shaping 
framework departs from the premise that social returns will naturally emerge and 
shed new light on actual institutional designs, policies and practices that 
contribute to a productive environment for innovation. In this context, typical 
industrial policy measures such as conditionalities tied to the allocation of public 
funds can be understood as active attempts to enable innovation to flourish while 
steering benefits directly to society. Examples of such conditionalities are the 
pricing of final goods and services, knowledge governance and reinvestment in 
innovation and local production, and these are discussed below. 
Pricing. Supported innovations, especially essential public goods and services, 
must be affordable and accessible to fulfil an investor-of-first-resort role for the 
state. Otherwise, taxpayers may end up paying the taxes that enable public 
investment in R&D and infrastructure, and again for high prices when these 
downplay the state’s contribution to the former (Alperovitz & Daly 2009). Pricing 
regulations for monopolistic industries of the kind enacted as a law in the United 
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States, but not yet implemented, can mitigate this problem. The 1980 Bayh-Dole 
Act includes a pricing cap provision named ‘march-in rights.’9 This rule provides 
public agencies that supported an invention with powers to license it to a third 
party if, among other causes, the patent-holder does not take steps to achieve 
practical use. An example of the rule in action is that the requirement on the 
practical application of research results regarding new drugs that benefited from 
public funding demands ‘reasonable’ (accessible and affordable) prices (Davis & 
Arno 2001).  
Knowledge governance. The term ‘knowledge governance’ has been used to 
describe the coordination of policy mechanisms into a broader strategic goal of 
positively influencing the rates and directions of knowledge accumulation 
(Burlamaqui 2012; Burlamaqui & Cimoli 2014). This approach finds support in the 
history of mission-driven public finance, which shows that the creation and 
diffusion of knowledge in priority areas were not spontaneous, but heavily reliant 
on the decisions of public funding agencies. The US military sector illustrates that 
the use of public procurement can furnish the government with leverage that 
enables it to steer the development of strategic technologies under an open 
science and collaborative environment (Mowery 2009). Ensuring that information 
was available and accessible, procurement stimulated dynamic and persistent 
exchanges among and within multiple organisations, favouring learning and high 
spillover effects. In any case, the scope for positive spillover depends on the 
stage of technology development – declining as technologies mature – and the 
                                               
9 35 US Code § 203 (‘March-in rights’). 
60 
 
design of missions and projects in question: the more sectors involved, the higher 
the synergies (Mazzucato 2018).  
Reinvestment. Instead of assuming that economic growth and job creation will 
ensue, a market co-creating and shaping approach sees the materialisation of 
those expectations as associated with the sustainability of investments in 
innovation and local production. If business profits are hoarded or mainly used 
for short-term, low-risk and high-return financialisation purposes, the expected 
effect on employment will be reduced. This interpretation offers a foundation for 
steering business investments into productive economic activities. A real 
alternative is to enforce regulations establishing obligations for firms to reinvest 
in innovation. Since the late 1990s, Brazil has implemented legislation mandating 
public and private companies in previously privatised sectors to reinvest a share 
of their profits into public R&D funds.10 A similar obligation gave rise to Bell Labs 
when US antitrust authorities ordered AT&T to invest in R&D in order to continue 
benefiting from a telephone industry monopoly. There is also plentiful evidence 
of governments taking a more active stance towards local manufacturing, which 
was closely linked to the opportunities for job creation. Furthermore, the Bayh-
Dole Act brought a requirement for products embodying the results of publicly 
funded R&D to be manufactured substantially in the United States.11  
Other conditions. Baumol’s (1990) work on the different types of 
entrepreneurship showed that encouraging ‘productive’ activities may not be 
                                               
10 Law 11540/07 enacted the National Science and Technology Development Fund (FNDCT) 
and sectoral R&D funds while establishing a mandatory requirement for profit reinvestment in 
R&D in selected areas.  
11 35 US Code § 204 (‘Preference for United States industry’). 
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enough to deter or block those that are ‘destructive’. In this regard, recognising 
that the state can act as a leading investor gives new meaning to initiatives to 
protect and manage its (capital and intangible) assets; however, such initiatives 
do not fit in a market-failure framework. Managers of public venture capital funds, 
like their private counterparts, contemplate the option of upholding preferred 
stocks or golden shares in individual firms as a way of protecting state-owned 
capital assets. Preferred stocks ensure priority in the receipt of dividends, high 
rates and warrants, whereas a golden share empowers the vetoing of key 
corporate events (mergers, liquidations, asset sales, etc.) when these are 
deemed detrimental to society. The UK government has widely adopted both 
types of measures to avoid hostile takeovers of privatised firms and foreign 
companies gaining full control (Jones et al. 1999). However, in the context of 
active entrepreneurial states, such measures have received renewed attention, 
as has the protection and management of intangible assets held in the public 
sector. Because of the UK government’s industrial strategy, the Treasury has 
published a report on this matter (HM Treasury 2018).  
As the literature on the entrepreneurial state and various academics propose, the 
mix of profit-sharing policy instruments and those involving conditionalities can 
be re-interpreted as incipient, often ad hoc attempts to fulfil the reward function 
of a portfolio approach to public funding. By analogy with business management 
practices, seeing public investments as a bundle, instead of individual units, 
means spreading the risk across individual programmes, R&D projects, directions 
of search and types of firms, enabling exploration of multiple pathways while 
enhancing the chances of success (Stiglitz & Wallsten 1999; Mazzucato 2013). 
Our framework highlights the importance of diversifying not just risks, but also 
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reward mechanisms, thus moving beyond the market-failure approach and 
providing decision-makers with core elements with which to devise a portfolio 
strategy. This makes it possible to assess these practices more systematically 
and derive lessons that are relevant to developing better policies.  
1.4.3 The legal and institutional foundations of symbiotic ecosystems 
 
So far, the analysis has indicated economic reasons for balancing risks and 
rewards of public investments, showing that they involve, among other factors, 
the mobilisation of resources in the legal domain, for example, through attempted 
changes in legal rules and contracts. At this point, it is useful to widen the view 
of the role of legal institutions in the economy and society. The fact that their 
development is dependent on state powers adds to the explanation of how and 
to what extent the socialisation of risks and rewards will occur.  
One consequence of the market co-creating and shaping framework is that 
attention on exchanges among private owners shifts to market interactions, 
especially public–private partnerships for financing innovation. Accordingly, the 
relevant analytical and policy problem regarding the functions of underlying 
contracts and rules is the extent to which an institutional environment favours and 
sustains widespread collaboration, dynamism and market creation. The equity of 
the distribution of rewards of public–private partnerships and the rules that fit that 
purpose are essential dimensions of that process.  
Research on developmental states and legal institutionalism points towards the 
risk–reward nexus being a social, political and legal construction, whereby the 
state plays an active and constitutive role (Polanyi 1944; Evans 1995; Deakin et 
al. 2017). The framework makes it possible to locate the decisions regarding the 
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adoption of profit-sharing policy instruments and conditionalities in the dynamics 
and tensions among state powers, within and across public organisations, and, 
in between these, the private sector and citizens. In this way, the framework goes 
beyond emphasising the importance of stability, clarity and predictability of the 
rules underpinning economic activity as devices for mitigating uncertainties: it 
indicates that signalling values such as trust and fairness are functions that the 
law should undertake. Therefore, an institutional environment only supports the 
risk–reward nexus of public–private partnerships when the key stakeholders 
perceive it as such. 
Rather than natural or neutral, as construed in neoclassical economics, legal and 
institutional frameworks mediate private and public appropriation of rewards. In 
this sense, the ‘winner takes all’ mindset results from political and legal choices, 
as illustrated by high-tech industries in the United States. Besides the changes 
in IPR legislation, the emergence of a special court to handle patent appeals 
meant that courts could play an active role. However, it is debatable whether 
expanding patent subject matters into living organisms was necessary for 
attracting business into biotech (Eisenberg 2006). In ICT, judges and regulators 
loosened copyrights and privacy regulations − justified by freedom of speech but 
resulting in a de facto industrial policy (Chander 2013). Similarly, publicly funded 
activities in defence and aerospace, such as those targeting low-Earth orbit, 
seem to be moving towards expanded private appropriability (Mazzucato & 
Robinson 2018), along with efforts to create more equitable public–private 
partnerships.  
To the extent that financial relations involve power, the outcomes depend on the 
unfolding of negotiations, bargaining and compromising (Pistor 2009). The Bayh-
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Dole Act originally contained a provision that entitled the US Treasury to recoup 
a share of the profits realised upon publicly funded research, but only above a 
certain threshold. Nevertheless, this provision was removed due to the economic 
downturn, political reasons and concerns regarding the bureaucratic costs of 
implementation (Herder 2008). In contrast, Israel exemplifies an investor-of-first-
resort state that co-evolves with legal and institutional structures that enable 
public rewards to be enhanced. The Innovation Law of 1984 requires successfully 
supported projects to repay royalties on sales to the Innovation Authority. Israel 
is also famous for the positive experience of the government’s performance as a 
venture capitalist through the Yozma Fund, which yielded returns via equity 
(Avnimelech 2009). These various arrangements across and within countries 
reinforce the need to deepen the knowledge on the instruments appropriate for 
each context which can then be applied to support strategic decision-making.  
While one could interpret some of these policies using market-failure theory (for 
example, asymmetric information causing incomplete contracts among private 
actors), it is hard to justify the bureaucratic burden of profit-sharing contracts 
involving venture capital or royalties purely on those grounds. The function-based 
approach to systems of innovation offers a more useful explanation, underscoring 
legitimation processes as a prerequisite for the emergence of new technology 
innovation systems (Bergek et al. 2008). However, the focus on individual 
technologies, and on the premise that business drives innovation offers a limited 
opportunity for analysis of the challenges for leading public agencies to shape 
how their role as investors can be legitimated. A market-co-creating and shaping 
framework sheds light on the development of this role, because within it is the 
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concept that governments’ efforts to build more equitable public–private 
partnerships are an integral part of legitimacy-building. 
Mazzucato (2013) has distinguished between two ideal types of innovation 
ecosystems – symbiotic and parasitic. Derived from a comparison to biological 
communities, the term ‘innovation ecosystem’ is used to describe the functionality 
of the economic dynamics of the network of relationships between the multiple 
actors and institutions collaborating for the purposes of R&D and innovation. The 
term complements the notion of ‘systems of innovation’ by highlighting the nature 
of those relationships. An innovation ecosystem is symbiotic if it is rooted in 
mutually beneficial legal relationships, in which increased profits accruing from 
innovation enable public and private investors to replenish funds and continue to 
invest in new rounds (Mazzucato 2013). A crucial ingredient is the perception that 
the environment at stake is virtuous and equitable. A parasitic ecosystem is 
rooted in legal relationships in which one actor benefits at the expense of the 
others. It tends to expand the private appropriability of financial gains obtained 
with public support, thus favouring ‘winner takes all’. The symbiotic/parasitic 
dichotomy is useful in any analysis of current systems and for informing the 
direction of change.  
Table 1.2 summarises the features of formal rules and contracts sustaining 
symbiotic and parasitic ecosystems. While the contrast suggests two opposite 
poles, the reality is more complicated. Between the two, there is a continuum of 
hybrid ecosystems rooted in public−private contractual relationships that 
combine the two types. Hence, one can consider a hypothetical spectrum of 
change between the two extremes.
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Table 1.2 Features of the legal underpinning of the distribution of rewards in public–private partnerships: parasitic 
versus symbiotic ecosystems (selected examples of how public actors can capture rewards) 
 Parasitic Symbiotic 
Risk−reward nexus Imbalanced 
Favouring private appropriability 
Balanced 
Favouring public appropriability 
Private appropriation Rewards captured as profits and capital gains 
(increase in asset value), but they lead to 
‘winner takes all’ 
Profits and capital gains still relevant, but shared 
more equitably among actors who contributed to 
the innovation process 
Public appropriation Passive Active 
Via conditionalities 
(legal measures to ensure 
tangible benefits to society) 
Rewards are natural, spontaneous and 
gradually accrued from competition through: 
§ Improved living standards for 
consumers;  
 
§ Diffused benefits of ‘public good’ 
provision and positive externalities;  
 
§ Knowledge creation and spillovers;  
 
§ Job creation 
 
Rewards targeted, steered and sustained through 
conditionalities on: 
§ Pricing controls for public goods/services 
(access and affordability to all);  
 
§ Targeted, mission-driven benefits (qualitative 
requirements for ‘public good’ provision); 
 
§ Knowledge governance (access to and 
diffusion of the crucial knowledge for tackling 
societal challenges); 
 
§ Local manufacturing to stimulate productive 
entrepreneurship and job creation within the 
country/region; 
 
§ Profit reinvestment on R&D to continuously 
stimulate productive investments and virtuous 
ecosystems; 
 
§ Avoidance or blocking of dilution/liquidation of 
state-owned capital assets (preferred stocks, 
golden shares etc.) 
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 Parasitic Symbiotic 
Via profit-sharing 
(legal measures to enhance 
financial rewards to the state) 
 
 
Limited to the taxation of profits or capital 
gains 
Beyond taxation, financial rewards recouped via: 
§ Reimbursement of public funds (partial or 
total);  
 
§ Public sharing of profits (e.g. royalties, levies 
on sales);  
 
§ Public sharing of capital gains (e.g. equity 
convertible bonds or hybrid financing 
instruments mixing equity and debt) 
Legal framework Allows public funding and assumes 
recoupment will follow 
§ Allows public funding plus recoupment (via 
conditionalities and profit-sharing);  
 
§ Allows public funding and makes recoupment 
mandatory 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
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The concrete examples in this section indicate limits and possibilities for state 
action institutionalising, through the law, more equitable reward structures. Such 
examples are a start towards identifying the conditions that encourage symbiotic 
ecosystems. Analysis of these and other experiences could lead to useful lessons 
for public agencies in how to design new policy instruments and shape symbiotic 
relationships. After all, experimentation is crucial to the accumulation of the 
powers to do this effectively. 
1.5 Conclusion, main implications and areas for future research 
  
In this chapter we have presented a new approach to innovation policy that 
complements the market-failure rationale. Public investments are at the centre of 
the innovation process because of their role in co-creating and shaping markets 
with businesses. Also, legal rules, procedures and contracts play a constitutive 
role and the state’s action is strategic for steering the institutional environment in 
those directions that allow for the realisation of socially desirable policy goals. By 
making explicit the leading role of the state as an investor and enabler of 
institutional change, this approach allows public funding agencies to be 
conceived of as actors entitled to seek to appropriate a share of the rewards of 
the innovations to which they contribute. In other words, it becomes possible to 
understand and analyse how governments, when acting along the innovation 
chain, may attempt to socialise both the risks and rewards of public investments 
– a question that has been only narrowly considered under a market-failure 
framework. The analytical and policy implications suggest interesting avenues for 
future research.  
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Recognition of the risk-taking entrepreneurial role of the state provides initial 
justification for public funding agencies’ attempts to recoup some of the financial 
rewards realised, beyond taxation. Sharing rewards with private actors enables 
a more ‘portfolio’ mindset – where the upside is used to cover the downside – 
and more stable funding to serve citizens’ needs. Furthermore, emphasis on the 
legal–institutional dimension sheds light on additional functions for measures 
such as royalties, equity stakes, pricing-capping mechanisms or other 
conditionalities, that remain invisible in the mainstream approach. In democratic 
societies, these can be understood as a means of attempting to balance 
asymmetric power relations, tensions and conflicting views among multiple 
stakeholders, while building a shared notion of the value and legitimacy of the 
state. On the basis of this conception, in this chapter we have refined the notion 
of innovation ecosystems in terms of the risk–reward nexus in public–private 
partnerships. While accepted equitable agreements lay the foundations for 
symbiotic ecosystems, those that are parasitic encourage ‘winner takes all’ at the 
expense of society.  
We have identified two sets of legal measures through which public agencies 
could seek an adequate return on investment. Profit-sharing enables recoupment 
of potential financial gains in proportion to the risks undertaken. Conditionalities 
target tangible benefits to society regarding the pricing of essential goods and 
services, access to and diffusion of new knowledge, job creation, etc. Although 
not meant to be exhaustive, this distinction reveals several legal instruments and 
practices fitting the two broad types of measures, instead of a ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
approach. This aspect highlights an opportunity for further thinking on new 
instruments – and corresponding governance schemes – capable of ensuring 
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that the state, representing the public, has the possibility of capturing a fair share 
of rewards. Pursuing a better understanding of the functioning of and interactions 
between those measures in governments’ policy mixes may also be worthwhile.  
The legal–political processes that influence the institutionalisation of initiatives to 
socialise rewards offer another way of grasping the complexity behind risk-and-
reward distributions. Recognising that these processes are intertwined, and that 
the state power is intrinsic to them, uncovers key challenges. Consensus-building 
takes time and effort, as it involves multiple actors, asymmetric powers, different 
interests and actors operating under various rules etc. Potential solutions will not 
always work: they reflect the possible agreement. Thus, experimentation, 
learning and flexibility are critical for institutional and legal design.  
The benefits of advancing a market co-creating and shaping framework for 
innovation policy seem clear in the face of contemporary societal challenges. 
While empirical studies could help to enrich and expand the analytical tools 
discussed in this chapter, this new approach also offers guiding principles for 
policy design, implementation and evaluation.  
First, our analysis suggests the importance of improving the targets of public 
investments so as to develop a clear public purpose and to state expected 
benefits to society through defining missions, goals and measures of progress. 
Extending the use of mission-oriented initiatives, and nurturing the capabilities to 
do so, are important for legitimising a risk-taking state; however, also required 
are adequate institutional mechanisms to enable open and broad participation in 
deliberations regarding the directions of change (Stirling 2008).  
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Second, the framework indicates the advantages of pursuing a portfolio approach 
to structure long-term public investments, as it allows public agencies to spread 
the risks while ensuring an upside in the event of success that could provide for 
a continuous funding source. A direct nexus between risks and rewards is 
instrumental in forming and managing a portfolio. Thus, policymakers should aim 
to develop a strategy for achieving a risk–reward nexus, which defines priorities 
and brings coherence to the measures to recoup rewards while keeping in view 
their public missions.  
Third, the framework emphasises the importance of contemplating the design of 
legal and institutional structures that underpin an equitable sharing of rewards 
between actors in the public and private sectors, as part of the process of market 
creation and shaping. Public agencies should be allowed to come close to the 
private sector and explore the different legal instruments available, in order to 
identify which are more appropriate for building symbiotic partnerships. As well 
as encouraging creativity, this may involve raising awareness of, and negotiating 
with, actors in the state legal apparatus, such as legislators, regulators, judges 
and auditing bodies.  
Together, the above-mentioned aspects suggest the need to promote the 
development and accumulation of capabilities in the public sector. Empowering 
governments to design, implement and assess practices for dealing with the risk–
reward nexus is the key to shifting the contemporary pattern of socialising the 
risks while privatising the rewards. Only appropriate capacity building can 
invigorate hopes for inclusive, innovation-led growth.  
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One avenue for future research is to explore relevant criteria for taking forward 
the taxonomy of the risk–reward nexus in innovation ecosystems. Also, 
undertaking case studies and in-depth empirical research could help illuminate 
market co-creating and shaping initiatives, and whether and how these co-evolve 
with the construction of virtuous ecosystems. Such research could also help 
explain the situations in which legal structures and framings enable equitable 
public–private partnerships. Drawing the relevant lessons from existing 
experiences should contribute towards building a richer evidence base which can 
then be used to inform decision-making and better practices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
73 
Chapter 2 The market co-creating and shaping role of 
the state: Insights from the Brazilian experience 
 
 
Abstract12 
This chapter documents the incipient emergence of an active role of the state in 
Brazil that has been oriented towards creating and shaping markets through 
strategic investments in innovation. It draws on a comparative analysis of two 
case studies of federal funding programmes: the BNDES–FINEP Joint 
Programme for Supporting Industrial Technological Innovation in the Sugar-
based Economy and Sugar-Chemicals Sectors (PAISS), and the Ministry of 
Health’s Production Development Partnerships Programme (PDPP). The study 
finds evidence of the programmes of five dimensions of effective public–private 
partnerships, these being that public funding agencies (i) seized mapped 
opportunities; (ii) took the lead; (iii) engaged in risk-sharing and institutional 
building; (iv) pursued risk diversification and competition; and (v) sought an 
equitable sharing of rewards. While public risk-taking has played a catalytic 
function, its limitations and those regarding the appropriation of rewards became 
apparent. After discussing the main policy implications I reflect on the specific 
challenges for building equitable public–private partnerships in the light of the 
increasingly competitive and global scope of the economy.  
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Governments around the world are confronted with new challenges, in particular 
having to reconcile economic growth, sustainability and inclusion. In this context, 
and markedly since the 2008 financial crisis, they have increasingly turned to 
innovation policies in response. Innovation policies, as an integral part of 
industrial policies, have historically been the subject of heated discussion about 
the positive and negative aspects of the active role of the state in the economy. 
                                               
12 I would like to thank the two anonymous referees of the SPRU Working Paper Series and 
Manuel Gonzalo (National University of General Sarmiento, Argentina) for constructive comments 
on earlier drafts.  
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Although there are different views in this debate, one of the practical ways being 
sought to steer the directions of innovation has been through mission-oriented 
policies (EC 2018). 
A mission-oriented approach can be associated with those initiatives that in the 
past have mobilised actors and sectors across the economy around the 
attainment of specific objectives – typically in the defence sector, but not limited 
to it (Ergas 1986). Since then, important lessons from the accumulated 
experience have been drawn (Foray et al. 2012; Mowery 2012; Mazzucato 2018). 
Also, there have been efforts to build up and systematise an evidence base and 
integrate it into theory, the objective being that these activities would lead to 
effective guidance for policymaking.  
In this regard, Mazzucato (2016) has argued that contemporary missions call for 
a new framework capable of offering policy tools for “co-creating and shaping 
markets”, besides “fixing” them. This perspective transcends the polarity between 
the public and private sectors and turns to the possibility of fruitful collaborations 
led by entrepreneurial public institutions (Mazzucato 2013). However, it 
acknowledges that there can also be problems if only the risks of investments are 
socialised, while the rewards are privatised – what Lazonick and Mazzucato 
(2013) have referred to as a dysfunctional “risk–reward nexus”.  
This issue has been examined in detail in the first chapter of this thesis, where 
particular attention was paid to the legal and institutional frameworks that also 
influence public–private relationships (Laplane & Mazzucato 2019). We have 
identified some instruments that can be used to allow the state to reap a fair share 
of rewards and hence help remedy imbalances in the risk–reward nexus. 
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Examples include royalties, equity stakes, price-capping mechanisms and other 
conditionalities. Nevertheless, analyses of this nexus in concrete cases and the 
implementation of these policy tools are still missing. 
Empirical studies focusing on emerging and developing countries are of particular 
interest because the economic, political and institutional challenges – as well as 
the conflicts over distribution – appear more clearly. This, in turn, offers 
opportunities for developing further theoretical and practical insights into the 
design, implementation and assessment of public–private partnerships for 
investments in innovation.  
This chapter is an attempt to contribute to the above line of study and has two 
main aims: 
a) to analyse, in real R&D programmes, some of the key issues that 
decision-makers and practitioners will need to address in order to 
make public–private partnerships more mission-oriented and effective; 
and 
b) to assess the preliminary outcomes of these programmes in the light 
of the concept of the risk–reward nexus.  
To these ends, a literature search has been conducted with the aim of identifying 
some of the critical (political, economic, legal and institutional) issues that drive 
successful mission-oriented innovation policies. This exercise enabled the 
foundations to be laid for an analytical framework that was used to study the 
implementation of public–private partnerships. In the analysis, the following are 
considered: (i) the objectives of the programmes; (ii) the role of public funding 
agencies; (iii) the legal and institutional changes enabling public–private 
  
76 
partnerships; (iv) the measures to increase and manage the risks taken; and (v) 
the measures adopted so the state can also reap an equitable share of rewards 
in case of success. 
This framework has then been adopted for use in a comparative analysis of two 
federal R&D programmes in Brazil, an emerging economy that has recently 
experienced a brief revival of active and explicit industrial policies (2003–2016). 
The two case studies are: (i) the BNDES–FINEP Joint Programme for Supporting 
Industrial Technological Innovation in the Sugar-based Economy and Sugar-
Chemicals Sectors (PAISS); and (ii) the Ministry of Health’s Production 
Development Partnerships Programme (PDPP). These programmes are 
interesting because they pioneered features of mission-orientation in Brazil and 
were considered symbolic of virtuous public–private collaborations by the local 
STI community in terms of the quality of resources mobilised and arrangements 
concerning reward distribution (Mazzucato & Penna 2016a). By including an 
examination of these experiences, the study promotes an understanding of some 
of the critical issues that arise in the implementation of programmes that rely on 
the state’s role as a risk-taker. The cases illustrate the process of developing the 
instruments that are designed to allow for a direct risk–reward nexus.  
I present a literature review and proposals for an analytical framework to 
operationalise the concept of the risk–reward nexus in Section 2.2. The 
methodology follows in Section 2.3. In Section 2.4 I outline the recent evolution 
of innovation policy in Brazil, and set the stage for comparing the case studies, 
according to the five key elements of the framework (Section 2.5). In Section 2.6 
I conduct a preliminary appraisal of the outcomes of those programmes through 
the lens of the risk–reward nexus. I discuss policy implications in Section 2.7, and 
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then conclude the chapter by reflecting on both the challenges for building 
effective public–private partnerships in the face of a global economy, and on the 
implications of the research findings. 
2.2 The market co-creating and shaping policy framework 
 
The concerns with contemporary challenges such as slow economic growth, 
rising inequality and environmental issues, have opened a new agenda for 
innovation policy studies. This has sparked critical analyses of both the purely 
theoretical position that is focused on the correction of market failures and the 
rationale for policy based on systems of innovation. Some critiques have put 
forward proposals for alternative approaches that have been developed from 
different perspectives, see, for instance, Schot and Steinmueller (2018) and 
Mowery et al. (2010).  
In this context where interest in active mission-oriented policies resurfaces, 
Mazzucato (2016) has argued for a new framework in which the justification for 
the role of the state in innovation is concerned with the co-creation and shaping 
of markets. The underlying premise is that if the problems in need of solution 
come from the market, they cannot and will not be addressed by the market 
alone. Recognising that innovation crucially depends on the quality of the network 
of relationships between a variety of actors including firms, research institutions, 
financing bodies, regulators, users and others (Lundvall 1992; Freeman 1995), 
Mazzucato draws attention to the importance of different types of actors – 
especially those in the public sector. 
Accordingly, Mazzucato (2013) has put forward the notion that the 
‘entrepreneurial state’ should become the cornerstone of an argument that 
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governments can, and should, play a more active role as investors in innovation 
– which is very different from maintaining the overall assumption that 
governments only fix failures. Entrepreneurial states are driven by a clear 
purpose and vision of economic and technological opportunities. As public 
finance arrives before technologies are mature enough for a business to be 
willing or able to invest, public agencies feature as lead risk-takers, rather than 
mere de-riskers (Mazzucato 2013). They operate through a commonly hidden, 
decentralised, coordinated and networked governance structure, rather than one 
that is centralised and top-down (Block 2008; Block & Keller 2011). History shows 
that this course of action – which goes well beyond funding basic science to reach 
the entire innovation chain, including the deployment and diffusion phases 
through supply-and-demand-side policies – enables the strategic mobilisation of 
different types of public (and private) finance (Mowery 2009; Foray et al. 2012).  
This broader perspective on the role of the state in which direct public funding 
increasingly moves downstream means that public agencies work in close 
collaboration with business and become more exposed to failures, particularly 
given the inherent uncertainties of the innovation process. That is why the 
question arises whether, in the exceptional cases of success, the nexus will be 
kept between those who take the risks of investing and those who will reap the 
rewards – since the sharing of rewards among those who have shared the risks 
is a fundamental principle of investment partnerships (Lazonick & Mazzucato 
2013). In this regard, some academics have been defending a position that public 
investments should be treated as a portfolio that contains diversified assets, 
which will mitigate the risks, while ensuring public agencies have the right to 
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recoup any financial gains that can be later reinvested into innovation (Block 
2008; Mazzucato 2013, 2016; Lazonick & Mazzucato 2013; Rodrik, 2015). 
In Chapter 1, we reviewed the literature on legal institutionalism (Hodgson 2015; 
Deakin et al. 2017) in an attempt to develop a deeper understanding of how the 
risk–reward nexus varies in response to changes in social shaping processes. 
From this viewpoint, the legal sphere is an expression of the state’s powers and, 
thus, a space for contestation, negotiation and experimentation that not only 
enables institutional change, but also constrains it. On this basis, and recognising 
that public–private partnerships will be legitimate if perceived as reasonable and 
fair (Commons 1959), we have identified two sets of measures that could help 
public agencies have a share in any rewards. These are profit-sharing (involving 
financial gains to the state) and conditionalities (for more significant economic, 
social and environmental benefits). 
To sum up, the aspects highlighted so far point to the theoretical possibility of 
building virtuous public–private collaborations based upon the risk–reward 
relationship. However, success will depend on a sequential path of action being 
taken; identifying this path provides the basic building blocks for an initial 
analytical framework which can be used to study concrete R&D programmes 
(Figure 2.1). The first step along the path is the identification of clear opportunities 
related to overcoming societal challenges. In the second step, public actors are 
required to mobilise resources, taking and sharing risks to attract private partners. 
This, in turn, compels them to engage in legal and institutional experimentation 
and change (the third step), and to move towards a portfolio approach to manage 
the risks taken (the fourth step). Moving to the final (fifth) step entails devising 
measures for ensuring that public agencies are able to recover a portion of the 
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amounts invested, in the event of success, and which may allow the process to 
be repeated. Naturally, this is a simplification for analytical use, as in reality, the 
process is often non-linear and less clear-cut.  
Figure 2.1 Framework operationalisation 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
From this analytical framework, five main guiding questions for the case studies 
were derived: (i) What motivations and aims lie behind the programmes? (ii) Who 
takes the lead, the private or public sector? (iii) What legal and institutional 
changes enable implementation? (iv) How do federal funding agencies seek to 
increase and manage the risks taken? (v) How is an equitable sharing of rewards 
pursued?  
2.3 Methodology 
 
To investigate these five questions, a comparative case study was adopted. 
Qualitative case studies can be a rich source of data and thereby can enhance 
the understanding of a particular problem or phenomenon (George & Bennett 
Identifying 
opportunity
Mobilising 
resources
(risk-taking)
Legal and 
institutional 
experimentation
Managing the 
risks
Sharing in the 
rewards
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2005; Stake 2005; Yin 2009). Because it was recognised that legal and 
institutional specificities have a significant effect on policymaking, the study 
focused on a single country, Brazil; however, cross-country analysis is the next 
logical area of research. 
According to Stake (2005), case studies that have the potential to reveal 
information relevant to a particular research problem are the most worthwhile – 
hence my choice of two R&D programmes in the biofuels and health sectors 
(covering the period between 2008 and 2016). These programmes were unique 
in advancing a broad-based and challenge-oriented approach to innovation 
policies, in a period of time that followed the government’s stated goal of 
enhancing investments in innovation and improving the underlying legal 
framework (more details are given in Section 2.4). As such, they were well suited 
for studying public–private investment partnerships and how the risk–reward 
nexus could be achieved. By following a comparative approach, it was possible 
to gain insights into the differences in how public actors engaged with business 
and responded to the need of risk- and reward-sharing.  
A variety of data sources were used for the analysis. First, a review of the 
literature and documentary material on public agencies’ activities, policy reports, 
and scientific and popular journals, provided an initial account of the goals and 
characteristics of the programmes, actors involved, challenges for 
implementation, and preliminary outcomes. Second, interviews with the key 
stakeholders allowed for a more nuanced understanding of their experiences with 
or perceptions about innovation policies, while enabling exploration of the notion 
of a risk–reward nexus.  
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Fieldwork took place between May and August 2016 and comprised in-depth 
semi-structured interviews with 51 subjects, representing different types of actors 
and organisations in the public and private sectors (Table 2.1). Given the 
research interest in identifying critical issues for successful policy 
implementation, priority was given to respondents in the public sector (41 in total). 
Selection of the interviewees relied on purposeful sampling and the snowballing 
technique (Atkinson & Flint 2004). To increase the robustness of the analysis 
while mitigating bias, I selected interviewees from various positions (leadership, 
technical and academic), who had been active during the period under study 
(Table 2.2). Respondents were contacted by email, following a standardised 
protocol in accordance with ethical guidelines. Each person was interviewed once 
and the interviews had an average duration of one hour. This process ended at 
the saturation point (Bryman 2016).  
The interviews were recorded and their contents transcribed. A deductive 
approach was then adopted, in which the interviews were analysed and manually 
coded (Kvale 1996) in the five steps outlined in the operational framework set out 
in Figure 2.1. First, I observed how policymakers identified an investment 
opportunity related to overcoming a societal challenge and coded the perceptions 
of interviewees in terms of both the benefit and risk potential involved. Second, I 
looked at the specific measures that enabled public funding agencies to perform 
a leading role and take on such risks, including those measures that the 
interviewees regarded as limited in scope, and coded for these measures and 
their limitations. Third, I identified the changes (i.e. experimentation) in legal rules 
and institutions at various levels (e.g. legislation, organisations’ operational 
guidelines, etc.) that allowed the implementation of the programmes, and also 
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coded for these changes. Fourth, I examined the specific measures through 
which public agencies managed the risks undertaken, and categorised these into 
three streams (new financing instruments, risk diversification, and competitive 
funding application processes). Fifth, I considered whether public funding 
agencies resorted to any additional measures aimed at ensuring they could 
appropriate a share of potential rewards. This coding and analysis were based 
on Laplane and Mazzucato’s (2019) framing of policy instruments for sharing both 
risks and rewards, which allows a distinction to be made between two sets of 
policy instruments: profit-sharing and conditionalities.  
Based on this framework, the empirical analysis in section 2.5 has been 
structured around five themes: (i) opportunity-driven risk-taking; (ii) public sector 
leadership; (iii) incremental legal and institutional innovations; (iv) new financing 
instruments, risk diversification and competition; and (v) profit-sharing and 
conditionalities balancing the risks and rewards of investing.           
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Table 2.1 # Interviewees by organisation and sector13 
 
Organisation # Interviewees Sector 
Brazilian Centre for Research in Energy and 
Materials – CNPEM 
 
1 
 
Public 
Brazilian Company of Research and Industrial 
Innovation – EMBRAPII (public non-profit) 
2 Public 
Centre for Strategic Studies and Management in 
STI – CGEE (non-profit) 
1 Public 
Development Bank – BNDES 18 Public 
Health Regulatory Agency – ANVISA 1 Public 
Innovation Agency – FINEP 6 Public 
Ministry of Defence 1 Public 
National Agency for Petroleum, Natural Gas and 
Biofuels – ANP 
1 Public 
Oswaldo Cruz Foundation – FIOCRUZ 
Research Foundation linked to the Ministry of 
Health 
3 Public 
Public universities – UFRJ, Unicamp and USP 5 Public 
Sao Paulo Research Foundation – FAPESP 1 Public 
State-owned oil enterprise – PETROBRAS 1 Public 
 41 Total public 
Brazilian Association of Fine Chemical 
Industries, Biotechnology and its specialties 
(non-profit) 
1 Private 
National Oil Industry Association (private non-
profit) 
1 Private 
Grupo FarmaBrasil (private non-profit) 1 Private 
Business enterprises (Bionovis, BG, Cristalia, 
Grambio, Orygen and Recepta) 
7 Private 
 10 Total private 
Total 51  
Source: Own elaboration 
 
                                               
13 Data in the table refer to the year in which the interviews took place (2016), which means that 
interviewees may have previously worked in different organisations and sectors. 
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Table 2.2 Interviewees' profile 
  Position   
Type of 
organisation 
Chief 
executive 
Senior 
executive 
or civil 
servant 
Higher 
executive 
officer 
Executive 
officer 
Legal 
officer Founder CEO 
R&D 
manager Total 
Ministry 
 
1 
      
1 
Development bank 
 
3 7 6 2 
   
18 
Innovation agency 
 
2 1 1 2 
   
6 
Research institute 1 
       
1 
Research foundation 1 3 
      
4 
University 1 4 
      
5 
Regulatory agency 
  
2 
     
2 
State-owned 
enterprise 
       
1 1 
Private enterprise 
     
1 5 1 7 
Non-profit 4 2 
      
6 
Total 7 15 10 7 4 1 5 2 51 
Source: Own elaboration
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During the interviews, the following themes were addressed (further details are 
in the Interview guide, see Appendix): (i) the context and roles of public and 
private actors; (ii) characteristics of public support; (iii) legal and institutional 
issues affecting public–private partnerships; and (iv) the risk–reward relationship.  
Data analysis proceeded through three main phases; in each, the results of the 
interviews were triangulated with those obtained from other data sources to 
ensure robustness (Mabry 2008). In phase one, the secondary data regarding the 
programmes were summarised in chronological order. This was useful for 
understanding the backgrounds, goals, evolution and results of the programmes. 
In phase two, repeated comparisons were made between the data and the 
theoretical framework, the outcome of which enabled the five guiding questions 
to be addressed. The interviews were key for identifying the specific roles of the 
different public and private actors, given that their contributions were intertwined 
(Nelson 2005). It was also possible to characterise the processes and 
instruments for building the risk–reward nexus, on the basis of the features of the 
financial instruments deployed and the actors’ perceptions and narratives. In 
phase three, an attempt was made to link the data on the outcomes of the 
programmes with the pattern deducted from theory (Yin 2009). The relationship 
between the risks and rewards of public and those of private co-investors could 
then be established.  
Before proceeding to the case studies, it is important to note the political, 
economic and institutional developments that allowed for active innovation 
policies to emerge in Brazil. 
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2.4 The recent evolution of innovation policy in Brazil 
  
The evolution of innovation policy in Brazil is still recent, which is reflection of the 
country’s late industrialisation and the continuous changes in the role of the state 
in the economy. It was not until the late 1990s that the Ministry of Science and 
Technology14 (MCTIC) took incipient steps to restore and sustain STI funding – 
through the National Science and Technology Development Fund (FNDCT) – and 
propose legislation to allow public–private partnerships (the Innovation Law). 
However, since those initiatives took place amid neoliberal reforms and a 
conservative macroeconomic administration, it has not proved possible to reach 
the synergies needed, within and across the government, to integrate innovation 
into actual policy.  
The election of President Lula da Silva, in 2002, inaugurated the gradual shift 
towards a more favourable political, legal and economic landscape for advancing 
the role of the state through policy experimentation. In May 2003, the government 
affirmed its commitment to long-term, environmentally sustainable, and inclusive 
growth, recognising the importance of the state as a driving force (MPOG 2003). 
The revival of industrial policies would then place innovation at the centre of the 
development strategy for the first time, evolving through three successive plans 
(MDIC 2003, 2008, 2011).  
To this end, the legal and institutional frameworks had to undergo change. Among 
this was the passing into law of the innovation bill (Law 10973/04), enabling the 
government to offer direct financial support to the business sector. This laid the 
                                               
14 It originated as the Ministry of Science and Technology; in the 2000s, it became the Ministry of 
STI and recently it has been merged with communications to become MCTIC.   
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foundations for the Brazilian Innovation Agency (FINEP) to start a Subvention 
Programme in 2006. The legislation also permitted the use of other policy 
instruments, including on public procurement. Enacted in 2007, the Law of Good 
(Law 11196/05) similarly regulated tax incentives for R&D. There were also 
institutional changes at the level of public funding agencies themselves. For 
instance, under new directorship, the state-owned development bank (BNDES) 
gradually resumed its role as the chief financier of development strategy. New 
operational norms ensued, which prioritised support to investments in innovation 
with longer-term horizons, broader access, subsided credit, and the waiving of 
risk premium, thus signalling the bank’s willingness to take risks. Furthermore, in 
2007, BNDES intensified its operations in venture capital, indicating the rise of 
public institutions acting as venture capitalists (Schapiro 2012).  
Despite these changes, the initial move towards increasing investments in 
innovation was modest, in part because, up to that point, the political and legal 
environment had been extremely inflexible about the use of public funds directed 
to R&D. In the absence of an explicit and active innovation policy, a legal vacuum 
persisted, and there was little innovation culture in the private or public sectors. 
As private finance for innovation had historically been missing (Melo & Rapini 
2014), the lack of public funding meant that business remained risk-averse. The 
enactment of the Innovation Law and other pieces of legislation had only begun 
to change actors’ practices and mindsets. Nevertheless, effective implementation 
would require learning, further adjustment and time.15 Another critical factor was 
                                               
15 In 2015, a constitutional amendment (n. 85/2015) made explicit the public sector’s role in 
stimulating innovation in the private and public sectors and promoting interactions between the 
two. Early in 2016, the enactment of the ‘New STI Legal Framework’ (Law n. 13243/2016) clarified 
some procedures, the aim being to bridge the gap concerning auditing controls. 
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the continuity of a misaligned macroeconomic policy approach. As the 
government maintained high interest rates while withholding public funds, the 
stifling of private investments was not surprising. 
President Lula’s second term (2008–2011) opened a period of progressive 
reorientation towards an active role for public investment. Following the eruption 
of the financial crisis, countercyclical measures such as the Investment Support 
Plan (PSI: 2009–2013) provided BNDES and FINEP with additional resources. 
From 2010 onwards, the Treasury also (temporarily) ceased the systematic 
retention of FNDCT funds. In that propitious context, the Government Blue Book 
stated the need to break new ground in terms of the legal framework, and quantity 
and quality of public support to innovation (MCT/CGEE 2010).  
Over the next few years, federal public funding achieved new breadth; one can 
also observe a correlation between it and growth in business expenditure in R&D 
(Figures 2.2 and 2.3). Led by executives invested with autonomy and resources, 
and committed to encouraging risk-taking, public agencies experienced a thriving 
period of experimentation and learning. Meanwhile, advances in the coordination 
mechanisms within government, and between it and the private sector ensued, 
culminating in the growing ambition of the national STI strategy (MCTI 2012). 
Among the highlights were new programmes with features of mission-orientation 
such as the Inova Empresa Plan (Mazzucato & Penna 2016a). Notwithstanding 
such positive developments, again the mismatched macroeconomic policy, and 
the worsening of international conditions, gradually led to a major political, 
institutional and economic crossroads, interrupting Brazil’s promising 
developmental path.  
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Figure 2.2 National R&D expenditure by sector, Brazil (PPP$ millions) 
 
 
 
Source: MCTIC 
 Figure 2.3 National S&T expenditure as % GDP by sector, Brazil 
 
 
Source: MCTIC 
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The two programmes selected as case studies were pioneering in that they 
embodied incipient features of mission-orientation, i.e. innovative activities were 
not an end in themselves, but to some extent were part of a strategy to address 
mapped problems (Gadelha 2016). They represent clear departures from the 
previous status quo, whereby neither the public nor the private sectors took the 
high risks of investing in R&D. As well as being relatively successful in stimulating 
risk-taking, interview data shows that the programmes were considered positive 
examples of public–private partnerships in Brazil (Mazzucato & Penna 2016a). In 
this sense, the programmes paralleled each other sufficiently to merit study using 
a compare-and-contrast approach.  
2.5 Two case studies on the market co-creating and shaping role 
of the state  
 
In this section, two programmes are described that were initiated by the federal 
government to encourage R&D and innovation: the BNDES–FINEP Joint 
Programme for Supporting Industrial Technological Innovation in the Sugar-
based Economy and Sugar-Chemicals Sectors (PAISS) and the Ministry of 
Health’s Public–Private Production Development Partnerships (PPDP). PAISS is 
a supply-side stimulus aimed at tackling the key challenges that advanced 
technologies impose in order to maintain the country’s world leadership in 
sugarcane-based biofuels. It offers direct financial support to business, structured 
across the whole innovation cycle. PPDP is a demand-side policy geared towards 
building capabilities and catching, up mainly in biotechnologies applied to 
pharmaceuticals. In coordination with supply-side funding, it deploys public 
procurement to support partnerships for the local development, transfer and 
absorption of strategic health technologies.  
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Both programmes represent a positive turn in the historical record of policies 
oriented towards the sectors in question. The Brazilian pioneering production and 
use of vehicular biofuels based on sugarcane that dates back to the 1970s have 
benefited from active government support primarily through the mandatory 
blending of ethanol in gasoline – especially under the National Alcohol 
Programme created in 1975 (PROALCOOL). Conversely, the Brazilian 
pharmaceutical sector, which experienced a setback following the sudden 
liberalisation of markets in the 1990s, has enjoyed the government’s proactive 
engagement in rebuilding the industry. Key measures were the adoption of 
generic drugs legislation (1999) and the supply of subsidised credit under the 
BNDES Programme to Support the Development of the Pharmaceutical Industrial 
Chain (BNDES Profarma16) created in 2004. Therefore, it is only after these 
cumulative efforts in biofuels and pharmaceuticals that PAISS and PDPP could 
embrace a more systemic, purposefully driven view of innovation. 
2.5.1 Opportunity-driven risk-taking 
 
Both programmes aimed to stimulate high-risk private investments in R&D and 
innovation, following the perception of new opportunities. In the case of PAISS – 
the joint initiative by BNDES and FINEP launched in 2011, new technologies for 
the processing of sugar-based biomass brought the potential for breaking new 
ground in productivity gains for the biofuel agroindustry. The frontier has been 
moving from traditional fermentation techniques (first-generation biofuels) to 
more efficient models based on biochemical or thermochemical processes – the 
                                               
16 According to Gomes et al. (2014), the successful implementation of Profarma involved three 
distinct phases: in Phase I (2004–2007) the focus was on production capabilities; in Phase II 
(2008–2012) there was a move towards incremental innovations (mainly generic drugs); and in 
Phase III (2013 onwards) the emphasis shifted to biosimilar drugs and biotechnology. 
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second-generation (E2G) or advanced biofuels. Thus, there were advantages 
regarding environmental sustainability and energy efficiency, in particular 
because these new processes represented a promising alternative to fossil fuels. 
In turn, the Ministry of Health’s (MS) PPDP released in 2009, came in response 
to the awareness that biotechnology could help to reposition the national 
pharmaceutical industry in the world. The imminent expiry of patents (held by 
global players) for drugs that represented a heavy burden on the public 
healthcare system’s (SUS) budget opened a window of opportunity for steering 
private investment in directions that ensured access to medicines. Besides 
potentially having high spillover effects, the programme represented a systemic 
view in which innovation was integrated into economic and social development 
perspectives (Gadelha 2003; 2009). Therefore, PAISS and PDPP were both 
oriented towards seizing the opportunities that increased risk-taking could offer, 
including high economic, environmental and social benefits.  
Favourable supply- and demand conditions were in place that suggested that 
Brazil could succeed if the government acted. PAISS qualified, having natural 
resources, a competitive industry, and potential demand due to the prevalence of 
vehicles that could operate on different types of fuel (‘flex-fuel vehicles’) (Nyko et 
al. 2010). Scientific and technological capabilities in ethanol,17 and public funding 
sources of sufficient scale to support internationalisation strategies (BNDES), 
were also essential. PDPP had a mature generic drugs industry and the demand 
of one of the largest healthcare systems in the world. Public laboratories with 
some experience of biotechnology, a science base and growing STI infrastructure 
                                               
17 For a historical analysis of the Brazilian sugarcane innovation system and its dynamics see 
Furtado et al. (2011).  
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were also relevant. Hence, in both cases, the combination of supply- and 
demand-side factors, STI base and public finance constituted drivers of change 
in the ambitions of policymakers.  
However, the challenges were enormous. In PAISS, adopting technologies under 
test required investors to bear inevitable failures. A viable cost of production has 
yet to be reached, and the high productivity levels of the first-generation biofuels 
set a benchmark that was difficult to overcome. There was also the risk of 
international players arriving first and foreclosing the window of opportunity. 
Similarly, PDPP faced vulnerabilities such as a poorly integrated supply chain – 
including small and fragmented biotech firms. Given the high technological 
complexity of the products targeted for development through tech transfers, the 
risks were high and dependent on the accumulation of capabilities and 
infrastructure. Moreover, as public demand alone could not ensure a viable rate 
of return for supported companies, market risks remained high. Thus, the two 
cases dealt with technological challenges that required long-term, high-risk and 
capital-intensive investments that the private sector could not meet on its own. 
PAISS and PDPP appeared in response, as possibilities for public–private 
partnerships: the former focused on direct supply-push mechanisms, the later on 
demand-pull. 
2.5.2 Public sector leadership  
 
The leading role of state actors in mapping the technological, economic and 
institutional challenges, engaging with business, and devising solutions was vital. 
In the case of PAISS, public officials from BNDES started investigating the 
reasons behind the stagnation of the Brazilian ethanol agroindustry early in 2010. 
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Back then, confronted with a complex R&D project, BNDES and FINEP were 
grappling with the problem of improving coordination and the structure of funding. 
This situation prompted ideas on how public support could be best employed 
(see, Nyko et al. 2010)).18 Early communications with business, signalling a 
willingness to share the risks of investments, would also prove strategic:  
We noticed that whoever managed to solve these technological 
bottlenecks would establish this industry…we offered financial 
support with a view on this future… Once we had a diagnosis, we 
devised a strategy and engaged with the business sector 
(Interviewee 9, PublMa). 
 
In turn, PDPP stemmed from the gradual alignment of industrial, STI and health 
policy agendas. In 2004, the formulation of a National Policy for Science, 
Technology, and Innovation in Health (MS 2008) was a milestone in building a 
shared vision among stakeholders in the public and private sectors and organised 
civil society.19 While public officials operating the BNDES Profarma engaged in 
diagnosis and prognosis (see Reis et al. (2009, 2010, 2011)), the MS was taking 
the first steps towards using strategic procurement. The approximation between 
them facilitated coordination. Therefore, the proactive and future-looking attitudes 
of public officials in decentralised agencies triggered PAISS, and both bottom-up 
and top-down pressures contributed to PDPP.  
Indeed, the public sector’s leadership in PDPP went far beyond stimulating 
private investment, as BNDES was playing an active role in articulating existing 
national players under a more competitive structure. Moreover, the successful 
experience of engaging a public laboratory in tech transfer from a pharmaceutical 
                                               
18 This background is recalled by Nyko et al. (2013). 
19 For a detailed account on the consensus-building process driven by the Ministry of Health, see 
Guimarães et al. (2006). 
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company and local production in 2007,20 offered a template upon which to 
structure the procurement programme. Hence, in addition to the public sector’s 
leadership in terms of financing and coordination, one can observe a process of 
growing confidence to deal with business: 
What is it that allows us to be so bold? It’s that Brazil has a large 
market. With… 200 million people, you can ask for certain 
responses (Interviewee 33, PublMa). 
 
The mobilising feature of the state’s risk-taking is apparent. PAISS made it 
possible to increase the scale of public support and combine the financing 
instruments of BNDES and FINEP. Before PAISS (2010), public investment 
amounted R$ 415 million ($ 250 million21); from 2011 to 2015, it reached R$ 5 
billion ($ 2.3 billion) (Nyko et al. 2013). FINEP non-refundable grants targeted the 
early stages of R&D, whereas BNDES credit and equity were key for reaching 
the higher-risk and capital-intensive stages of industrial plants. Likewise, federal 
investment in health R&D gradually moved from R$ 600 million ($ 433 million) in 
2004 to R$ 1.7 billion ($ 907 million) in 2013.22 The coordinated efforts within the 
government enabled a systemic policy approach to PDPP, having public actors 
who would fund R&D directly, perform it, or manufacture/buy the resulting 
products.  
2.5.3 Incremental legal and institutional innovations  
 
The move towards public–private partnerships had incremental legal and 
institutional transformations as vehicles. PAISS’s approach to attracting private 
                                               
20 On that occasion, the MS had issued a compulsory licence for the drug Efavirenz which is used 
for HIV treatment.  
21 Hereafter, conversion from Brazilian R$ into US dollars adopted the Purchasing Power Parity 
Exchange Rate of the corresponding year (www.ipeadata.gov.br). Accessed on 9 October 2018. 
22 http://www.mcti.gov.br/index.php/content/view/29534.html. Accessed on 5 May 2018. 
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investments involved opening calls for funding applications and experimentation 
with priority setting. The first edition (2011–2014) targeted the development of 
2EG and renewable chemical technologies, whereas the second (2014–2018) 
targeted agricultural bioenergy. Another novelty was the structuring of the bidding 
process around business plans instead of R&D projects, signalling a preference 
for investments with high commercial potential. In PDPP, converting an early 
attempt at priority setting (Portaria n. 978/2008) into a systematic practice within 
the MS demanded new governance structures. The Executive Coordination 
Group (GECIS) has representatives of ministries and public agencies, including 
BNDES and FINEP. It is responsible for publicising the list of strategic products, 
which triggers procurement and guides investment decisions of both public and 
private actors. Another example is the National Committee for Technology 
Incorporation (CONITEC). With civil society participation, CONITEC defines the 
criteria for investment and disinvestment in technologies for the healthcare 
system.  
Public agencies’ attempts to guide the directions of innovation involved 
conditionalities but maintained degrees of flexibility. BNDES and FINEP included 
commercial application, production, and collaboration with other firms and/or 
research institutions as qualifying criteria for PAISS23 while ensuring freedom for 
companies to choose technological paths and partners. In PDPP, the government 
required the involvement of public laboratories in the partnerships, quality 
standards and gradual price reductions of the products that, if met, would benefit 
                                               
23 Annex I to the Cooperation Agreement between BNDES and FINEP: 
https://www.bndes.gov.br/wps/portal/site/home/financiamento/plano-inova-empresa/plano-
conjunto-bndes-finep-apoio-inovacao-tecnologica-industrial-setores-sucroenergetico-
sucroquimico-paiss/plano-conjunto-bndes-finep-apoio-inovacao-tecnologica-industrial-setores-
sucroenergetico-sucroquimico-paiss. Accessed on 10 May 2018. 
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from public demand over the following ten years. Public laboratories featured as 
mediators of the relationships between the MS and firms – de facto price 
regulators – and internalisers of technological and production capabilities through 
transfers. This institutional design illustrates the bold attitude of the state, and 
reveals the legal and political–economic nature of the challenges confronted: 
Because [public] labs are subject to bidding exemption [under the 
procurement legislation], they have been chosen to stand as 
‘sellers’ of health goods to the MS…they are [also] in a better 
position to resist dumping (Interviewee 36, CivSoc); 
and 
Multinationals cannot acquire public labs, so technology knowledge 
can remain in Brazil (Interviewee 40, PrivMa). 
 
Incremental institutional changes happened at various levels to enable 
implementation. PDPP demanded extensive regulations beyond the Innovation 
Law’s general provisions. Law 12349/10 amended the procurement legislation, 
establishing preferential margins for the health sector and additional margins for 
products developed locally. Similarly, the regulatory framework for biological 
products had to be built (RDCs 55 and 49). Furthermore, a conditioning factor 
was that the choice of standards compatible with those of European and US 
agencies allowed for the mitigation of market risks. 
Increased institutionalisation, capacity building and adjustments were important 
ingredients that enabled the programmes to operate and the inevitable failures to 
be borne. Indeed, public officials at BNDES and FINEP described PAISS as an 
innovation itself, a process of “learning by doing” (Nyko et al. 2013, p. 60). One 
could say the same about PDPP. It started with a few partnerships (around 25) 
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and soon scaled up to over a hundred. As the programme evolved, the rules that 
defined procedures for, obligations on and responsibilities for public and private 
actors went through a revision (in 2014), later obtaining clearance from the 
auditing bodies. Thus, public risk-taking came hand-in-hand with efforts to 
strengthen the legal and institutional frameworks.  
Public organisations themselves had to adapt in order to embrace active policies. 
Under PAISS, the provision of structured support changed the dynamics of 
financial design in that businesses would no longer apply for specific types of 
support for individual R&D projects. Instead, public agencies were put in charge 
of selecting the financing tools that best suited the different stages of business 
R&D plans (Nyko et al. 2013). BNDES’ institutional set-up regarding PDPP, in 
turn, exemplifies more profound changes associated with a new mindset. In 2016, 
the department that was in charge of promoting the pharmaceutical industry 
became the Department of Industrial Complex and Health Service (DECISS), 
reflecting a move beyond the sectoral level consistent with the national policy 
perspective. Hence, both programmes were implemented within evolving legal 
and institutional frameworks.  
2.5.4 New financing instruments, risk diversification and competition 
 
The quest to promote investments of higher technological risk also prompted 
attempts to devise new financing instruments that allowed public agencies to 
increase their risk appetite. In 2016, while targeting the scaling-up phase that is 
critical in the case of biofuels, BNDES introduced the Hybrid Debenture for 
 
 
 
100 
Innovation Support (THAI).24 While the aim was to encourage disruptive 
innovations in large companies, in practice, design and implementation proved to 
be challenging, not only for legal and technical reasons, but also due to internal 
tensions:  
We noticed that the DoE (US Department of Energy) concentrated 
the bulk of non-refundable grants on few and not small companies, 
yet by law, BNDES cannot operate non-refundable…The challenge 
was to design a financial instrument with features of equity but 
linked to the innovation project...Internally…the biggest…resistance 
referred to the withdrawal of collateral guarantees…It is an 
extremely complex product, which took us almost a year to develop, 
following failed attempts in the past (Interviewee 18, PublMa). 
 
Earlier, in the context of financial support to pharmaceuticals, BNDES had also 
experimented with another financing instrument – the Future Revenue-Sharing 
Risk Contract (BNDES 2010). However, operational difficulties and the lack of 
demand for this kind of support led to it being withdrawn from use:  
It was difficult to assess revenues and to define clear milestones for 
firms. Finally, it ended up not generating returns (Interviewee 11, 
PublMa). 
 
In the interviews, public officials showed they had been mindful of the importance 
of increasing their risk-taking, for which ensuring an equitable sharing of any 
potential rewards in case of success would serve as an enabler.  
In order to manage the risks taken, indications suggest that public agencies have 
pursued a sensitive portfolio approach. PAISS funds were spread across many 
types of firms and industries such as national start-ups, medium-sized and larger 
                                               
24 https://www.bndes.gov.br/wps/portal/site/home/financiamento/produto/bndes-thai. Accessed 
on 1 June 2018. 
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firms related to the sugar and ethanol industry (GranBio, CTC S.A. and Raízen 
S.A.) along with larger international groups in the biotech (Amyris, Novozymes 
and Mascoma), chemicals (Dow and Dupont) and oil sectors (Oliveira Filho & 
Consoni 2016). While part of the public support covered investments in R&D such 
as laboratory facilities and pilot plants, others entailed demonstration and 
commercial facilities. Moreover, to the extent that companies were left to choose 
their preferred technological solutions, PAISS financing also allowed variety and 
exploration of technological paths. By doing so, besides mitigating the blame-
game regarding inevitable losses, this financing also increased the chances of 
success. In contrast, PDPP took an important step towards developing a portfolio 
approach when, following an initial period in which the MS commissioned a sole 
partnership for each product, it introduced competition. While advancing risk-
mitigation practices helped to alleviate accusations of ‘picking winners’, it would 
not prevent failures – more than 25 partnerships have been dissolved along the 
way.  
2.5.5 Profit-sharing and conditionalities balancing the risks and rewards 
of investing 
 
In both programmes, concrete mechanisms were adopted to ensure that the state 
could benefit from the upside in case of success and compensate for the likely 
setbacks. In the context of PAISS, until the creation of THAI, equity was the main 
instrument that the public sector could employ for that purpose, and it is what we 
have referred to in Chapter 1 as a ‘profit-sharing policy instrument’. Indeed, 
BNDES played an active role in seeking minority shareholder participation in 
national players such as Granbio and the Sugar Cane Technology Centre, thus 
acting as a venture capitalist. There were advantages for both the public and 
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private sides of the partnership. Within structured support that combines several 
financing instruments, shareholding activity reduces the risks on BNDES’ lending 
by helping national firms to build muscle. Moreover, if the investment thrives, the 
bank can recoup a share of rewards that it can channel into further investments: 
We enter these equity partnerships due to the technological risks 
involved and the expected returns. If [it] works, we can have a 
[financial] return that can fund future initiatives. At this stage, 
however, we are not making any money…it could even be that firms 
other than the ones on which we’ve bet might win the race 
(Interviewee 9, PublMa).  
 
The use of this type of financing instrument has also aimed to fulfil the strategic 
purpose of keeping national (as opposed to foreign) control over supported 
companies. An interviewee in the private sector made it clear: 
If there weren’t public support, probably the company wouldn’t be 
Brazilian and investments would have taken longer to happen 
(Interviewee 10, PrivMa). 
 
It is worth noting that neither BNDES nor FINEP retains IPR on the exploitation 
of research results. Public officials at both agencies reported having discarded 
this option as a more general policy stance, due (among other reasons) to the 
high bureaucratic costs and potential for driving private investment away. 
In contrast, since PDPP’s anchor is public procurement, the conditionality on 
pricing is the primary mechanism through which the government recoups any 
financial rewards. Here, aside from the impact on national savings, price 
regulation has a concrete meaning linked to access to medicines. The starting 
point is the obligation for firms to incur some price reduction, not necessarily 
initially, but along the learning curve and throughout the product cycle. Even 
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though price stability is expected, renegotiation is also possible in the case of 
supervening circumstances. Therefore, the evidence suggests that risk-and-
reward sharing serves multiple and strategic purposes, but that implementation 
invites caution and flexibility. Public agencies’ ability to negotiate and compromise 
is key because it is what allows the creation and development of a common path 
with the business sector (Chapter 1):   
We are flexible and offer opportunities for [companies] to defer 
payment [via equity] (Interviewee 19, PublMa); 
and 
The guarantee of [public procurement] will lower industry costs with 
marketing and commercialisation, which are up to 40% of 
pharmaceuticals value. Can I ask for a 40% price reduction? … 
What is the price? It’s the price of common sense! That’s why it’s so 
complex and risky (Interviewee 33, PublMa). 
  
Just as important as the government’s predisposition to have dialogue and to 
negotiate with the private sector, is that of reaching agreement across public 
agencies. In particular, in the context of a systemic policy like PDPP, overcoming 
the inherent tensions between different players’ rationales, interests and return 
expectations – for instance, between public financiers and public purchasers – is 
challenging but possible through coordination. Another critical issue concerns 
negotiating with auditing bodies, if possible ex ante, over assessment criteria 
beyond the standard cost-benefit analysis:  
In technology procurement I can’t be opening a bid to obtain the 
lowest price every year… [on the other hand], whoever takes a 
picture…[now] will forget that in the first year I [have obtained] a 
40% price reduction…there must be a reasonable way in which this 
can be done (Interviewee 33, PublMa). 
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In order to mitigate accountability risks for public managers, which negatively 
affect private investments, building consensus regarding the appropriate metrics 
to deal with the dynamic and uncertain nature of the innovation process is critical. 
Table 2.3 includes a summary of the results of the comparative analysis of the 
two programmes. 
Table 2.3 A comparison between PAISS and PDPP through a market co-
creating and shaping lens 
 
Guiding questions PAISS (supply-push) PDPP (demand-pull) 
What are the 
programmes’ 
motivations and aims? 
 
2nd generation biofuels, 
sustainability and 
competitiveness 
Biopharmaceuticals,  
access to medicines and 
competitiveness 
Who takes the lead, the 
private or public sector? 
 
Forward-looking public 
officials 
Top-down and bottom-up 
pressures 
What legal and 
institutional changes 
enable implementation? 
 
Conditionalities and 
flexibilities 
New governance 
structures, regulation and 
routines 
How do federal funding 
agencies seek to 
increase and manage the 
risks taken? 
 
New financing instruments, risk diversification and 
competition 
How is an equitable 
sharing of rewards 
pursued? 
Profit-sharing (equity) Profit-sharing (equity) and 
conditionality (pricing) 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
2.6. Outcomes, risks and rewards: a preliminary appraisal  
 
It is beyond the scope of this research to include an evaluation of the impact of 
the programmes and, in any case, it would be premature to do so as they are 
ongoing. However, some results are already visible and help to illuminate the 
risk–reward dynamics in the public–private partnerships in question. Below, the 
results have been pulled together under three categories: public risk-taking 
 
 
 
105 
boosting private risk-taking; limitations in public risk-taking mirrored in private 
risk-taking; and links between public and private rewards.  
Public risk-taking boosting private risk-taking. Once the public sector was 
willing to take risks, it managed to attract private investment and stimulate 
collaboration. During PAISS’s first phase, the announcement of R$ 1 billion of 
public funds prompted 39 business plans (35 selected) involving potential 
investments of nearly R$ 6 billion linked to 25 firms, 7 business consortia, and 10 
university–industry partnerships. In response, public funding increased to around 
R$ 3 billion, indicating the public sector’s disposition to undertake higher risks. 
Subsequently (2015), two commercial plants were under operation, one under 
construction, and one demonstration plant was operating. Brazil now hosts 12% 
of the world’s installed capacity for 2EG production, following the United States, 
Europe and China (UNCTAD 2016). Furthermore, two of the three companies 
closer to reaching economic viability, GranBio and Raízen S.A. (Marques 2018), 
have remained under national capital control.  
PDPP achieved similar outcomes. In parallel with their production of generic 
drugs, local companies embraced the biotech endeavour. From 2009 to 2014, 
105 partnerships obtained approval, involving 50 private and 19 public 
laboratories, covering 61 drugs, 6 vaccines, 19 health products and 5 devices 
(Vargas et al. 2016). According to the same source, by the end of 2014, 
procurement linked to the programme amounted to R$ 2.7 billion (U$ 1.3 billion), 
generating R$ 1.8 billion (U$ 880 million) savings for SUS and over R$ 9.1 billion 
(U$ 4.4 billion) of revenue for public producers. Furthermore, building work 
started on two new manufacturing plants for biopharmaceuticals.  
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Limitations in public risk-taking mirrored in private risk-taking. As public 
agencies were able to take some risks – albeit while maintaining caution in 
several domains – business responded accordingly. In PAISS, public officials 
noticed that the early stages of technology development, which typically had been 
supported by grants, suffered from an insufficient scale (Milanez et al. 2015). Out 
of the R$ 5 billion of public funds mobilised, only R$ 250 million were non-
refundable. FINEP’s capacity in this realm has improved but is still deficient. 
Thus, with few exceptions, most companies opted for technologies developed 
abroad, not daring to try local alternatives during the more embryonic stages 
(Milanez et al. 2015). The lack of specific demand-side policies25 and other 
incentives left the acceleration of 2EG diffusion vulnerable:  
Establishing a new industry…depends on more than finance (…) 
regulation…, tax incentives and… support on collateral guarantees 
[are also important], …[but] here we only have finance (Interviewee 
9, PublMa). 
 
One can observe an analogous dynamic in PDPP. Despite growing its ambition, 
the government remained limited in its ability to do more. Auditing and judicial 
bodies still consider the lowest price to be the guiding principle for procurement, 
regardless of the written rule including qualitative criteria. The cautious pace at 
which institutional building aligns with policy agenda somehow stifles the process, 
exposing public and private actors to additional risks:  
The regulatory framework is not ready for innovation. Pioneer 
companies are paying the price of arriving first: there isn’t 
institutional hostility, government agencies are proactive and 
engaged in seeking solutions, but it isn’t simple, and it takes time 
(Interviewee 41, PrivMa); 
                                               
25 Since the 1930s, the government determined the mandatory blending of ethanol in gasoline 
(5%). In 1975, it raised it to 20% and stimulated ethanol production and use. To date, the stimulus 
maintains similar levels but has no specific reference to 2EG. 
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and 
[Because] there is legal and institutional instability to deal with the 
risks of innovation (…) public managers are scared. [Being fearful 
makes it unlikely that they will engage in any innovation] 
(Interviewee 33, PublMa). 
 
The lack of a stable legal framework increased the uncertainties, especially 
following the economic and political turmoil that ensued in 2015, contributing to 
some firms downsizing their original plans (Fontes 2016). 
PDPP provides yet another clear indication of the link between the public and 
private sectors’ risk-taking. Policymakers envisioned that public laboratories 
would gradually move from being knowledge-transfer recipients and 
manufacturers to being R&D providers, and procurement would enable the 
development of technologies new to the world. Nevertheless, conciliating the 
goals and rewards expectations of public and private actors regarding future 
technologies has proved to be more difficult than anticipated. Consequently, as 
yet, local companies are not necessarily betting in directions that meet public 
health priorities. 
Links between public and private rewards. Public agencies sought 
mechanisms that enabled an equitable sharing of rewards, which favoured a 
balanced risk–reward nexus. Both cases showed how state action towards 
enabling such a nexus appeared as an evolving process. Indeed, in the context 
of the incipient emergence of the role of the state as an investor in Brazil, it was 
possible to observe that public actors have exercised caution about rewards. 
Within PAISS, a public official recalled that the possibility of retaining a golden 
share in individual companies had been discussed but not implemented:  
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Sometimes we support university start-ups that may end [up being] 
sold to foreign companies and the state receives nothing in 
exchange...Golden shares… can be designed… [so] the company 
needs to compensate the state or give it priority to buy [it] 
(Interviewee 9, PublMa). 
 
Although golden shares could have enhanced public appropriability, it is not clear 
whether they would have been endorsed by business partners.  
Nevertheless, the unveiling of policymakers’ concerns with keeping national 
versus foreign ownership of capital investments indicates another way in which 
the disconnection between those who bear the risks and those who reap the 
rewards might occur. The economic openness that could serve as a catalyst to 
innovation has given way to the aggressive strategies of global players, resulting 
in increased risks of losing national ownership. In contrast, PDPP dealt with this 
by building a complex institutional arrangement anchored in public laboratories. 
Therefore, the cases show that the efforts to create an explicit link between risks 
and rewards in public–private partnerships led stakeholders to different 
contextual solutions that, albeit imperfect, have been negotiated and accepted. 
2.7 Key issues for policy and practice  
 
In this chapter the aim has been to analyse critical issues in the implementation 
of public–private investment partnership programmes, and explore the risk–
reward nexus. To this end, an analytical framework has been proposed – called 
the market co-creating and shaping framework – which has been used in an 
empirical analysis of recent innovation policies in Brazil that can be seen as the 
government taking small steps towards mission-oriented initiatives. The case 
studies offer evidence confirming that the framework is a useful analytical tool 
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and that it is relevant to actual experiences. The studies also highlighted some 
complexities which need to be taken into account in the design, implementation 
and evaluation of this policy approach. Hence, there are lessons drawn from the 
Brazilian experience that can serve as guidance for other government initiatives. 
In the following sub-sections, these lessons have been assembled under four 
headings: carving out a suitable policy space; making entrepreneurial public 
finance effective; building legal foundations for symbiotic public–private 
partnerships; and nurturing institutional learning and capability accumulation.  
2.7.1 Carving out a suitable policy space 
 
As anticipated in Section 2.3, a change of vision from the top by which the 
government commits to promoting development policies, though a necessary 
foundation, is not enough. Equally important is the state’s convening power. It 
must be able to create the synergies needed, within and across ministries and 
agencies, to harmonise macro- and micro-economics with social policy goals. 
Achieving this, however, first requires a change to the rationale that sees the 
space for policymaking as limited to fixing market failures. A fundamental shift in 
mindset, capable of countering the stigma attached to state ‘intervention’, while 
increasing public agencies’ stamina to act as key drivers of economic and social 
change is, thus, critical for the development of virtuous public–private 
partnerships. The Brazilian cases illustrate that such a shift is possible even after 
a long period of neoliberal administrations. Still, it tends to be gradual and 
concentrated in a few ‘islands of excellence’.  
The process of legitimacy-building goes over and above the structural economic 
conditions preceding a given policy. It features as strategic throughout the policy 
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process, even more so in young democracies like Brazil. On the one hand, the 
creation of a shared vision that guides large-scale initiatives must already be 
present when the programme is formulated. In PAISS, whose design involved 
mainly BNDES and FINEP, public officials perceived that engaging more actors 
at that stage would have helped to strengthen public support. On the other hand, 
a policy like PDPP was part of a more articulated strategy for the health sector, 
engaging a wide range of actors such as civil society, public agencies and 
business. This suggests that expanding participation in the formulation of the 
policy – that is, combining both top-down and bottom-up approaches – is 
essential for legitimation and increases the likelihood of sustaining the policy’s 
effects in the long-run; it is also in line with the considerations that have been 
highlighted in studies on the need for democratising decisions about the 
directions of innovation (Stirling 2008, 2009).  
Following on from the above, the specification of the intended policy outcomes in 
terms of environmental, social and economic benefits – on which the two 
programmes relied – also plays a role in constructing a favourable political 
environment for targeted initiatives. However, it is not sufficient. The value of an 
open-ended interaction, not just across public agencies but also between them 
and business and civil society, also became apparent. While an 
intergovernmental body that helped to bring coherence to public (and private) 
actions were missing in PAISS, it and other participatory institutions were present 
in PDPP, contributing to the latter’s systemic approach and stronger support. In 
any case, the starting point for any such policy must be a predisposition of public 
and private actors to collaborate with one another so as to promote the socio-
economic goal in question.  
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2.7.2 Making entrepreneurial public finance effective  
 
The change in the government’s strategy must translate into real financial risk-
taking and sharing capacities that enable the state to become entrepreneurial in 
the first place. While this is an aspect that might have been overlooked in studies 
focusing on contexts where the public sector had been playing a leading role for 
a long time, in the Brazilian cases, its relevance emerges clearly. Once federal 
agencies came under active, and forward-looking directorships – aligned with the 
administration’s vision, vested with autonomy and funding – proactive and 
innovative attitudes flourished in the bureaucracy. It then became possible to 
improve both the quantity and quality of public finance.  
The gains in scale and scope of public support, spread across the innovation 
chain while reaching the supply and demand sides through a wide range of 
instruments, are core ingredients for stimulating high-risk private investments. In 
the case of PAISS, collaboration between the funding agencies was intended to 
achieve greater breadth of support which was then expected to enhance their 
performance. There was an acknowledgement that the absence of specific 
measures to stimulate the demand and supply sides were shortcomings that the 
creation of a new market (ideally) would need to overcome. A similar and yet 
more comprehensive mix of policy instruments was deployed in PDPP, linking up 
the supply and demand sides to tackle the transformation of an existing market. 
This is consistent with what other comparative studies on mission-oriented R&D 
have found (e.g. Foray et al. (2012)) regarding the importance of systemic 
policies in positively affecting the rate and direction of private investment.  
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Increasing the impetus of strategic public finance further involves assigning it 
properties such as patience, timely investment and some flexibility. It is worth 
recalling that the point of departure was a change in public funding agencies’ 
operational policies, indicating their willingness to take risks (Section 2.3). In the 
case studies, the initiative to advance entrepreneurship first came from the public 
sector. The interview data also supports the interpretation that companies 
recognised that the state took the lead, arriving before the private sector and 
accelerating investments that otherwise would have taken longer (if ever) to 
happen. Besides, public support was well timed as it tackled challenges that 
benefited from windows of opportunity.  
Similarly, there is evidence pointing to a nexus between the risk appetite of public 
and private actors which showed that public officials were aware of the 
importance of playing an active role; for example, there was the realisation that 
less ambitious business behaviour mirrors cautious attitudes in the public sector 
(e.g. the insufficient scale of grants allocated within PAISS) and there were 
attempts to innovate around financial instruments (in both cases). Although the 
evidence presented here is limited to two case studies, which involved some 
constraints in terms of the scale of resources mobilised and other factors, it does 
provide elements relevant to the Entrepreneurial State hypothesis as put forward 
by Mazzucato (2013). However, there is one aspect of the evidence that 
contradicts that hypothesis.  
Public–private partnerships can, and must, occur in explicit ways. The analysis 
has drawn attention to instances in which risk-sharing was considered vital, and 
stakeholders were outspoken about what was being agreed upon, 
notwithstanding the uncertainties involved. This means that some common 
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understanding regarding risk allocation had been achieved. Thus, the rise of the 
new ‘Developmental and Entrepreneurial State’ does not depend on 
implementation through implicit policies (Block 2008; Mazzucato 2013). If risk-
sharing occurs consciously and openly, it is more likely to allow openness about 
the distribution of rewards.  
2.7.3 Building the legal foundations for symbiotic public–private 
partnerships 
 
Besides having the political will and availability of resources to invest, solid legal 
bases are needed that enable the state to engage effectively in collaboration with 
business. The Brazilian experience is again revealing in this respect. The case 
studies illustrate that the incipient rise of public entrepreneurial finance requires 
the breaking of new ground in terms of legal and institutional building. They also 
showed that this process evolves incrementally, and can take some time to 
mature. Filling the gap between the adoption of a broad legal framework for 
innovation, and implementation, often involves further amendments in legislation, 
new administrative procedures, regulations, financing instruments allowing for 
risk-and-reward sharing, contract designs, etc. 
A crucial focus of tension that needs to be overcome consists of defining the 
boundaries within which public funds can be put at risk. This is apparent in the 
case of PDPP, in which interviewees stressed that public–private partnerships 
faced additional uncertainties due to the legal framework being under 
construction. Needless to say, to welcome long-term investment requires stability 
of governing rules, predictability and guarantees that contracts agreed upon will 
be honoured. Also important are high levels of institutionalisation of selection and 
decision-making processes within public agencies, along with robust internal and 
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external controls as safeguards against arbitrariness, capture and corruption. 
However, equally imperative is that the legal environment develops tolerance to 
(1) recognise that some margin of discretion is inherent to any investment, policy 
and legal process; and (2) protect public officials in case of losses owing to market 
or technological risks.  
Otherwise, irrespective of how technically sound public investments may be in 
terms of their compliance with standards of good practice and prudence, the 
entire premise behind a policy driven by public sector entrepreneurship falls flat. 
While the evidence indicated the constitutive features of legal institutions in 
defining the room for public risk-taking (Laplane & Mazzucato 2019), there is 
more to be understood about how to shape the legal foundations that allow 
entrepreneurial states to emerge and become acceptable. 
Statutory laws that incorporate the notion that innovation has social value, and 
subsequent formal rules that operationalise this notion, may trigger the legal 
design chain, yet effectivity also lies in those norms being perceived as fair and 
interpreted as such by judges, auditing bodies and citizens. The evidence on the 
difficulties of obtaining a common view about the metrics for policy evaluation 
underscores that this might become an obstacle, suggesting that policymakers’ 
disposition to take part in dialogue and to compromise may be a valuable (Pistor 
2009), if not essential, requirement for promoting awareness of the inherent risks 
of innovation. Since building consensus around public risk-taking is so urgent and 
complex, the legal framework must also ensure the negotiation of an equitable 
deal regarding the appropriation of any arising rewards. The case studies 
unveiled that such negotiation was an enabling device for raising the stakes of 
public–private partnerships which motivated innovations around financing 
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instruments. In this sense, the social – and importantly legal – construction that 
allows both the risks and rewards of public investments to become socialised 
become palpable. Thus, the evidence presented supports an interpretation that 
sees a rationale for policy design to include mechanisms that enable the state to 
capture a share of financial rewards of publicly financed innovations (Lazonick & 
Mazzucato 2013; Laplane & Mazzucato 2019). 
Although the primary policy objective is to promote innovations that tackle 
relevant societal problems, a secondary policy objective is to build an 
environment within which actors can feasibly reach an agreement concerning the 
potential rewards. The empirical analysis showed the importance of operating 
under a legal framework that is flexible enough to allow supported companies’ 
financial positions to be considered before the imposition of a distribution of 
profits that could harm them. This aspect is even more relevant for developing 
and emerging economies, which usually lack robust technology-based firms. A 
sensible approach seems critical, especially given public officials’ references to 
the difficulties of overcoming resistance to having flexible collateral guarantees – 
and their observations suggest they also faced pressures to generate returns for 
their organisations. Therefore, elaborating adequate safeguards to restrain short-
termism and profit-seeking within public agencies themselves is also important to 
ensure adherence to the main policy objective of promoting innovations that 
tackle relevant societal problems. Omission of this aspect would also result in the 
breaking down of the expected symbiosis in public–private partnerships that 
justifies their existence in the first place.  
While policymakers can draw on a variety of financing instruments that make it 
possible to share the risks and rewards of innovation, the identification and 
 
 
 
116 
selection of those that are fit for each context is another issue that deserves 
attention. Because public agencies considered and eventually discarded 
alternatives like IPR or golden shares, advancing knowledge on individual 
instruments may help to illuminate which types of deals are feasible in different 
settings so as to overcome constraints imposed by the legal framework and 
actors’ capabilities. If increasing the array of reward-generating mechanisms 
allows for better adjustment to contextual circumstances, linking them up through 
a portfolio approach that diversifies risks while ensuring recoupment in the upside 
is just as suitable for legitimation purposes.  
2.7.4 Nurturing institutional learning and capability accumulation  
 
Instead of focusing on whether public and private actors know how to establish 
symbiotic public–private partnerships, a more pressing issue to consider is 
whether these actors can develop the capabilities to learn how to do so and 
improve their partnerships over time. In Section 2.3 favourable conditions were 
presented that allow for changes in institutions and practices, as well as in the 
mindset of the various actors, to occur while the cases illustrated the importance 
of competent and highly motivated bureaucracies with problem-solving attitudes. 
Nevertheless, key challenges persist. 
Equipping state agencies with institutional structures and technical and policy 
capacities that enable them to be nimble is a conditioning factor for entering the 
risk–reward game. The interview data highlighted that public officials face 
difficulties in operating instruments such as non-refundable grants and strategic 
procurement, at least in part because of legal and institutional rigidities. Also, 
there were references to the complexity of financial instruments, R&D projects 
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and business plans themselves, highlighting the centrality of developing the 
required expertise in risk assessment, valuation and the measurements on which 
to retrieve expected rewards (Windus & Schiffel 1976). Devising adequate 
mechanisms within the state that allow for the constant monitoring and 
identification of investment opportunities and future needs is also important. 
PDPP contemplated this with CONITEC, but the fact that such a structure was 
absent in the case of PAISS suggests that in some innovation systems this 
remains as a rather ad hoc practice. Surely there are opportunities for public 
organisations to review, simplify and improve their procedures so that they can 
effectively speed up their operational capacities. There is, however, a trade-off 
between fast-tracking proceedings, and the quality of negotiations with business, 
especially when more substantial changes in industrial strategies are at stake. 
Indeed, one of the lessons from PAISS is that accelerating procedures can be 
vain and even counterproductive, considering that strategic decision-making in 
the corporate sphere may need time (Nyko et al. 2013). Therefore, institutional 
and capacity building is also a matter of learning by doing.  
The advancement of risk–reward management strategies and practices is 
another critical factor for spurring policy and institutional learning. Both cases 
offered evidence showing that public agencies took essential steps in the 
direction of a portfolio approach – including flexibility for companies to choose 
technological paths and R&D collaborators, risk diversification and competitive 
bids. There were perceptions that these contributed to mitigating the blame-game 
and the problem of picking winners. The empirical analysis also illustrated the 
experimental nature of government efforts to design and oversee their investment 
portfolios, from opening calls for funding applications to negotiating the contracts 
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with business. The analysis also made clear an additional advantage of a 
portfolio, concerned with allowing the eventual recoupment of financial returns, 
which is useful for recovering from losses and replenishing public funds that could 
sustain investments in the long-run. In any case, a crucial factor of success in 
portfolio management is that public and private actors get to learn from 
experience (Sabel 2004; Rodrik 2014; Karo & Kattel 2016), including from the 
failures in handling either the down- or upsides of the investment process 
(Laplane & Mazzucato 2019). Ultimately, building an institutional setting that 
nurtures exploration, trial and error, and learning, albeit challenging, is also a 
precondition for strengthening the state powers needed for addressing the 
directionality of innovation and negotiating more equitable partnerships.  
2.8 Conclusion 
 
The incipient emergence of a strategic role of the state co-creating and shaping 
markets in Brazil has been examined in this chapter. The findings come out of a 
comparative case study of two federal R&D programmes which had some 
features of mission-orientation. The starting point was a framework in which the 
state is viewed as a lead investor in innovation and promoter of legal and 
institutional changes capable of favouring symbiotic public–private 
collaborations. Evidence was presented which supported this view through the 
entrepreneurial way (i.e. that was opportunity-driven, proactive, problem-solving, 
and constructive) in which public funding agencies interacted with businesses 
and sought to achieve an explicit link between the risks and rewards of public 
investments.  
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The preliminary results of the programmes also made it possible to observe more 
closely the risk–reward dynamics in public–private partnerships. While public 
risk-taking has played a catalytic function, contributing to a virtuous ecosystem, 
its limitations and those of the mechanisms agreed upon regarding the 
appropriation of rewards became apparent. This finding indicates that the 
construction of a balanced risk–reward nexus, within an evolving legal–
institutional framework, is an outcome that reflects the possible agreement 
obtained between multiple stakeholders. This nexus is then contingent upon 
tensions, power and learning relations between all those involved.  
Some of the questions that the implementation of the market co-creating and 
shaping policy framework raises have been discussed (Section 2.7), although it 
should be noted that the case studies uncovered an additional complexity: how 
should the link between the risks taken and the rewards appropriated by public 
investors be sustained? Policymakers’ concern about the risk of denationalisation 
of businesses that benefited from public support deserves more attention and 
offers opportunities for future theoretical and practical developments. Not only do 
tech-based companies enjoy greater mobility than other types of business, but 
also they may be more vulnerable to takeovers by powerful global players. These 
trends are salient features of the increasingly integrated world economy and also 
reflect changes in the strategies of multinational corporations.  
A critical issue is the asymmetries in states’ powers and capabilities to formulate 
and sustain policies that confront the interests of powerful corporations. This 
problem – although particularly sensitive in the case of emerging and developing 
economies, where institutional vulnerabilities are usual features – is also 
experienced in other economies. Thus, expanding the framework to enable a 
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fuller understanding of the challenges and opportunities for devising responses 
at the local and national levels appears to be a worthwhile activity. Moving in this 
direction should enhance the explanatory power of the framework and contribute 
to making it an even more useful guide for policy. 
Lastly, the research findings raise some important lessons: in cases of emerging 
and middle-income economies that have accumulated some experience, they 
indicate that under certain circumstances, it is possible to create the spaces for 
active and broad-based innovation policies while exploring pathways for 
sustainability and inclusive development. Nevertheless, the challenges for 
institutional building and implementation must be noted. In the case of Brazil, the 
hope is that this early experience of engaging in market creation and shaping will 
help to illuminate present and future innovation policy. Because this positive 
agenda is vital for breaking out of the current economic, political and institutional 
crisis, it is one that the country cannot afford to give up. 
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Chapter 3 Public risks rewarded: Lessons from 
contract design in public investments in innovation 
 
 
Abstract26 
In this chapter the features of contracts designed by public funding institutions 
that have explicitly embraced an active entrepreneurial role are explored. 
Particular attention is given to those features associated with the possibility of 
equitable sharing of financial rewards arising from public–private investment 
partnerships. The analysis proceeds through the case study of the partnership 
between the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) and the research centre 
CSEM Brazil, which involved amendments in the contracts that led to a shift from 
non-refundable grants to reward-sharing. The main attributes and functions of 
those contracts were identified from open-ended semi-structured interviews with 
public officials and document analysis. The attributes comprise flexibility and 
ambiguity; the functions comprise levering, legitimation and preservation. Such 
features transcend the common view of contracts as cost-mitigating devices and 
highlight their appropriateness as tools for strengthening the entrepreneurial role 
of the state. Lessons are drawn from contract design, and guidelines are 
developed for policies aimed at a balanced risk–reward nexus.  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
It is by means of institutions that policies for supporting innovation in business 
can be designed, conducted and enforced (Andreoni & Chang 2019). Contracts, 
written or implicit, are institutions that structure relationships between two or more 
actors, create obligations, allocate risks and ultimately assign rights over any 
accruing rewards (Hall 1994). Policy experiences show a variety of possible 
contracting strategies and forms both in public procurement (Kalvet & Lember 
                                               
26 I would like to thank my colleagues Pavel Corilloclla (SPRU) and Manuel Gonzalo (National 
University of General Sarmiento, Argentina) for their very helpful comments on earlier drafts. 
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2010; Georghiou et al. 2014) and in financing innovation (e.g. Kerr and Nanda 
(2014)). They may also vary in the degree to which they succeed in fulfilling the 
functions for which they were originally created. Nevertheless, governments can 
learn from examining different institutional and, thus, contractual alternatives “and 
their distinctive features” that are associated with the achievement of certain 
policy objectives (Andreoni & Chang 2019, p. 9).  
With the growing interest in the role of the state as an investor, however, there 
does not seem to be a commensurate emphasis on contract design. 
Governments are urged to move beyond their role of “fixing market failures” and 
to welcome the high risks at the early stage of technology development that no 
private investor or industry would be able to bear alone (Mazzucato 2013, 2016). 
Yet the move towards active entrepreneurial states is a challenge in itself (Martin 
2016) and one closely related to contractual issues. 
First, policymakers are confronted with the need to develop tools for enabling the 
state to mobilise a large scale of financial resources. In this regard, there have 
been calls for public institutions to seek a balanced risk–reward nexus (Lazonick 
& Mazzucato 2013). By not only taking the risks of investing, but also 
appropriating financial rewards directly in case of success, the public sector could 
support the creation of a sort of revolving innovation fund, whereby the wins 
would cover the losses (Mazzucato 2013; Rodrik, 2015). This would mean 
abandoning the idea of public funding as a subsidy, which is implied in the use of 
traditional instruments such as non-repayable grants. In this fashion, contract 
design is what enables any such change towards public–private sharing of risks 
and rewards. 
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Second, governments are required to overcome the institutional obstacles that 
prevent the stimulation of symbiotic innovation ecosystems – i.e. those in which 
mutually beneficial interactions among various types of actors result in an 
uninterrupted flow of investments in innovation in areas of high social benefit 
(Mazzucato 2013). However, the effectiveness of measures taken in this direction 
also depends on whether the purposes and forms of collaborations pursued, as 
well as the results achieved, are perceived as virtuous (Laplane & Mazzucato 
2019). The problem is that innovation is inherently uncertain; measuring it and 
distinguishing failure and success is an extremely complex task. As policymakers 
face tight budgets and high demands to demonstrate impact, the potential for 
misalignments between their own perceptions of successful performance and 
that of auditing bodies increases. This is the context in which the concerns for 
building more equitable public–private partnerships must be understood. Still, it 
is through shifts in the reward structures defined in contracts, once again, that the 
hopes for symbiotic relationships may be fulfilled. 
In practice, there have been incipient changes allowing recoupment by public 
funding institutions and, thus, management of the risk–reward nexus (Laplane & 
Mazzucato 2019 and Chapter 2 in this thesis). Financing instruments already 
used that serve this function, to varying degrees, include repayable grants, loans 
with reduced interest, venture capital, private equity and mezzanine funding 
(combining elements of debt and equity) (OECD 2014, 2016).  
Although studies on these policy tools exist, the framings of the contracts that 
underpin them have rarely been the focus of empirical analysis. Despite that, 
following Andreoni and Chang’s (2019) line of reasoning, one would expect that 
some contract designs and features are best for promoting the equity of risk–
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reward relationships. Therefore, analysing amendments to contracts made for 
this purpose, in connection with their key characteristics, could help to generate 
lessons for public institutions on how they may positively affect innovation policy 
processes and outcomes.  
In the present chapter, the amendments in and features of financial contracts that 
allow a shift from non-refundable grants to reward-sharing between actors in the 
public and business sectors are explored. The research question posed is: What 
attributes and emerging functions of contracts enable a move from a situation 
where the parties do not share any rewards, to another that facilitates the 
construction of a balanced risk–reward nexus? 
To address this question, the analysis proceeds through a case study of the 
partnership between the (state-owned) Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) 
and the (private, non-profit) research centre CSEM Brazil. This case involves 
amendments in contracts designed in 2011 and 2013, and implemented shortly 
after, that represent a departure from the then standard practices at BNDES 
concerning the supply of non-refundable grants. For the first time, the bank 
introduced a condition making possible its participation in any economic results. 
Eventually, this right was exercised by retaining equity stakes in the spin-off 
company Sunew which was devoted to manufacturing and commercialising 
organic solar panels (OPV). Since both parties share in the risks and potential 
rewards of innovation, and publicise it as a successful case,27 it can be 
considered an exemplary attempt to build a symbiotic partnership. This makes it 
                                               
27 According to CSEM Brazil’s website: https://csembrasil.com.br/en/project/sunew-opv/ 
(Accessed on 3 June 2019), BNDES (2018) and interviews with public officials (1, 6, 12, 14 and 
20). 
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a suitable case to illustrate the engineering of an instrument that directly 
influences the risk–reward nexus.  
By illustrating a success story, the analysis in this chapter does not ignore the 
high exposure to failures that this type of policy implies. Rather, the point is to 
begin to identify the institutional features, focusing on the contractual attributes 
and functions, associated with a rationale for policy in which the state co-creates 
and shapes markets (Mazzucato 2013, 2016). The study also contributes 
empirical data to this area of research, by combining document analysis and 
semi-structured interviews with the public actors involved in decision-making. The 
rich body of data collected provides the basis for detecting the particularities of 
the contracts and deriving the key lessons from financial contract design. 
Section 3.2 comprises a review of the literature on contracts and contains my 
proposals for a complementary approach to market-failure theory. Section 3.3 
covers the methodology. Section 3.4 contains background information on the 
case study of BNDES providing funding to CSEM. Here I use the study as an 
illustration of an attempt to structure an equitable partnership. In Section 3.5 I 
identify the features of the contracts used in the process of shifting from non-
repayable grants to reward-sharing, and distil the main lessons. I have 
emphasised the interplay between experimentation with financial contracts and 
the context in which they unfold. In Section 3.6 I present some conclusions.  
3.2 From contracts for market fixing to contracts for market 
creating and shaping 
 
Contracts can be seen to be much more than just a formal link between two or 
more parties. Important to this study are the notions of contracts as technologies, 
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organisations and cost-mitigating devices. If technologies are taken to mean 
“useful knowledge about how to produce things at low cost”, contracts meet such 
criteria in that they entail knowledge embodied in “documents that serve as 
blueprints for collaboration” (Davis 2013, p. 85). Alternatively, assuming 
organisations follow specific objectives and develop fairly formal rules to regulate 
their internal relations and those with external actors, contracts can also qualify 
as forms of organisations themselves (Smith & King 2009). In their review of 
empirical research, however, Smith and King (2009) have found that the focus on 
the role of contracts as cost-mitigating devices prevails. This latter conception 
stems from economic thinking rooted in market-failure theory.28  
Economic theories have made important contributions towards the understanding 
of contract relationships under uncertainty; they have highlighted the fact that the 
specific characteristics of market failures concerning innovation – mostly unclear 
boundaries of property rights or incomplete contracts – can give rise to many 
costs. These may comprise externality (Demsetz 1967), transaction (Williamson 
1981) and agency costs (Jensen & Meckling 1976), which in turn offer one 
possible explanation of existing forms of economic organisation and the 
associated allocation of risks and rewards between collaborating entities.  
Transaction cost economics posits that the specificities of the object of contracts 
for innovation, which comprise a heterogeneous, often indivisible knowledge 
base that cannot be used to safeguard any transaction, lead to uncertain and 
                                               
28 In this regard, Eggleston et al. (2000) argue that there are two streams in the economic literature 
on contracting. One is Law and Economics, in which the economic effects of legal rules are 
sought, the aim being the development of guidance for public (executive, legislative and judicial) 
institutions. The other is Economics of Contracting (or incomplete contract theory), which focuses 
instead on the relationships between private actors, using the assumption that the rules are given 
within which actors operate. For reasons of space, this section prioritises the latter stream. 
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high-risk outcomes for which few buyers may exist (Williamson 1988a, 1988b). 
These features cause entrepreneurs to have better information on innovation 
projects than external capital providers, making it difficult for these to define 
ownership rights, negotiate equal shares of returns, and avoid selecting projects 
with higher chances of failure (Stiglitz & Weiss 1981; Williamson 1988a). Given 
the assumption that actors behave opportunistically, it suggests a strong 
likelihood that incomplete contracting will result in unfair agreements. The main 
implication is that the choice of contract design and underlying reward structures 
work as a governance mechanism to mitigate transaction costs, especially those 
involving monitoring, renegotiating the initial agreement in response to 
contingencies (so-called ‘private ordering’), resolving disputes and enforcing 
sanctions ex post.  
The principal-agent theory points to the dilemma that the separation between 
ownership and management within corporate structures, and between external 
investors and entrepreneurs, may raise for striking complete contracts for 
financing innovation (Jensen & Meckling 1976). Managers (agent) are often more 
risk-averse than shareholders (principal) and may prefer short-term, low-risk 
investments rather than those that are long term and uncertain, which may 
nonetheless yield higher returns. Consequently, in order to maximise their 
rewards, managers have strong incentives to act against the interests of the firm, 
enhancing the costs of defining adequate ownership rights, negotiating 
commensurate shares of returns and avoiding moral hazards. It follows that the 
choice of contract design and underlying reward distributions emerges as an 
incentive-alignment device. The main purpose it serves is the mitigation of such 
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costs that are most significant before the parties reach an agreement, which may 
lead to investment strategies that do not maximise shareholder value.  
In line with these economic theories, attributes such as predictability, efficiency 
and security are desirable if contracts are to play their primary function of cost 
mitigation. Regarding the risk–reward nexus, one can notice some of the main 
options that innovative firms and (assumed to be private) investors might have 
under the market-failure approach (Table 3.1). Beyond grants, which rarely entail 
an expectation of reward-sharing, financing instruments can take the form of 
equity (common or preferred stocks), loans or bonds (corporate bonds or 
convertible debt) (Wang & Thornhill 2010). The associated reward schemes are, 
respectively, dividends, payment of the loan, and periodical payment of interest 
rates, which can eventually be converted into returns on equity (Stiglitz 1991). As 
the last two columns of the table illustrate, equity and convertible bonds offer 
strong alignment between risks and financial rewards and are linked with no 
‘appropriation discrepancy’ for investors (Wang & Thornhill, 2010). In turn, loans 
and corporate bonds are less suitable for that purpose, as investors earn returns 
irrespective of the supported innovation’s success. 
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Table 3.1 Financial instruments, contract designs, risks and rewards 
 
Financial 
instrument 
Parties 
relationship 
Governance 
mechanism 
Risk-reward 
nexus 
Returns to investors 
Equity         
Common 
stock 
Integration 
between 
investor and firm 
(long-term 
relationships) 
Investor seeks 
information to select most 
promising rate of returns 
and continues to monitor 
execution through 
participation in the Board 
of Directors 
Risk-reward  
sharing 
Residual value of the firm 
in the form of dividends 
(no appropriation 
discrepancy); preferential 
stocks get priority in 
receiving dividends 
Preferred 
stock 
Investor monitors through 
participation in 
shareholder meetings 
though not necessarily 
holds voting rights 
(minority shareholders) 
Loan 
(‘Bank 
finance’) 
Separation 
between 
investor and firm 
(short- or long-
term 
relationships) 
Investor monitors that 
funds are executed in the 
way promised by the 
borrower, and that the 
borrower, in responding 
to contingencies, takes 
into account the interests 
of the capital providers 
Ex ante and 
reciprocal 
allocation of 
risks and 
rewards 
Payment secured 
through collateral assets 
(isolated from 
shareholders residual 
value) 
Bond         
Corporate 
bonds 
(‘Market 
finance’ or 
‘Relational 
debt’) 
Separation 
between 
investor and firm 
(long-term 
relationships) 
In principle investor 
cannot intervene in firm 
management  
No risk-
sharing  
Periodical payment of 
predetermined interest 
rates - fixed or variable 
(isolated from 
shareholders residual 
value)  
Convertible 
debt 
Initial separation 
with option for 
investor to hold 
common stocks 
Investor cannot 
participate in firm's Board 
of Directors until opting to 
become shareholder  
Risk-reward 
sharing 
Returns indirectly aligned 
with the firm’s residual 
value, as conversion to 
hold common shares 
enables investor to 
benefit from upside (low 
level of appropriation 
discrepancy) 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Williamson (1988a); Stiglitz (1991); Wang and 
Thornhill (2010) 
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Despite being useful for identifying issues that under certain situations can be 
relevant in public–private partnerships, market-failure theory remains a narrow 
lens through which to observe the features of contracts in circumstances where 
the state plays a leading role as a risk-taker (Mazzucato 2013). Besides assuming 
economic actors are homogeneous and profit-maximisers, a market-failure 
approach is based on the assumption that markets, technologies and overall rules 
are given. In so doing, it hinders the possibility of analysing the political processes 
through which existing institutional and legal alternatives came into being and 
evolved towards the achievement of broader policy goals (Nelson & Winter 1982; 
Hodgson 1999; Perez 2003; Pistor 2009). In contrast, a perspective that 
considers the state as a powerful driver of transformation in the patterns of 
interactions underpinning innovation ecosystems calls for new analytical tools 
that acknowledge actors’ diversity and contextual variables.  
To account for the attributions and functions that distinguish public investors from 
those in the private sector, and the two-way interplay between financial contracts 
and the context in which they come about, this chapter builds upon the approach 
set out in an earlier study (Laplane & Mazzucato 2019). The rationale for 
innovation policy is therefore viewed as co-creating and shaping markets, rather 
than simply fixing them. Legal institutions play a constitutive – enabling, as much 
as constraining – role in these processes, which are permeated by power 
relations (Hodgson 2005, 2015; Deakin et al. 2017). Accordingly, the state’s 
ability to alter the balance of power in part depends on whether it explores and 
learns to use the legal tools – i.e. contracts – that best serve socially desirable 
policy goals (Deakin et al. 2017). In a nutshell, directing innovation towards 
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pathways that enable a more equitable distribution of rewards is also a matter of 
legal and contract design.  
Under a market co-creating and shaping approach, the hypothesis could be 
raised that public–private contracts embody features that transcend those 
associated with cost mitigation (assumed under a market-failure approach). In 
particular, some attributes and emerging functions would be most appropriate for 
meeting a balanced risk–reward nexus. But which ones? This is an empirical 
question that I aim to explore in this chapter. To do this, in addition to using the 
institutional literature mentioned above, in my analysis I draw insight from legal 
scholarship on corporate governance and finance, in particular, Gilson et al. 
(2009, 2010); Pistor (2013); Hockett and Omarova (2014).  
3.3 Methodology 
 
Financing contracts between actors in the public and private sectors depend on 
established rules and values that are historically and socially contingent. These 
vary according to context and time. The Brazilian setting, where between 2003 
and 2016 there was an incipient shift in the role of the state towards promoting 
risk- and reward-sharing through public–private partnerships (Chapter 2), 
enables in-depth analysis of the instruments developed in this process. Case 
studies are well suited for examining contemporary and complex problems at 
length and within their real-life context (Yin 2009). They can help to illuminate a 
particular issue or illustrate theoretical insights about it (Miles & Huberman 1994; 
Stake 2005).  
Formalised in 2011, the collaboration between BNDES, a public financial 
institution, and CSEM Brazil, a non-profit research centre, involved public support 
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in the form of grants, the result of which was the creation of a spin-off company. 
The novelty of the contract design, consisting of moving from a non-refundable 
grant to a scheme in which the rewards could be shared, had been brought to my 
attention during fieldwork in 2016. The specific characteristics of the contract, 
embedded in its context, invited a detailed case study. Apart from being unique 
in Brazil, this case illustrates a strategic behaviour of the public financier in 
supporting the early stages of technology development that would normally 
benefit from non-refundable resources. By assessing the dynamic links among 
public and private actors, policy goals, tools and outcomes, this study highlights 
contractual amendments made by the state in the attempt to achieve equitable 
relationships as it begins to perform as a risk-taker. 
Empirical legal studies tend to rely on close textual analysis of legal documents 
as primary sources (Genn et al. 2006; Korkea-aho & Leino-Sandberg 2019). In 
contrast, in the social sciences, interviews are frequently deployed and viewed 
as helpful for eliciting information on political and social behaviour. This method, 
however, is rarely used in legal research (Webley 2010). 
Consistent with our view of the law being embedded in the broader social, political 
and economic context (Laplane & Mazzucato 2019), in this particular study I 
adopted a methodological approach of combining document analysis with 
interviews. These sources of data were appropriate to my interest in learning from 
the insights, experiences and perceptions of the public actors involved in the 
contracting process. 
Data collection through interviews took place in two stages. From the total of 51 
interviews conducted during fieldwork (Chapter 2), on the basis of the purposeful 
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sampling and snowballing technique (Atkinson & Flint 2004), those with subjects 
who worked at BNDES were initially selected (18 in total). The targeted public 
officials included key individuals who had been involved in decision-making in 
different ways. To avoid bias, interviewees were selected to ensure the inclusion 
of people occupying a wide range of positions (leadership, managerial and legal 
services). Next, of these 18 interviewees, a stratified sample of 5 – all those who 
had mentioned the CSEM partnership (interviewees 1, 6, 12, 14 and 20) – were 
investigated. This process allowed me to gain valuable insights from those who 
had been active during the inception and development of the BNDES–CSEM 
partnership (Table 3.2). 
Table 3.2 Interviewees' profile29 
 
Position Gender Total 
Female Male 
 
Senior civil servant 
  
1 
 
1 
Higher executive 
officer 
1 1 2 
Executive officer 1 1 2 
Total 
 
2 3 5 
 
Source: Own elaboration  
 
The interviews followed an open-ended semi-structured questionnaire, which 
made it possible to add specific questions and probes about the partnership, 
when the first accounts of this case started to appear. Respondents were asked 
about (i) the amendments in the contract design that enabled public recoupment; 
(ii) the conditioning factors affecting implementation; and (iii) their overall 
                                               
29 This takes the year in which the interviews took place (2016) as reference, but some of the 
interviewees had previously held leadership positions. 
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perceptions about the risk–reward nexus (Interview guide, Appendix). All 
interviews were recorded, transcribed, coded and contrasted with notes taken on 
site (Kvale 1996). 
The interview data was later cross-checked with the written contracts and 
secondary data sources to enrich and corroborate the analysis. Copies of the 
contracts in digital format have been obtained upon formal request from the 
BNDES Citizens’ Enquiry Service. 
Directed content analysis was used to examine both the interview and document 
data (Hsieh & Shannon 2005). This approach is based on the use of an initial 
theoretical framework in which thematic categories are prioritised and tools 
provided for establishing relationships between the two types of data. The 
continuous analytical process of contrasting data and theory allowed for findings 
that validated and qualified Laplane & Mazzucato’s (2019) framework, while 
providing the means for drawing up lessons for policymakers. 
3.4 A case study of the partnership between BNDES and CSEM 
Brazil 
 
In this section I present the case study of the partnership between BNDES and 
CSEM Brazil, which involved changes in the use of non-refundable grants and 
resulted in the creation of the solar panel company Sunew, of which BNDES 
became an equity partner. The account is focused on two broad aspects. One is 
the division of labour: How has BNDES taken the risks of investing? For what 
reason? The other is the contract design: What were the reasons for changing 
the standard practice concerning non-refundable grants and moving into a 
reward-sharing scheme? What were the alternatives considered regarding the 
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modes of public recoupment of rewards, and the corresponding challenges 
involved? Before addressing these issues, some contextualisation is necessary.  
3.4.1 Background  
 
An overview of the initial situation in Brazil in the early 2000s has already been 
presented (Chapter 2). Essentially, the resumption of active industrial policies 
meant that the state placed innovation at the centre stage of its development 
strategy and, through BNDES, assumed the leading role as coordinator, financier 
and inducer of economic behaviour. In this respect, several changes in the legal 
and institutional frameworks ensued, which, among other things, enabled the 
diversification of the state’s policy mix. By the end of 2016, the following financing 
tools were available: non-refundable grants, loans with reduced interest, capital 
investment (venture capital, private equity and a new hybrid instrument), besides 
procurement. There were also significant developments relating to the federal 
sponsoring public institutions.  
BNDES’ trajectory in development finance, in particular, and the fact that it is the 
main operator of capital investments in the country, make it an interesting 
illustration of the rise of entrepreneurial public actors. After the experience 
accumulated in financing the industrialisation process and in divestment during 
the privatisations that followed in the 1990s, the bank regained a prominent role 
in the 2000s, when it incorporated the promotion of business innovation into its 
mission. From 2007 onwards in particular, the bank’s investment arm 
BNDESPAR became crucial to the (early) development of the entrepreneurial 
finance landscape in the country. Although acting on a scale that was still 
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insufficient, the bank supported the creation of venture capital funds and became 
a minority equity partner in ground-breaking SMEs that had high growth potential.  
Against this background, and considering the underlying institutional structure – 
banks operate in the expectation of achieving a monetary return – BNDES took 
part in the only known case in Brazil of the conversion of a non-refundable grant 
into a reward-sharing agreement (Figure 3.1). Since the partnership targeted the 
early stage of technology development in a sector with high potential for social 
benefit (renewable energy), it offers an appropriate setting for looking into public 
institutions’ contractual practices and attitudes towards the risk–reward nexus.  
Figure 3.1 The BNDES–CSEM partnership in the innovation funding 
landscape 
 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Jackson (2011) 
 
In the context of this study, a key institutional innovation was the recovery of 
BNDES Technology Fund (FUNTEC) in 2006, which had been established in 
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1964 but discontinued shortly after. Originating from a share of BNDESPAR 
profits and replenished annually, the fund now supports R&D collaboration 
between research institutions and business, involving early-stage and potentially 
disruptive innovations. Besides being the only source of non-refundable grants 
that BNDES operates, a distinctive feature is that the money cannot be supplied 
to companies directly. Statutory rules only authorise it to be applied to scientific 
and technological institutions (Decree n. 4418, 11 October 2002. Art. 9, IV). The 
Innovation Law (Law n. 10973, 2 December 2004) also restricts this type of 
support to the mandatory sharing of IPR between collaborating entities. Despite 
these requirements, and given that the bank has greater independence over the 
use of FUNTEC money than it has in relation to other sources, it was possible to 
gradually accumulate experience in mobilising resources in selected directions. 
Priority has been given to those projects that tackle issues such as aging 
populations, smart cities, urban mobility and renewable energy (Souza et al. 
2016). The partnership between BNDES and CSEM fits in with the bank’s efforts 
to meet this latter challenge.  
3.4.2 BNDES as a risk-taker 
 
Solar power, as a clean and renewable source of energy, is considered one of 
the alternatives that can be used to mitigate the environmental harm caused by 
greenhouse gas emissions. Although solar panel technologies have matured in 
the past years, allowing for large-scale production, their widespread use has yet 
to be achieved. The obstacles for diffusion stem from certain attributes of 
traditional technologies – both physical (such as their weight, rigidity and opacity) 
and economic (related to their limited applicability and high costs). Therefore, 
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overcoming these hurdles opened opportunities for breaking new ground in 
energy solutions. 
Created in 2006, CSEM Brazil is a private non-profit centre for applied research 
modelled after a similar institution already in place in Switzerland – the Swiss 
Centre for Electronics and Microtechnology (CSEM). In 2010, with support of 
public and private funding sources, CSEM Brazil started research on organic 
printed electronics, with a view to developing organic solar panels (OPV). 
Because these panels bring together qualities such as flexibility, lightness and 
transparency that will enable them to be used in smart buildings, urban furniture, 
mobility aids and many other new applications, they are deemed to be the next 
generation of solar panel technologies. However, developing the capabilities and 
infrastructure needed to confront the challenges inherent to the incipient stages 
of any technology, and its production processes, were key obstacles that had to 
be overcome before OPV could be brought to market.30  
Examining the prospects for OPV in Brazil, BNDES’ public officials noted that 
although the country had positive enabling conditions, there were some 
weaknesses (Rivera & Teixeira 2014). The strengths included a promising R&D 
base (CSEM Brazil worked with a highly skilled team and networks worldwide), 
access to high solar incidence, potential demand from local industries, and 
(mostly public) funding sources for R&D. That said, no doubt the risks of investing 
in OPV were high: the technology might not mature; OPV competitors might 
advance faster; or local companies might not meet the scale needed to compete 
globally. On the other hand, interviewees were mindful that if BNDES did not take 
                                               
30 CSEM Brazil. http://csembrasil.com.br/ (Accessed on 3 June 2019).  
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the chance, it could not enjoy the potentially huge successes either (Mazzucato 
2013). The achievement of such a cutting-edge technology represented an 
opportunity to fuel sustainable and long-term growth: 
There [were] huge technological risks (…) but at the same time [the 
research results] could be highly valuable...Who was making [that 
undertaking] possible was the state. If there weren’t the support 
from BNDES, this initiative wouldn’t consolidate (Interviewee 20, 
PublMa). 
 
Considering this, when CSEM Brazil’s investors reached out to BNDES prior to 
starting OPV research, late in the 2000s, the bank was willing and able to accept 
the risks. The bank granted support through FUNTEC in two occasions, nearly 
R$ 45 million (or $ 25 million) in total, becoming the main sponsor of the initiative. 
According to one of the research centre’s creators, BNDES “was the only place 
in the country in which they found people who understood their project” (BNDES 
2018). Thus, by acting as the main financial actor to put its capital at risk for the 
development of a cutting-edge technology with promising (but uncertain) 
commercial prospects, once again BNDES revealed its role as a lead investor, 
risk-taker and entrepreneur (Chapter 2).  
3.4.3 An imbalance in the risk–reward nexus as an obstacle  
 
The partnership between BNDES and CSEM was already innovative in the 
structure of the financial contract design. As noted in Section 3.4.1, by law, the 
bank’s use of non-refundable grants was typically conditioned to: (i) the presence 
of a company collaborating with the supported research institution; and (ii) IP 
sharing between the two. The former was aimed at stimulating linkages in the 
innovation system. The latter, according to interviewees, indicated an implicit 
understanding regarding the public appropriation of potential rewards in the 
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sense that it would occur mainly through positive externalities (e.g. spillover 
effects, job creation and economic growth): 
ICTs (research institutions) can use and license the same 
technology to different companies, which increases the chances of 
generating spillovers, further innovations, economic growth, and job 
creation (Interviewee 1, PublMa); 
and 
The concept was (…) to maximise [positive] externalities to society. 
This was [a] sufficient [mechanism of public appropriability] in most 
cases (Interviewee 14, PublMa). 
 
In practice, this materialised in the contractual requirement for research 
institutions to retain the IPR and know-how developed, which could exceptionally 
be negotiated and take the form of a temporary exclusive licence for cooperating 
firms. As a result, BNDES tended to be rewarded rather indirectly, meaning that 
it would not retrieve any financial gains from FUNTEC resources.  
Nevertheless, the operational model of CSEM did not fit this scheme. CSEM 
worked under three main scenarios for the exploitation of research results: (i) if 
the technology became viable, it could be developed by the industry upon the 
payment of royalty fees; (ii) the research centre could opt to develop it by itself; 
or (iii) it could create a spin-off company for that same effect. In this latter case, 
besides the equity stake in the start-up in question, CSEM would hold an 
exclusive technology licence agreement with this company (Arruda et al. 2016). 
However, if this choice prevailed, it would break down the bank’s expectations of 
achieving indirect returns via spillover effects. This is so because an exclusive 
IPR licence granted too early in the R&D process may block or slow-down 
diffusion and follow-up innovations (Mazzoleni & Nelson 1998).  
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The perception of interviewees supports the interpretation that keeping the 
contract as it was implied accepting an imbalance in the risk–reward relationship 
in the public–private partnership. Therefore, in order for the operation to proceed, 
revising and adapting the standard contractual practice was needed: 
As CSEM operated under exclusive technology licences, we 
supported the creation of technological capabilities but decided that 
in case of success, we would have the right to become partners of 
the spin-off company. This is an appropriability mechanism on 
behalf of the state (Interviewee 14, PublMa). 
 
3.4.4 The contract design: from non-refundable grant to equity stake on 
spin-off 
 
BNDES went on to pioneer provisions in the contracts signed in 2011 and 2013, 
which entitled it to capture a direct share of financial gains. In the first contract (n. 
10.2.1969.1 of 18 January 2011) public support focused on the creation of an 
adequate research environment. It involved R$ 12.892 million ($7.524 million) 
aimed at the development of systems oriented towards precision farming based 
on Low-Temperature Co-Fired Ceramics (LTCC) and Microelectrical Mechanics. 
This in turn included investments in technology absorption, professional training, 
and building and equipping a laboratory for LTCC development. With regard to 
the mechanisms for the state’s appropriation of research results, Clause XXV 
assigned to BNDES the priority right to buy (for 1 R$ each) shares or any 
securities convertible into shares issued by companies in which CSEM Brazil 
might become an equity partner. In so doing, the contract effectively served to 
play out the scenario of creating a spin-off company. In contrast, Clause XXXII 
addressed the possibility of CSEM opting to produce and commercialise the 
results of the supported technology itself. Should that be the case, the research 
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centre faced the obligation of paying royalties of five percent (5%) of gross 
revenues to BNDES.  
The interviews show that this contractual choice was also driven by some public 
officials’ concern about intrinsic tensions in the entrepreneurial finance 
landscape; these tensions became apparent when the state acted as a risk-taker, 
in part, because this operation drew the attention of venture capitalists, who 
nonetheless were not putting resources in at that stage (Interviewee 20). Beyond 
that, what the industrial application of research results would be was still unclear, 
although the presence of an established research centre as a partner (CSEM 
Switzerland) signalled the possibility of important achievements (interviewees 14 
and 20). These elements reinforce the idea that the amendments in the financial 
contract design openly challenged another potential imbalance in the risk–reward 
relationship, not only because an exclusive technology licence prevented the 
public bank from fulfilling its expectations of achieving high spillover effects, but 
also due to the presence of venture capitalists being perceived as representing 
an imminent risk of disconnection between those who would bear the risks and 
those who would reap the rewards of innovation (Mazzucato 2013; Lazonick & 
Mazzucato 2013). 
A key feature of the contractual tool adopted was its flexibility, as it provided for 
different forms of remuneration of the state’s contribution, depending on the 
circumstances at issue (Clauses XXV and XXXII). However, some limitations can 
also be observed. Clause XXXII, in particular, did not specify a minimum revenue 
basis, a maximum cap, nor the time frame for the companies’ obligation to pay 
royalties to BNDES. While these omissions could have been the focus of 
additional tensions and technical difficulties in the implementation (Windus & 
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Schiffel 1976), they could also have been a sign of the public institution’s caution. 
Allowing some room for manoeuvre was important to avoid imposing too strict a 
set of measures that could have hurt SMEs – which would have been at odds 
with the very policy objective of promoting their growth.  
The second contract (n. 13.2.0371.1 of 21 May 2013) introduced positive 
changes. The circumstances were also different, starting with the much higher 
value at stake, namely R$ 32.321 million ($17.247 million) and the greater clarity 
in relation to the expected results, which now would go beyond R&D infrastructure 
and process to include product innovation. The stated aims of the contract were 
the installation of an OPV technology platform and the development of low-cost 
solar panels. This contract mirrored that devised in 2011 in that it defined the right 
of priority to BNDES (now under clause XXXI), and of receiving a share of 
revenues (now XXXVI). It also kept open some important aspects of the 
implementation of this latter provision. Nonetheless, it differed in that it 
established a term of 15 years within which those rights could be exercised (Final 
paragraph in the third Section of the agreement). Thus, in this regard, the 2013 
contract design was an improvement in relation to the previous contract in that it 
helped to reduce the uncertainties (and eventual conflicts) that the lack of 
boundaries for the sharing of rewards of high-risk ventures could potentiate. 
Table 3.3 below summarises some of the contract amendments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
144 
Table 3.3 Contract design before and with the CSEM case 
Provisions Before CSEM  
(2007–2010) 
CSEM contracts  
(2011 and 2013) 
 
Purpose of public support 
 
Multiple 
 
R&D infrastructure, 
process innovation and 
capability building (2011) 
 
Technology platform and 
product innovation (2013)  
 
Value of public 
disbursement 
R$ 277 million 
(aggregate)* 
R$ 12.892 million (2011) 
R$ 32.321 million (2013) 
 
Recoupment mechanism 
 
None 
 
Priority right over shares 
or convertible securities 
issued by company in 
which supported institution 
may become partner 
 
OR 
 
Royalties of 5% of gross 
revenues 
 
Boundaries for recoupment 
implementation  
None Non-written (2011) 
 
15-year term for exercising 
those rights (2013) 
 
Source: Own elaboration. (*) Based on figures reported by Souza et al. (2016). 
 
It was only when CSEM’s efforts in OPV began to bear fruit that these agreements 
with BNDES were put to the test. In 2015, the research centre created its first 
spin-off company, Sunew, “launched as the largest and most modern OPV 
manufacturing line in the world.”31 BNDES then opted to exercise its right through 
BNDESPAR, participating as a minority shareholder with nearly 25% equity 
stakes. Besides CSEM Brazil and FIR Capital (venture capital fund behind CSEM 
Brazil), who had been working together with BNDES since the inception of OPV 
research, Sunew attracted two investors from the energy sector, Tradener and 
                                               
31 CSEM Brazil. http://csembrasil.com.br/ (Accessed on 3 June 2019). 
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CMU. They also became equity partners. From that moment, Sunew was 
constituted as a company with full national capital ownership. The company has 
shown signs of expansion ever since (Table 3.4). In this manner, the ingenuity of 
public officials proved effective in enabling government funds to co-create a high-
value venture, while shaping an equitable financial relationship insofar as the 
appropriation of potential financial gains was concerned. 
Table 3.4 Timeline of a successful attempt at building the risk–reward 
nexus 
 
Year Event 
2006 CSEM Brazil, a joint venture between FIR Capital and CSEM Switzerland is set 
up; its focus is to create new products and undertake research into innovative 
solutions.  
2008 CSEM Brazil starts its operations, with support from public (FAPEMIG and FINEP 
among others) and private sources.  
2010 The research and development of OPV technology begins. 
2011 Signature of first contract with BNDES involving R$ 12.892 million (via FUNTEC).  
2013 Signature of second contract with BNDES involving R$ 32.321 million (FUNTEC).  
2014 Roll-to-roll printing equipment developed by CSEM Brazil team, manufactured in 
Germany, is brought to Belo Horizonte for installation and initial testing.  
2015 Sunew is set up, a spin-off responsible for manufacturing and commercialising 
large-scale OPV film, with the largest and most modern production structure in 
the world. 
BNDES exercises its stock option and becomes a minority shareholder (25%), 
together with CSEM Brazil, FIR Capital, Tradener and CMU.  
2016 Sunew produces and delivers the largest OPV installation in the world at Totvs 
headquarters in the city of Sao Paulo, Brazil. 
2018 Sunew opens an office in Silicon Valley. 
2019 Sunew signs a contract with EDP – a leading company that operates in all 
segments of the electricity sector – that will result in the largest installation in the 
world to use adhesive OPV technology on facades.  
 
Source: Author’s adaptation of Sunew’s timeline. (https://sunew.com.br/ (Accessed on 
15 July 2019). FAPEMG, Foundation for Research of the State of Minas Gerais. 
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To sum up, this case illustrated a situation in which the public sector explicitly 
aimed to act as a risk-taker, but encountered legal–institutional obstacles – one 
of which consisted of an imbalance in the risk–reward nexus. The contractual 
amendments ensuring an equitable sharing of the rewards of financing innovation 
between the public sponsor institution and the private sector was then devised 
as a tool for enabling this partnership to materialise. This also meant 
incorporating a greater degree of flexibility into the originally non-refundable 
financial instrument so that the parties could adjust to the circumstances at issue. 
3.5 Towards symbiotic innovation ecosystems: lessons from 
financial contract design 
 
Although the circumstances underlying the partnership between BNDES and 
CSEM are unique in the context of the bank’s allocation of FUNTEC funds, this 
case study offers an opportunity to explore in detail the perceptions of public 
officials regarding this experience and to derive the main lessons about the risk-
taking role of the state in shaping symbiotic innovation ecosystems. In this 
section, key issues are discussed that public funding agencies may need to 
confront: devising robust but flexible and enabling financial contracts; learning to 
design and negotiate these contracts; developing institutional strategies to fulfil 
the potentials for socialising the rewards, not just the risks; and tackling existing 
limitations, whether at the domestic level, or those arising at the interface 
between the local scope of government funding and the global financial 
landscape. On that basis, it is possible to identify some desirable attributes and 
emerging functions of contracts, aimed at building a balanced risk–reward nexus 
in public–private partnerships (Table 3.5). These features, which are closely 
interconnected and to some extent overlap, are examined below.  
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Table 3.5 Key lessons from contract design: attributes and emerging 
functions for balancing risks and rewards 
 
Attributes/ 
Functions 
Key lessons 
Flexibility 
 
- Public recoupment can be optional and attached to the occurrence of 
pre-specified events linked to successful performance; 
- Provision of alternative mechanisms for implementation (e.g. equity 
stakes, royalties on revenues, or others) can increase the likelihood of 
attracting business;  
Ambiguity - Loose boundaries for recoupment (e.g. no term of duration, no cap) 
can provide for manoeuvring room; 
- However, conflict between the parties is highly likely. 
Levering - Recoupment mechanisms negotiated on a case-by-case basis can 
increase the chances of striking a deal; 
- Choice of implementation tool for taking into account the relative 
strength of alignment with supported firm’s residual value can help 
build a balanced risk–reward nexus. 
Legitimation - Negotiation of recoupment outcomes as one of the assessment 
criteria of the performance of public funding institutions can help to 
create a shared vision of the importance of the role of the state in 
innovation; 
- Institutionalisation of revolving funds through which the amounts 
recouped can be continuously reinvested into R&D and innovation also 
contribute to signalling the value of the role of the state, if public 
investments target contextual social needs; 
- Signalling that state involvement is not an end itself but meant to lead 
to success and exit, whenever possible, also plays a positive 
legitimising function. 
Preservation - Institutionalisation of revolving funds through which the amounts 
recouped can be continuously reinvested into R&D and innovation also 
contribute to signalling the value of the role of the state, if public 
investments target contextual social needs; 
- Negotiation of safeguards to protect the value generated through 
public support, such as through retaining golden shares in strategic 
supported companies or devising other solutions, are key for tackling 
the risk of denationalisation. 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
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Flexibility. Implementing an active role of the state at the incipient stage of 
technology development, which is fraught with high uncertainty and high 
technological and market risks, requires the fashioning of a widely flexible 
contractual instrument. Compared with the standard design of non-refundable 
grants, the new clauses adopted in both the 2011 and 2013 contracts embodied 
alternative mechanisms of public recoupment: stock options/convertible 
securities; or royalty fees upon revenues. Such flexibility is desirable in order to 
adjust the deal to the circumstances that will only become clear as the innovation 
process unfolds. The occurrence of specified events associated with the success 
of the R&D endeavour and CSEM’s strategy to exploit it (Arruda et al. 2016), 
would then trigger BNDES’ modes of participation in the results. In this regard, 
the contract incorporated a distinctive characteristic of venture capital, which 
makes the sharing of rewards conditional upon the success of the project (Triantis 
2001). Hence, the analysis of this case corroborates the observation of legal 
scholarship on finance that the rigidity of financial commitments varies and to 
some extent is a matter of legal choice (Choi & Triantis 2013; Pistor 2013).  
In addition, there are indications that broadening public agencies’ mechanisms of 
public appropriability into initiatives aimed at stimulating the involvement of 
industries may bring other advantages. One of the lessons learned during 
BNDES’ efforts to encourage another industry, namely ICT design services, was 
that the exceptional temporary exclusivity in technology licensing agreements 
may not be enough to activate the “animal spirits” of private sector entrepreneurs 
(Interviewee 1). On the other hand, this instrument proved useful in the promotion 
of advanced solar panels, as the CSEM case illustrates. There are good reasons 
to believe that the relative importance of IPR as an appropriability mechanism is 
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industry-specific and determined by the modes of innovation therein (Pavitt 1984). 
Thus, it makes sense to expect that having a range of alternative reward-sharing 
mechanisms when negotiating with companies from a wide range of sectors – as 
opposed to a one-size-fits-all type of provision – increases public agencies’ 
chances of striking a deal. 
Ambiguity. In the light of the highly uncertain and cumulative nature of the 
innovation process, it also seems desirable for contracts to allow room for 
adaptation, renegotiation and learning, which in turn requires the written 
language to embody some level of openness. Indeed, the presence of a mix of 
comprehensive and vague provisions could be found in both contracts examined. 
The clauses that specified different modalities of public recoupment coexisted 
with no definition of the time during which BNDES’ options could be exercised (in 
the 2011 contract) and unclear boundaries for the payment of royalties (in both 
contracts). This suggests some ambiguity in the role of the state in the legal 
structuring of finance. It has been pointed that such ambiguity is manifested in 
the establishment of regulations essential to the functioning of financial 
relationships, but whose effects are eventually suspended, whenever the 
sustainability of the whole financial system is at risk (Pistor 2013).  
In the context of government financing of innovative SMEs, this appears as a 
tension between wanting to spur on innovation on the one hand, and applying 
caution on the other, so as not to drive businesses away or harm them; because 
what matters the most is often ensuring incumbent SMEs a robust financial 
position rather than short-term gains (Kaivanto & Stoneman 2007), too much of 
an emphasis on reward-sharing could be counterproductive. In practice, BNDES 
addressed this issue on a case-by-case basis and eventually withdrew or 
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postponed the payment of royalties and renegotiated payment conditions 
(Schapiro 2012; Chapter 2). In the case study, despite the contractual alternative 
involving recoupment through royalties on revenues having not materialised, it is 
plausible to assume that the adoption of vague terms was partly intentional, since 
this is commonplace in contract practice (Scott & Triantis 2005). Furthermore, 
given that combinations of formal and informal mechanisms have been identified 
as the governance pattern in inter-firm contracts for R&D collaboration (Gilson et 
al. 2009, 2010), the finding of a similar mode of public–private interaction is not 
surprising. A closer and more open-ended interaction is consistent with the 
purposes of problem-solving and learning that condition the success of the 
partnerships.  
Changes in public–private relationships are reflected in contracts and thus the 
degree of specification of contract provisions is also subject to change. While the 
2011 contract did not clarify the timing during which recoupment provisions could 
be implemented, in 2013 this gap was filled by the definition of a term of 15 years 
within which those rights could be exercised (Final paragraph in the third Section 
of the agreement). In view of the fact that some gaps continued to exist, this case 
shows that financial contract design is as much an enabling policy tool as it is a 
gradual process: it co-evolves with the broader legal framework, the underlying 
conditions of the partnership in question and the experience accumulated by the 
actors involved.  
In addition to the attributes of flexibility and ambiguity just noted, there are at least 
three essential functions that contract design processes should aim to perform, 
which are examined next.  
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Levering. Although the contractual relationship is established between the public 
institution and an actor in the private sector, its legal form must be thought of as 
governing interactions among a broader range of actors (Herder 2008; Laplane 
& Mazzucato 2019). Engaging with business requires the building of mutual trust. 
However, firms may not be equally receptive to the different mechanisms that 
allow for public institutions to recoup a share of the rewards of innovation. Not 
long before, in 2010, in the framework that was set up to enable the BNDES 
Profarma line to support pharmaceutical R&D, the bank attempted to introduce a 
new financial instrument that involved a profit-sharing scheme similar to the 
royalty provision established in the CSEM contract – the Risk-Sharing Contract 
with Participation in Future Results (BNDES 2010). However, from interviews with 
public officials, it appears that this initiative failed due to a general aversion on 
the part of companies (Chapter 2), among other reasons. German public 
institutions had had an analogous experience, one study found (Rothgang et al. 
2003). Accordingly, grants with qualified repayment schemes lacked businesses’ 
acceptance partly because of the requirement to disclose sensitive information. 
Therefore, contract design needs to enable solutions that are compatible with 
companies’ confidentiality, notwithstanding the standard requirements for 
transparency within, and accountability of, public institutions. 
Regarding the interactions among financial actors in the innovation funding 
landscape, the contract – together with other mechanisms such as market 
competition and regulation – plays a role in determining the magnitude of the 
shares of rewards that different actors may be able to appropriate. As one of the 
interviewees asserted, amendments in the contract went beyond addressing an 
imbalance in the relationship between BNDES and CSEM. It also sought to 
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mediate the tension generated by the coexistence of other types of financial 
actors, operating under a short-term, high-return rationale (Interviewee 20). Due 
to way in which private venture capital funds operate, one can infer that having 
BNDESPAR participate in the capital gains of the newly created company, which 
had benefited from high-risk public support early on, can be seen as a superior 
policy choice to other profit-sharing tools, which only allow for lower or indirect 
alignment between risks and rewards (Table 3.1). If the aim is to shape a 
symbiotic innovation ecosystem, then the revenue basis for government 
recoupment (and the timing of exit) are relevant dimensions to be taken into 
account in the process of levering private investments (Laplane & Mazzucato 
2019). 
Legitimation. The contracts underpinning public–private partnerships also play 
a legitimising function, which is equally important for sustaining the 
entrepreneurial activity of the state (Laplane & Mazzucato 2019). The timeline 
shown in Table 3.4 illustrates the sequence of events that led to the emergence 
of Sunew and its continuing appreciation. The company is currently well 
capitalised (BNDES 2018) and owns installed production capacity in OPV solar 
panels of 600,000 m2  per year.32 In that connection, while the financial return to 
BNDES was a secondary objective – as in fact it emerged from a rather ad hoc 
contract design in FUNTEC disbursements – some public officials perceived it as 
useful policy tool for signalling the value of the state’s role: 
BNDES exercised the right to participate in the company that was 
created, which is a [direct] return to the bank and demonstrates that 
projects supported by BNDES FUNTEC can reflect on the 
development of value for BNDES (Public official’s quote drawn from 
BNDES (2018)). 
                                               
32 www.sunew.com.br (Accessed on 22 July 2019).  
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This perspective implies that enabling public actors to recoup a share of financial 
rewards provides for an objective measure of success of their performance, in 
addition to highlighting the contribution to addressing socially desirable policy 
objectives (Mazzucato 2016). Furthermore, it is also useful as management tool, 
as it offers opportunities for monitoring the performance of supported firms. 
Hence, the evidence supports the interpretation that developing tools for favouring 
a balanced risk–reward nexus serves the purpose of building a shared notion of 
the importance of public finance (Laplane & Mazzucato 2019).  
It is worth mentioning that legitimation was an especially relevant issue in the 
Brazilian context, where the legal foundations for public risk-taking were (and still 
are) in the making (Chapter 2). Speeding up this political and legal construction, 
in turn, requires a key focus of tension within government to be overcome, which 
can be boiled down to the assessment criteria used to control public expenditures. 
According to interviewees, external and internal oversight bodies rely on 
standardised rules, which have been interpreted as impeding the state’s 
entrepreneurial function: 
The rules (…) are the same regardless of the operation [e.g. size or 
profile of the company] (…). Control bodies would need to allow the 
bank to expose itself to more risk [which in turn] would require 
BNDES to adapt [its] financial instruments, like we did with CSEM 
(Interviewee 20). 
 
For some interviewees, the pathway for mitigating this tension involved taking 
active steps to negotiate assessment criteria (interviewees 6 and 20). But there 
were also perceptions that transforming the ad hoc and bold contractual design 
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analysed here into an institutionalised practice could help to solve the issue 
(interviewees 1, 6, 18 and 20):  
Institutions [supported through FUNTEC] develop new things, 
generate spin-offs and obtain gains that we don’t appropriate. If we 
had some mechanism that enabled us to obtain some return, be it 
in the form of equity stakes or recoupment of the amounts offered, 
we would be much more comfortable about offering further support 
to those who have already benefited from public funding before 
(Interviewee 1). 
 
As a matter of fact, ideas to make FUNTEC a revolving fund were mentioned. The 
experiences of this type of government initiative in countries such as Israel, 
Finland and Switzerland, indicate that states can successfully engineer and 
manage venture capital funds while building equitable public–private 
partnerships. In spite of this, in the context of BNDES’ recent role in fostering 
business innovation, this and other ideas on how to approach the risk–reward 
nexus have yet to mature. This is something that public officials acknowledge 
(Interviewee 14). Hence, the case study shows that as public institutions explicitly 
move towards proactive risk-taking and sharing, they are confronted by the need 
to re-frame and implement their views regarding the direct appropriation of 
potential rewards.  
Preservation. The analysis of the positive functions that contract designs can 
have on public–private partnerships should also include some caveats. On the 
one hand, at the local level, there are institutional difficulties that need to be 
overcome in order to ensure that any amounts eventually recouped by public 
actors will be used to replenish public funds and be reinvested into R&D and 
innovation. Public officials’ accounts of the constraints they were faced with over 
proposals for turning FUNTEC into a self-sustainable fund (mentioned above), 
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illustrates this issue. On the other hand, as the literature on industrial policy has 
highlighted, the increasingly competitive and global playing field imposes 
additional challenges for local governments to reap the potential rewards of 
investments in tech-based firms. Hockett and Omarova (2014) identified ‘market-
preserving’ as one of the state’s instrumentalities in the US financial sector. 
Drawing a parallel, the problem of public institutions taking on the financing of 
innovation can be seen as one of preserving the new markets that their risk-taking 
role helped to create, in a context of increasing international capital mobility.  
Issues of this nature – (de)nationalisation – that have increasingly become a 
concern for policymakers in middle-income countries33 (Andreoni 2016), seem to 
have more general scope. In the partnership between BNDES and CSEM Brazil, 
the presence of BNDEDPAR as an equity partner in the spin-off company Sunew 
helped to ensure national, instead of foreign, capital ownership. This strategic 
aspect regarding national sovereignty is even recognised by some Brazilian 
companies (Chapter 2). Nevertheless, the fact that the state-owned bank acts as 
a minority shareholder means that it has no right of veto over key corporate events 
such as the potential sale to foreign groups. In contrast, during the period of 
privatisations in the 1980s and 1990s, several governments throughout the world, 
including the UK, made use of golden share clauses as a means to safeguard 
national industries (Jones et al. 1999). Therefore, legal choices are not equally 
effective in meeting a ‘market-preserving’ policy goal.  
                                               
33 “Deindustrialisation (the loss of strategic manufacturing industries), increasing trade 
imbalances, and decreasing technological dynamism have all been major concerns in advanced 
industrial economies. Meanwhile, in middle-income countries, governments have been 
increasingly threatened by emerging giants that are capturing global manufacturing production 
and export shares, aggressively pulling ahead in the global technological race” (Andreoni 2016, 
p. 245).  
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More recently, within the framework of Germany’s National Industry 
Strategy 2030 launched on 5 February 2019, the government announced the 
creation of an investment fund aimed at protecting those of its companies deemed 
strategic from a technological standpoint. The policy document affirms that the 
state may do so “for a limited period of time”, if necessary to prevent them from 
being controlled by foreign shareholders (Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs 
and Energy 2019). It is still too early to know which contractual tool will be 
adopted, and how effective it will be in Germany. However, two key observations 
can be made in light of the comparison with the BNDES–CSEM partnership. The 
first aspect to highlight is the asymmetries in terms of governments’ accumulated 
power, resources and institutional capacities in the two cases, as determinants of 
the reach of their actions. In resuming its role as coordinator of the industrial 
strategy in Brazil, following the neoliberal experience of the 1990s, BNDES only 
went as far as becoming an equity partner of a few new firms; in contrast, in 
Germany, where industrial and innovation policies have been kept active over 
recent decades, the government now seems to have the confidence to go one 
step further in sustaining its position in the global market. The second observation 
brings some hope. BNDES’ very experience with CSEM illustrates, once again 
(Chapter 2), that favourable political, economic and institutional conditions can 
allow room for experimentation with legal designs and improvements in public–
private relationships that has promising outcomes. The recognition of the leading 
role of state as an investor is, thus, essential for encouraging creativity in 
contractual solutions that are suitable for playing the risk–reward game in local 
and global playing fields.  
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3.6 Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter has been to identify desirable attributes and emerging 
functions of contracts that can allow for public–private partnerships to share both 
the risks and rewards of financing innovation. To this end, the purposes of public 
funding bodies opting to recoup part of their investments, as opposed to relying 
on non-refundable grants, have been explored. Emphasis has been given to the 
challenges of creating new policy instruments, while overcoming institutional 
obstacles, for sustaining dynamic and symbiotic innovation ecosystems.  
The case study involving the partnership between BNDES and the research 
centre CSEM Brazil has provided key insights. Specificities underlying the R&D 
project – i.e. an exclusive IPR licence blocking follow-up innovations and 
diffusion, in addition to perceptions concerning the opportunism by risk-averse 
private venture funds – created an imbalance in the risk–reward relationship that 
impeded the materialisation of the partnership. The solution found was to 
incorporate contractual provisions that rendered the non-repayable grant similar 
to venture capital. That is, in the case of success, the occurrence of certain events 
would give the public investor the possibility of capturing a share of financial 
return, through alternative means – equity stakes or royalties on revenues. To 
that effect, the contracts embodied attributes such as flexibility and ambiguity, as 
well as levering, legitimising and preserving functions. Further empirical analysis 
could help shed additional light on the theory and practice of contracts led by 
entrepreneurial public institutions.  
The analysis of this experience of contract design, and the resulting lessons, lead 
to some conclusions.  
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1. While it is true that the underlying institutional and legal frameworks within 
which governments operate condition their ability to step towards the 
entrepreneurial endeavour, there is also some degree of agency. Contract 
design, in particular, has been shown to be an effective enabler of the role of the 
state as a creator of a new market and shaper of a symbiotic ecosystem. A trade-
off must be noted, however, between the formalisation that provides for the 
stability and predictability of investment decisions, and the flexibility and 
ambiguity needed to adapt to contextual circumstances under high uncertainty. 
Finding a balance is a rather experimental exercise; 
2. The engineering of these tools is also highly dependent on the knowledge and 
capabilities accumulated in public funding institutions; but there are instances in 
which these can be harnessed and improved over time, resulting in more 
equitable public–private partnerships. In the five-year period between the 
reactivation of FUNTEC and the CSEM case, BNDES was able to build up 
capabilities, improve the practice of non-refundable grant allocation, and sort out 
a contractual solution that was creative and effective. Therefore, it is also possible 
to change institutional frameworks in ways that allow for learning and result in 
enhanced policy outcomes; 
3. Preserving these achievements, however, appears to be challenging. At the 
global level, the highly competitive, concentrated and internationalised nature of 
the financial landscape creates pressures for innovative responses from local 
governments. This is due to the increased potential for the benefits of successful 
high-risk investments to be reaped by global players, to the detriment of domestic 
investors. Just as important, at the domestic level, legitimising and 
institutionalising a strategic, future-looking attitude of the public sector encounter 
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significant barriers. There are major challenges in aligning the perceptions of 
auditing bodies over the progress and outcomes of public support, with the 
perceptions of policymakers and public officials. This, in turn, may translate into 
increased liability risks for public actors, which can discourage, instead of nurture, 
the desirable contractual solutions for the sake of promoting technological 
innovations. Another challenge that must be overcome is the possibility of policy 
discontinuities. Although there is evidence indicating that contract design 
underpinning reward-sharing in public–public partnerships is seen as a useful tool 
for mitigating this problem, building a shared vision that can lead to 
institutionalising such practices is a long-term process.  
It would not be reasonable to assume that economic policies (and especially 
innovation policies) will not involve errors. Most of these are inevitable, given the 
high-risk nature of the investments required. Precisely because of this, it is crucial 
that public institutions get to learn from failure. Likewise, since the successes will 
be rare though transformational, they deserve due recognition (the case of 
BNDES–CSEM illustrates that promoting such transformation is indeed possible). 
It remains to be seen whether the OPV solar panel technologies will mature and 
whether the emerging tech company Sunew will attain the first-mover advantages 
in the world market, the potential for which had motivated BNDES to fund it. 
Meanwhile, the equity participation owned by BNDESPAR leaves a traceable 
record. If the company succeeds, society and the bank itself will be rewarded 
appropriately. If, in addition, such rewards were to be used to replenish the funds 
that first originated the investment, and to continue to support new high-risk 
ventures, societal benefit could be maximised. 
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Chapter 4 Conclusion 
 
In this thesis I have analysed the emergence of an active role of the state as a 
risk-taker and co-investor in technological innovation. In particular, I have focused 
on policy initiatives aimed at building public–private partnerships that allow public 
actors to directly appropriate financial rewards in the event of success. I have 
examined instruments like royalties, equity stakes and conditionalities involving 
issues such as pricing, knowledge governance and reinvestment, among others. 
My main claim was that these initiatives cannot be fully understood without a 
framework that takes into account the position of public actors as market-creators 
and, hence, contract-makers and drivers of legal and institutional change (which 
I have called ‘market shaping’). I have also argued that this new approach could 
help tackle contemporary societal challenges.  
Through three chapters34 in this thesis, I have explored the following overarching 
question: How can public–private partnerships be effectively implemented and 
scaled up to address contemporary societal challenges? In this concluding 
section, I return to this question by, first, summarising the findings and 
contributions of the chapters to the argument made in the thesis and, second, 
highlighting key policy implications. I then reflect on some limitations of the thesis 
and conclude by outlining avenues for future research.  
 
                                               
34 Chapter 1 is a slightly modified version of a working paper that I published with one of my 
supervisors (Laplane & Mazzucato 2019) and that is currently under review in Research Policy; 
Chapter 2 is an extension to a paper that I presented for review to the SPRU Working Paper 
Series; Chapter 3 is the outcome of a case study that I conducted specifically for this qualification. 
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4.1 Findings and contributions 
 
In Chapter 1 a normative question was posed: How can both the risks of 
innovation and the rewards be shared between public and private actors? I 
answered this question through reviewing, discussing and analysing different 
theoretical approaches. This allowed me to identify the dominant narrative as one 
that construes the role of the state as limited to the correction of market failures 
and therefore having no reason to be rewarded beyond the natural mechanisms 
of economic growth and taxation. I also developed an alternative account. If the 
rationale for the role of the state is viewed further as co-creating and shaping 
markets, then, through active risk-taking, a public actor might be motivated to 
resort to a broader set of instruments to appropriate a share of rewards. I have 
classified these rewards into two categories: profit-sharing and conditionalities. 
Overall, the analysis in Chapter 1 drew attention to the legal dimension as one of 
the drivers of how, through experimentation and incremental changes to the 
framework conditions, the state may be able to accumulate the capabilities and 
powers to build effective and equitable partnerships geared to the solution of 
contextual problems.  
In chapters 2 and 3 I offered qualitative evidence in support of the initial 
framework published in Laplane and Mazzucato (2019); I also highlighted some 
qualifications. In Chapter 2, I presented my analysis of a comprehensive 
comparative case study of two R&D programmes in Brazil that had features of 
mission-orientation. These programmes involved advanced biofuels and health. 
I found evidence related to five dimensions of effective public–private 
partnerships, including the objectives of the programmes. These dimensions 
were: the presence of public actors seizing mapped opportunities in areas of high 
 
 
 
162 
social benefit, taking the lead, engaging in risk-sharing and institutional building, 
pursuing measures to manage the risks, and seeking to share in any rewards 
through profit-sharing and conditionalities.  
Furthermore, my analysis of the preliminary results of the programmes through 
the lens of the risk–reward nexus has led to some potentially significant findings. 
Not only were the risks taken by public and private actors linked to one another, 
but so were their potential rewards. While public risk-taking has both attracted 
and accelerated private investments, limitations in the partnerships and those 
regarding the instruments adopted for sharing the rewards became apparent. The 
latter, in particular, exposed the importance of appreciating the specific dynamics 
between the local scope of the policies and the increasingly global character of 
the economy – and these dynamics represent a potential source of disconnection 
in the risk–reward nexus. 
In Chapter 3, I deepened the analysis of the legal underpinning of public–private 
partnerships, focusing on the features of contracts that enable reward-sharing 
among the parties. In a market-failure framework, one would expect financial 
contracts embodying attributes like predictability, efficiency and security, if they 
were to fulfil their function as cost-mitigating devices. I formulated the hypothesis 
that additional features (attributes and functions) would appear in contracts 
designed by public actors who embraced an active entrepreneurial role, and 
investigated it empirically. The research question was: What attributes and 
emerging functions of contracts enable a move from a situation where the parties 
do not share any rewards, to another that facilitates the construction of a 
balanced risk–reward nexus? Based on an in-depth case study of the partnership 
between BNDES and CSEM Brazil geared to R&D in second-generation solar 
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panels, I was able to identify the attributes of flexibility and ambiguity, and new 
functions, namely, levering, legitimation and preservation. While contract design 
has been shown to be effective in building the risk–reward nexus, important 
challenges for institutionalising this type of practice were also noted. These were 
mainly related to the misalignment between the perceptions of auditing bodies 
and those of policymakers regarding what constitutes good performance in 
innovation policy.  
Taken together, the three chapters in the thesis contribute to the academic 
literature at the intersection between the fields of the developmental state, legal 
institutionalism and the entrepreneurial state and, in particular, to the discussion 
on the nexus between risks and rewards in public investments in innovation. By 
combining elements of the three theoretical approaches mentioned above, the 
analysis in the thesis (Chapter 1) shows that they can enrich one another and 
generate insights into concrete innovation policy issues. Although the relationship 
between the role of the state in economic development and technological 
innovation has been explored in previous studies, legal institutionalism can bring 
to these fields an understanding of how the law constitutes and influences the 
governance structures underpinning such transformative processes. Also 
significant is what the legal institutionalism approach can learn from the literature 
on the developmental state and the entrepreneurial state: namely, how 
institutions govern development processes and how state risk-taking capacity 
can drive economic performance, innovation and its direction. In addition, by 
exploring the connections between these three bodies of literature, the analysis 
in the thesis has enabled an understanding of how the law can structure and shift 
reward distributions between actors in the public and private sectors – and which 
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instruments could help to improve any imbalances – in favour of those states who 
opt for playing an active role in innovation policy. 
Besides illustrating two theoretical perspectives on the risk–reward nexus, which 
are linked to different rationales for the involvement of the state in innovation, and 
identifying two set of policy instruments that can help to build a direct risk–reward 
nexus, the analysis in the thesis (Chapter 1) promotes the understanding of the 
process underlying the construction of symbiotic partnerships. By situating this 
‘shaping’ process within the dynamics and tensions among state powers, within 
and across public organisations, and, between these, the private sector and 
citizens, I highlighted how the recognition of a direct risk–reward nexus can help 
to build a shared notion of the value of the role of the state as an investor. This 
value was noticeable in the analysis of concrete cases, both in the promotion of 
renewable energies (chapters 2 and 3) and access to health (Chapter 2). 
The analysis of innovation policies in the context of Brazil, where legal and 
institutional frameworks for innovation are still under construction, warranted 
additional insights into the risk–reward nexus. First, it made it possible to qualify 
the nexus both as an outcome of social and legal developments – and hence, 
contingent upon those developments – and a process marked by tensions, power 
and learning relations among all those involved (Chapter 2). Second, the analysis 
revealed the need to broaden our understanding of this problem beyond local or 
national levels, and also to consider the international dynamics, especially in light 
of an increasingly global economy dominated by powerful global players 
(chapters 2 and 3). Finally, the study of the role of the state as a contract-maker 
(in Chapter 3), allowed me to identify features of contracts geared towards 
enabling risk-taking while ensuring potential rewards are shared, and to show 
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that the attributes and features found were useful for the successful 
implementation of the entrepreneurial role of the state.  
The research summarised in the thesis also provides an empirical contribution to 
studies about the effectiveness and legitimacy of policies oriented towards market 
creation. Previous researchers have sometimes asserted a risk–reward nexus, 
but they have not investigated it empirically in concrete cases. In chapters 2 and 
3 I help to fill this gap by explicitly linking the relative balance between risks taken 
and rewards appropriated by actors in a public–private investment partnership to 
a broad-based rationale for policy. On the one hand, variables such as the 
objectives of the policy, the stage of technology development that benefited from 
public support, and the depth and breadth of public funding indicated the 
presence of an active role of the state as an investor. On the other hand, the 
features of the financial instruments themselves and their actual implementation 
allowed me to observe how public actors may seek to appropriate any rewards 
using profit-sharing or conditionalities. In Chapter 3 I contribute further to the 
study of the risk–reward nexus in public–private partnerships by using qualitative 
data on financial contracts. This has made it possible for me to uncover features 
and functions of the contracts geared towards allowing for reward-sharing which 
until now have received little attention. 
4.2 Policy implications 
  
The analysis presented in this thesis could be used to assist the design, 
implementation and assessment of explicit innovation policies oriented towards 
tackling contemporary societal challenges. I outline these broad implications 
below.  
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Policy design. My research has shown that the potential for a strategic role of 
the state as a co-investor comes with numerous challenges, but it can be 
politically and legally constructed. Accordingly, policies could be designed to 
enable the state to act as a risk-taker, and to build a clear risk–reward nexus at 
the same time. While there is no blueprint for this, the specific characteristics of 
each context in terms of the knowledge accumulated in public institutions, the 
legal framework, and characteristics of the industries and firms involved must be 
taken into account. Direct instruments through which the state could reap a share 
of financial gains – such as repayable grants, royalties, equity stakes and hybrid 
instruments (as profit-sharing), and conditionalities on pricing, knowledge 
governance and reinvestment – could be useful to that end. 
Implementation. The studies presented in the thesis offer evidence on the 
experimental nature of the process of shaping such a balanced risk–reward 
nexus. Each of the three cases analysed in chapters 2 and 3 illustrated attempts 
at implementing new financial instruments meant to allow for public investors to 
fulfil their roles as entrepreneurs and to capture a share of any arising financial 
gains. In light of these experiences, public institutions could explore various 
instruments, through trial and error, and learning, as opposed to relying on a one-
size-fits-all type of measure. This, in turn, would require the development of 
higher degrees of flexibility in terms of legal contracts and new rules to avoid 
harming supported SMEs or discouraging further investments in innovation. By 
way of example, legal frameworks could allow public actors to take risks and 
appropriate rewards (via profit-sharing and conditionalities) by providing a non-
exhaustive list of examples of instruments that could serve that purpose. 
Likewise, the implementation of these instruments should require that 
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governments build adequate governance structures. In particular, it is important 
that government structures develop in the directions that offer enhanced 
guarantees that any amounts eventually recouped by public actors will be 
reinvested towards tackling the pressing needs of the population. This guarantee 
is needed in order for entrepreneurial states to become legitimate. 
Assessment. Indeed, my research has revealed that the recognition of a direct 
risk–reward nexus could help to build a shared notion of the value of the role of 
the state as an investor. However, it also showed that the misalignment between 
the perceptions of auditing bodies and those involved in the policy implementation 
has proved to be one of the most significant challenges for the legitimation and 
scaling up of public–private partnerships. To tackle this, the authorities involved 
in the assessment of the performance of broad-based policy initiatives could 
develop more tolerance to failures – after all, these are bound to occur because 
of the risky nature of investments in innovation. At the same time, they could look 
upon those revenues that are eventually recouped as an objective measure of 
success (in addition to using other quantitative and qualitative criteria); they could 
also regard the presence of recoupment instruments as an indication of the equity 
of the partnerships. To achieve this, the interactions among the actors involved 
in the policy process must go well beyond what they are now. Overall, such a 
trust-building process could bring significant benefits in terms of setting new 
standards for failure and success of public initiatives that are better suited to 
twenty-first century innovation policies.  
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4.3 Limitations 
 
While the main insights generated on the basis of this research have been 
highlighted, some limitations to the work must be acknowledged. These are 
mostly related to the scope and focus of the research design adopted. In any 
qualitative study, researchers are faced with a difficult trade-off decision. One can 
either opt for widening the scope of the analysis, in favour of a greater degree of 
generalisation of results, or rely on a more focused design, in favour of depth and 
detail. Both carry advantages, but they also imply giving up on something, 
namely, depth on the one hand, and scope on the other. 
In considering these options in my investigation of the risk–reward nexus – an 
understudied issue, about which there was scant theoretical or empirical work – 
I gave priority to focus and depth. This means, however, that I limited myself to 
covering a relatively small number of cases (and their corresponding 
programmes, actors and policy instruments), all of which were bounded within 
the context of a single country. Nevertheless, in light of the evidence here 
produced, it is possible to assume that studies that cover a more extensive range 
of cases and contexts could contribute to an increased analytical generalisation.  
4.4 Additional reflections on the Brazilian experience 
 
As explained in the Introduction to the thesis and in Section 2.4, Brazil was far 
from having anything akin to a developmental/entrepreneurial state, neither 
before nor after the sudden liberalisation of markets in the 1990s. The cases 
examined in my research (chapters 2 and 3) are nonetheless interesting precisely 
because they constitute clear departures from the status quo where neither the 
private nor the public sectors took the risks of investing in innovation. While they 
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portray unusual manifestations of the role of the state in supporting innovation in 
the wider context of Brazil, these experiences serve to illustrate a potential 
direction for policy learning.  
The historical evidence on all successful experiences of economic transformation 
shows that they have only been possible where, through sustained efforts, the 
state has mastered how to design and implement industrial and innovation 
policies effectively (see Johnson (1982), Amsden (1989), Wade (1990), Andreoni 
(2016)). In the United States, for example, the successful development of 
complex systems of innovation in areas such as defence and health took decades 
to be accomplished.  
Currently, Brazil has no such policies in place, and only ad hoc efforts have been 
made so far. However, the experiences of the federal funding programmes and 
partnerships investigated in the thesis could offer a foundation upon which to 
build future strategies. In my empirical analysis I have highlighted the challenges 
that need to be overcome when the government decides to go down this path; I 
have done so by documenting key issues that policymakers faced in the political, 
financial, legal and institutional spheres, and by pointing out some of the 
limitations of the solutions devised. These challenges, albeit substantial, should 
not be seen as justification for the government’s inertia; rather, they suggest the 
need for a more systematic process of policy learning. In this sense, part of the 
value of my empirical case studies lies in showing what and how much remains 
to be learned in Brazil in order to develop the conditions for the state to play a 
more entrepreneurial role. 
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4.5 Future research 
 
To continue to develop the line of inquiry pursued in this study, I anticipate at 
least three interesting avenues for future research: (i) mapping profit-sharing and 
conditionalities; (ii) exploring the relationship between changes in contract design 
for public financing of innovation and financial innovations; and (iii) examining the 
crucial role of political coalitions and power relations behind developmental 
strategies. 
My research has led me to identify some of the policy instruments that could help 
to build a clear risk–reward nexus in public–private investment partnerships. 
However, more systematic efforts are needed to map existing policy instruments 
that perform the functions of profit-sharing and conditionalities in different 
countries, and to study their effects (both those that are intended and 
unintended). In this thesis I have also exposed important concerns raised by 
policymakers about the possibility of the rewards achieved by local partnerships 
being extracted by foreign actors – an aspect that also needs to be taken into 
account in the mapping exercises here proposed. Future research could explore 
the range of policy instruments and institutional arrangements devised to respond 
to this problem so as to derive relevant lessons.  
Another issue that deserves attention is that my empirical analysis of the 
contracts underpinning public–private partnerships implied similarities between 
these legal instruments and those used in the financial sector. That is partly 
because, in the discussion, I drew on insights from the legal scholarship on 
finance and corporate governance (e.g. Triantis (2001); Gilson et al. (2009, 
2010); Pistor (2013); Hockett and Omarova (2014)). The finding of features such 
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as flexibility and ambiguity in particular, suggests the possibility that there might 
be more similarities between the contractual solutions sought to deal with 
uncertainty in the field of technological innovation, and those aimed at mitigating 
the problems of instability and high volatility in the financial markets. Future 
research could explore further the relationship between the two and seek to 
establish the link with earlier empirical studies of financial innovations (Frame & 
White 2004; Lerner & Tufano 2011), with an emphasis on the risk–reward nexus. 
Last, but not least, while my empirical analysis covered a period in Brazilian 
contemporary history (2003–2016) in which the federal government stated its 
commitment with a developmental agenda, in hindsight it seems clear that the 
political coalitions needed to carry out this agenda were not strong enough. 
President Dilma Roussef was ousted in 2016 and since then the space for state 
action in the economy has reduced. Nonetheless, the cases that I have analysed, 
although exceptional in this broader context, show that there are circumstances 
in which the political construction of public–private collaborations to serve a 
common purpose may bear fruit. Future research could explore further the role 
of political coalitions and power relations in market creation and development 
strategies and seek to understand the relationship between the conflict resolution 
function of the state and its entrepreneurial role – and indeed this is an area that 
Andreoni and Chang (2019) have begun to investigate.      
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Appendix 
Interview codes  
 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
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PublMa
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Interview guide 
 
Chapters 2 and 3 have drawn upon semi-structured interviews as primary data 
sources. This means that instead of following a strict set of questions, the 
interviews were conducted within a framework of topics and thus were open-
ended. This method is particularly suitable for eliciting ideas on fairly new topics. 
Given the aim within this thesis has been to explore the meanings of, and 
practices regarding, the risk–reward nexus in public–private partnerships, the 
interview guide covered four main topics, all of which contained a mix of potential 
questions aimed at understanding the context and subject matter or allowing for 
triangulation. The greater flexibility in semi-structured as compared to structured 
interviews is an asset for researchers, who can then select and tailor the 
questions according to the context of the interview (e.g. different organisations) 
and specific people being interviewed. Therefore, the topics below are indicative 
only.       
1. The role of the state: public investments in innovation  
1.1 Within the context of your organisation (or specific programme or specific 
partnership) please describe the investments that your institution makes in 
innovation, in terms of: 
1.1.1 The time frame (long term/short term). 
1.1.2 The area of the innovation chain (basic research, applied research, 
development, commercialisation). 
1.1.3 Instruments of support.  
1.1.4 What areas, sectors or activities (if any) have been prioritised, and why?   
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1.1.5 How would you characterise the higher risks taken by your organisation in 
investing in innovation?  
1.1.6 What criteria have been adopted for selecting R&D projects and/or firms 
for support? 
1.1.7 How do you know whether the R&D project or firm could not have been 
funded elsewhere? 
2. Returns on public investments 
2.1 How are ‘failure’ and ‘success’ defined in the context of your organisation’s 
activity in innovation? Have you noticed any changes over time? 
2.2 How does your organisation expect to obtain a return of a successful 
investment? 
2.2.1 Prompt: via spillover effects only or also through instruments such as 
equities, royalties, share of intellectual property, price-capping schemes, 
commitment from firms to reinvest in innovation, performance targets, etc. 
2.3 Any measures taken to ensure that these returns are captured to the benefit 
of the country? (For example, local or regional content requirements, capital 
control over supported firm, requirement that any arising patent be first filed 
in the country, etc.) 
2.4 In case of financial returns being shared between public and private actors: 
2.4.1 Why has the state sought this kind of arrangement, rather than relying on 
more indirect measures of social returns? (For example, spillovers and 
revenues from taxation.) 
2.4.2 How does it work? 
2.4.3 Any obstacles to implementing it? If so, which ones? 
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2.4.4 If the public funding organisation receives a direct share of monetary 
returns: 
2.4.5 Does this represent a substantive source of revenue?  
2.4.6 Does the state resort to any auditing mechanism to check on the accuracy 
of the earnings stated by the companies? 
2.4.7 How are the resources obtained through this source used? 
2.5 In your opinion, which of the following describes the interactions, and the 
distribution of returns from innovation, between your organisation and private 
actors, and why? 
2.5.1 Public and private agents benefit from the actions of one another, sharing 
risks and rewards of the research, development and innovation process. 
2.5.2 Some agents benefit more than others, and risks and rewards are 
unevenly distributed. 
2.5.3 Public and private agents are incapable of cooperating. 
3. Legal aspects of public–private partnerships for innovation: 
contracts, rewards and legal framework  
3.1 What type(s) of contract(s) underpin the relationship between your 
organisation and supported firms (e.g. credit, shareholder agreement, 
cooperation or others)? 
3.2 Were any amendments made in contract design or enforcement in order to 
implement public–private partnerships for innovation? Which ones, and why?  
3.3 How flexible is the contract, in light of the inherent uncertainties or any 
supervening circumstances that may emerge from the innovation 
process/innovative firm receiving support? Please give examples.  
3.4 How are these contracts monitored and evaluated?  
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3.5 Regarding the choice of the instrument through which the organisation 
appropriates a share of the rewards:  
3.5.1 Have any other designs been attempted and dropped?  
3.5.2 Have you found any obstacles imposed by legislation to implement the 
instruments selected? Please give examples. 
3.6 What are the main legal obstacles to your organisation investing in 
innovation? Have they changed over the past ten years? 
3.6.1 Are these specific to your organisation or shared by others?  
3.6.2 How important are the legal obstacles as compared to those of another 
nature such as skills, resources, etc.?  
3.7 How could the legal framework be improved to engender more effective 
public–private partnerships for innovation? (‘Effectivity’ might be considered 
in terms of attracting more private investments, generating more innovations, 
and increasing the quality of societal benefits.) 
4. State capacities for engaging in strategic partnerships with the private 
sector, promoting innovation and enhancing its social returns 
4.1 What capacities are key for public organisations to achieve effective 
partnerships with the business sector? (For example, legal, monitoring, 
measuring, evaluation, coordination, others)? 
4.2 What are the strengths and weaknesses of your organisation in contracting 
with business? 
5. Follow-up 
5.1 Would you be happy to answer follow-up questions by email? 
 
 
 
